Federalist Papers
1st Edition
Published on 9. October 2008
521 pages
978-0-19-153959-6 (ISBN)
Description
'A nation without a national government is an awful spectacle.' In the winter of 1787-8 a series of eighty-five essays appeared in the New York press, the purpose of the essays was to persuade the citizens of New York State to ratify the Constitution of the United States. The three authors - Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay - were respectively the first Secretary of the Treasury, the fourth President, and the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in American history. Each had played a crucial role in the events of the American Revolution, together they were convinced of the need to weld thirteen disparate and newly-independent states into a union. Their essays make the case for a new and united nation, governed under a written Constitution that endures to this day. The Federalist Papers are an indispensable guide to the intentions of the founding fathers who created the United States, and a canonical text in the development of western political thought. This new edition pays full attention to the classical learning of their authors and the historical examples they deploy. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.
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Alexander Hamilton | James Madison | John Jay
The Federalist Papers
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10/2008
Oxford University Press
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Introduction
- Note on the Text
- Synopsis of The Federalist Papers
- Select Bibliography
- A Chronology of Events 1763 - 1791
- Map of the United States c.1789
- THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Concerning dangers from foreign force and influence
- 3. The same subject continued
- 4. The same subject continued
- 5. The same subject continued
- 6. Concerning dangers from war between the States
- 7. The subject continued and particular causes enumerated
- 8. The effects of internal war in producing standing armies and other institutions unfriendly to liberty
- 9. The utility of the Union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection
- 10. The same subject continued
- 11. The utility of the Union in respect to commerce and a navy
- 12. The utility of the Union in respect to revenue
- 13. The same subject continued with a view to economy
- 14. An objection drawn from the extent of country answered
- 15. Concerning the defects of the present Confederation in relation to the principle of legislation for the States in their collective capacities
- 16. The same subject continued in relation to the same principle
- 17. The subject continued and illustrated by examples to show the tendency of federal governments rather to anarchy among the members than tyranny in the head
- 18. The subject continued with farther examples
- 19. The subject continued with farther examples
- 20. The subject continued with farther examples
- 21. Further defects of the present Constitution
- 22. The same subject continued and concluded
- 23. The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed
- 24. The subject continued with an answer to an objection concerning standing armies
- 25. The subject continued with the same view
- 26. The subject continued with the same view
- 27. The subject continued with the same view
- 28. The same subject concluded
- 29. Concerning the militia
- 30. Concerning taxation
- 31. The same subject continued
- 32. The same subject continued
- 33. The same subject continued
- 34. The same subject continued
- 35. The same subject continued
- 36. The same subject continued
- 37. Concerning the dificulties which the Convention must have experienced in the formation of a proper plan
- 38. The subject continued and the incoherence of the objections to the plan exposed
- 39. The conformity of the plan to republican principles: an objection in respect to the powers of the Convention examined
- 40. The same objection further examined
- 41. General view of the powers proposed to be vested in the Union
- 42. The same view continued
- 43. The same view continued
- 44. The same view continued and concluded
- 45. A further discussion of the supposed danger from the powers of the Union to the State governments
- 46. The subject of the last paper resumed with an examination of the comparative means of influence of the federal and State governments
- 47. The meaning of the maxim, which requires a separation of the departments of power, examined and ascertained
- 48. The same subject continued with a view to the means of giving efficacy in practice to that maxim
- 49. The same subject continued with the same view
- 50. The same subject continued with the same view
- 51. The same subject continued with the same view and concluded
- 52. Concerning the House of Representatives, with a view to the qualifications of the electors and elected, and the time of service of the members
- 53. The same subject continued with a view of the term of the service of the members
- 54. The same subject continued with a view to the ratio of representation
- 55. The same subject continued in relation to the total number of the body
- 56. The same subject continued in relation to the same point
- 57. The same subject continued in relation to the supposed tendency of the plan of the Convention to elevate the few above he many
- 58. The same subject continued in relation to the future augmentation of the members
- 59. Concerning the regulation of elections
- 60. The same subject continued
- 61. The same subject continued and concluded
- 62. Concerning the constitution of the Senate with regard to the qualifications of the members, the manner of appointing them, the quality of representation, the number of the senators and the duration of their appointments
- 63. A further view of the constitution of the Senate in regard to the duration of appointment of its members
- 64. A further view of the constitution of the Senate in regard to the power of making treaties
- 65. A further view of the constitution of the Senate in relation to its capacity as a court for the trial of impeachments
- 66. The same subject continued
- 67. Concerning the constitution of the President: a gross attempt to misrepresent this part of the plan detected
- 68. The view of the constitution of the President continued in relation to the mode of appointment
- 69. The same view continued, with a comparison between the President and the King of Great Britain on the one hand, and the governor of New York on the other
- 70. The same view continued in relation to the unity of the executive, with an examination of the project of an executive council
- 71. The same view continued in regard to the duration of the office
- 72. The same view continued in regard to the re-eligibility of the President
- 73. The same view continued in relation to the provision concerning support and the power of the negative
- 74. The same view continued in relation to the command of the national forces and the power of pardoning
- 75. The same view continued in relation to the power of making treaties
- 76. The same view continued in relation to the appointment of the officers of the government
- 77. The view of the constitution of the President concluded, with a further consideration of the power of appointment, and a concise examination of his remaining powers
- 78. A view of the constitution of the judicial department in relation to the tenure of good behaviour
- 79. A further view of the judicial department in relation to the provisions for the support and responsibility of the judges
- 80. A further view of the judicial department in relation to the extent of its powers
- 81. A further view of the judicial department in relation to the distribution of its authority
- 82. A further view of the judicial department in reference to some miscellaneous questions
- 83. A further view of the judicial department in relation to the trial by jury
- 84. Concerning several miscellaneous objections
- 85. Conclusion
- Appendix: The Constitution of the United States (1787 and 1791)
- Explanatory Notes
- Thematic Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
