Future's Back
Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War
1st Edition
Published on 10. September 1994
208 pages
978-0-7735-6656-9 (ISBN)
Description
Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.
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Frank P. Harvey
The Future's Back
Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War
Book
09/1994
McGill-Queen's University Press
€160.70
Article exhausted; check different version
Person
Poli Sci, Dalhousie
Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions
- 2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing
- 3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing
- 4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88
- 5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence
- 6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War
- 7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- V
- W
- Y
- Z
