
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2015
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- CHES 2015
- Workshop on Cryptographic Hardwareand Embedded Systems 2015
- Contents
- Processing Techniques in Side-Channel Analysis
- Robust Profiling for DPA-Style Attacks
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Motivation
- 1.2 Machine Learning for Profiling
- 1.3 Unsupervised Clustering in Conjunction with Partition-Based DPA
- 1.4 Our Contributions
- 1.5 Outline
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Differential Power Analysis
- 2.2 Unsupervised Clustering
- 2.3 Principal Component Analysis
- 3 Methodology
- 3.1 Our General Profiling Strategy
- 3.2 Model Building and Distinguishers
- 3.3 Experimentally Verifying `Robustness'
- 4 Experimental Results
- 4.1 `Straightforward' (Software) Scenario
- 4.2 `Problematic' (Hardware) Scenario
- 4.3 Discrepancy in Window Width and Location
- 4.4 Discrepancy in Measurement Resolution
- 4.5 Discrepancy in Measurement Error
- 4.6 Discrepancy in Trace Pre-processing
- 4.7 Non-fixed Sampling Frequency
- 5 Summary
- References
- Less is More
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Theoretical Solution in the Presence of Gaussian Noise
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 Model
- 2.3 Optimal Attack
- 2.4 Optimal Dimensionality Reduction
- 2.5 Discussion
- 3 Examples
- 3.1 White Noise
- 3.2 Correlated Autoregressive Noise
- 4 Comparison with PCA and LDA
- 4.1 Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
- 4.2 Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)
- 4.3 Numerical Comparison Between Asymptotic PCA and LDA
- 5 Practical Validation
- 5.1 Precharacterization of the Model Parameters D and
- 5.2 Computation of SNRs on the AES Traces from DPA Contest v2 Last Round
- 6 Conclusions and Perspectives
- References
- Blind Source Separation from Single Measurements Using Singular Spectrum Analysis
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Attacks
- 2.2 Evaluation Metrics
- 3 Singular Spectrum Analysis
- 3.1 Decomposition
- 3.2 Reconstruction
- 4 Practical Experiments
- 4.1 Measurement Setup
- 4.2 Unprotected and Masked AES in an Atmel Microcontroller
- 4.3 Unprotected PRESENT in a Xilinx FPGA
- 5 Conclusions
- A Univariate Attacks
- References
- Cryptographic Hardware Implementations
- Highly Efficient GF(28) Inversion Circuit Based on Redundant GF Arithmetic and Its Application to AES Design
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries and Related Works
- 2.1 Inversion Circuits by Tower Fields
- 2.2 Redundant Representations for Galois Fields
- 3 Proposed GF(28) Inversion Circuit
- 4 Performance Evaluation
- 5 Application to AES S-Box
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- NaCl's Crypto_box in Hardware
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries -- The Crypto_box Function
- 3 A Crypto_box Specific Instruction-Set Processor
- 3.1 Hardware Implementation Overview
- 3.2 The Controller
- 3.3 The Arithmetic Logic Unit
- 4 Machine-Code Implementations
- 4.1 The X25519 Key Exchange
- 4.2 A Streaming API for Crypto_box
- 5 Implementation Results
- References
- Lightweight Coprocessor for Koblitz Curves: 283-Bit ECC Including Scalar Conversion with only 4300 Gates
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Koblitz Curve Scalar Conversion
- 3.1 Scalar Reduction
- 3.2 Computation of -adic Representation
- 4 Point Multiplication
- 5 Architecture
- 6 Results and Comparisons
- 7 Conclusions
- A Implementation of Operations Used by Algorithm 5
- B Estimates for B-163 and K-163
- References
- Single Base Modular Multiplication for Efficient Hardware RNS Implementations of ECC
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Notations and Definitions
- 3 State of Art
- 3.1 Base Extension
- 3.2 RNS Montgomery Modular Multiplication
- 4 Proposed RNS Modular Multiplication Algorithm
- 4.1 Decomposition of the Operands
- 4.2 Proposed RNS Modular Multiplication SBMM
- 4.3 Selecting P=Ma2-2 for RNS Efficient Implementations
- 4.4 Controlling the Size of SBMM Outputs
- 5 Theoretical Cost Analysis
- 6 Hardware Implementation
- 6.1 Proposed Architecture
- 6.2 Implementation Results on Various FPGAs
- 7 Examples of ECC Computations
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Homomorphic Encryption in Hardware
- Accelerating Homomorphic Evaluation on Reconfigurable Hardware
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Somewhat Homomorphic Scheme YASHE
- 2.2 Number Theoretic Transform
- 2.3 Cached-FFT
- 2.4 Catapult Architecture/Target Hardware
- 3 High Level Description
- 4 Hardware Architecture
- 4.1 Implementation of the Cached-NTT and Memory Addressing
- 4.2 Computation of the C-NTT on the Cache
- 5 Configuration of Our Core for YASHE
- 5.1 Implementation of RMult
- 5.2 Implementation of KeySwitch
- 6 Results and Comparison
- 6.1 Resource Consumption and Performance
- 6.2 Comparison with Previous Work
- 7 Future Work
- References
- Modular Hardware Architecture for Somewhat Homomorphic Function Evaluation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 System Setup
- 2.1 Modular Polynomial Rings
- 2.2 YASHE
- 3 High Level Optimizations
- 4 Architecture
- 4.1 Polynomial Arithmetic Unit
- 4.2 CRT Unit
- 4.3 Division and Rounding Unit
- 5 Results
- 6 Conclusions and Future Work
- References
- Accelerating LTV Based Homomorphic Encryption in Reconfigurable Hardware
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 LTV-Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- 2.2 Arithmetic Operations
- 3 Architecture Overview
- 3.1 Software/Hardware Interface
- 3.2 PCIe Interface
- 3.3 Arithmetic Core Units
- 4 215215 Polynomial Multiplier
- 4.1 NTT Operation
- 4.2 Inner Multiplication
- 4.3 Inverse NTT
- 4.4 Final Scaling
- 5 Implementation Results
- 6 Comparison
- 7 Conclusions
- References
- Side-Channel Attacks on Public Key Cryptography
- Stealing Keys from PCs Using a Radio: Cheap Electromagnetic Attacks on Windowed Exponentiation
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Our Contribution
- 1.3 Vulnerable Software and Hardware
- 1.4 Related Work
- 2 Cryptanalysis
- 2.1 GnuPG's Sliding-Window Exponentiation Routine
- 2.2 ElGamal Attack Algorithm
- 2.3 RSA Attack Algorithm
- 3 Experimental Results
- 3.1 SDR Experimental Setup
- 3.2 Signal Analysis
- 3.3 ElGamal Key Extraction
- 3.4 RSA Key Extraction
- 3.5 Untethered SDR Attack
- 3.6 Consumer-Radio Attack
- 4 Discussion
- References
- Exclusive Exponent Blinding May Not Suffice to Prevent Timing Attacks on RSA
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Modular Exponentiation with Montgomery's Multiplication Algorithm
- 3 Theoretical Background of Our Attack
- 3.1 Exponentiation (modpi)
- 3.2 Further Arithmetic Operations and Noise
- 3.3 The Distinguisher
- 4 The Attack
- 4.1 The Attack Algorithm
- 4.2 Experimental Results
- 4.3 Table-Based Exponentiation Algorithms
- 4.4 Countermeasures
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Who Watches the Watchmen?: Utilizing Performance Monitors for Compromising Keys of RSA on Intel Platforms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Exponentiation Algorithms and Underlying Multiplication Primitive
- 2.2 RSA-OAEP Randomized Padding Scheme
- 2.3 Dynamic Branch Predictor
- 3 Modelling Branch Miss as Side-Channel from HPC
- 3.1 Using Event Branch-Misses as Side-Channel
- 3.2 Strong Correlation Between Two-Bit Predictor and System Branch Predictor
- 4 Attack Algorithm Featuring Performance Counters Monitoring Branch Misses
- 4.1 Threat Model for the Attack
- 4.2 Offline Phase
- 4.3 Online Phase
- 5 Formally Modelling the Success
- 6 Experimental Validation for the Online Phase of the Attack
- 6.1 Experiments on Square and Multiply and Montgomery Ladder Algorithm
- 6.2 Comparing Timing as Side-Channel to Branch Misses from HPC
- 6.3 Variation of Parameters Such as Number of Inputs (L) and Iteration (I)
- 6.4 Revealing Secret Exponent in RSA-OAEP Randomized Padding Procedure
- 7 Discussions
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Cipher Design and Cryptanalysis
- Improved Cryptanalysis of the DECT Standard Cipher
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The DECT Standard Cipher
- 2.1 The DSC Internal Configuration
- 2.2 The Output Combiner
- 2.3 Notations Used in the Rest of the Paper
- 3 The Nohl-Tews-Weinmann Attack
- 3.1 Guessing Correctly a Status
- 3.2 Determination of More Equations
- 3.3 Results of the Nohl-Tews-Weinmann Attack
- 4 A Theoretical Model of an Improved Cryptanalysis
- 4.1 Computation of the Weights
- 4.2 Determination of the Best Candidates
- 4.3 Exhaustive Search Among the Remaining Bits
- 5 Improved Implementation of the Cryptanalysis
- 5.1 Efficiency Consideration
- 5.2 A Time-Accuracy Trade-Off
- 5.3 Selection of the Relevant Equations
- 6 Experimental Results of Our Attack
- 6.1 Results Based on Simulated Data
- 6.2 Results Based on Real Data
- 6.3 Partially-Known Plaintext Attack
- 7 Conclusions and Future Developments
- References
- Practical Key Recovery for Discrete-Logarithm Based Authentication Schemes from Random Nonce Bits
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Erasure Correction Scenario
- 3.1 The Attack Knowing Two Signatures
- 3.2 The Attack Knowing t Signatures
- 3.3 Experimental Results
- 4 Error Correction Scenario
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- The Simeck Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Design Specifications and Rationales
- 2.1 Specifications of Simeck
- 2.2 Design Rationales
- 3 Hardware Implementations
- 3.1 Metrics and Design Flow
- 3.2 Two Different Hardware Architectures for Simeck
- 3.3 Hardware Evaluations of Simeck
- 4 Result Comparisons Between Simeck and SIMON
- 5 Security Analysis
- 6 Concluding Remarks
- References
- TriviA: A Fast and Secure Authenticated Encryption Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Authenticated Encryption and Its Security Definitions
- 2.2 Examples of Universal Hash Functions
- 3 EHC Hash
- 3.1 ECCode
- 3.2 EHC Hash
- 3.3 Discussions
- 4 TriviA Authenticated Encryption
- 4.1 Specification of TriviA
- 4.2 Discussions
- 5 Security Analysis
- 5.1 Security Against Known Attacks
- 5.2 Privacy of TriviA
- 5.3 Authenticity of TriviA
- 6 Hardware Implementation of TriviA-Ck
- 6.1 Cycles per Byte (cpb) Analysis
- 6.2 Hardware Architectures
- 6.3 Performance Results and Comparison
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- True Random Number Generators and Entropy Estimations
- A Physical Approach for Stochastic Modeling of TERO-Based TRNG
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The TERO Based RNG -- Background
- 3 Physical and Stochastic Model of TERO
- 3.1 Modeling the Number of Temporary Oscillations
- 3.2 Experimental Validation of the TERO Stochastic Model
- 4 Stochastic Model of the Complete TERO-Based TRNG
- 5 Discussion
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Predictive Models for Min-entropy Estimation
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Entropy and Predictability
- 1.2 Our Contributions
- 1.3 Guide to the Rest of the Paper
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Entropy Estimation Using Predictors
- 3.1 Predictor Performance and Entropy Bounds
- 3.2 Global Predictability
- 3.3 Local Predictability
- 3.4 Deriving a Final Estimate
- 3.5 Underestimates and Overestimates
- 4 A Concrete Set of Predictors for Entropy Estimation
- 4.1 Ensemble Predictors
- 4.2 Categorical Data Predictors
- 4.3 Numerical Predictors
- 5 Results
- 5.1 NIST Entropy Estimation Suite
- 5.2 Simulated Data
- 5.3 Real-World Data
- 5.4 General Discussion
- 6 Conclusions
- 6.1 Future Work
- References
- Side-Channel Analysis and Fault Injection Attacks
- Improved Side-Channel Analysis of Finite-Field Multiplication
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Galois Field Multiplication
- 2.2 Probabilities
- 2.3 Leakage Model
- 2.4 Learning Parities with Noise
- 2.5 The BKW Algorithm and Its Variants
- 3 Our New Attack
- 3.1 Overview
- 3.2 Filtering
- 3.3 Solving the LPN Problem
- 3.4 Comparison with State-of-the Art Attacks
- 4 Extension to Chosen Inputs
- 4.1 Comparing Leaks
- 4.2 Key Recovery
- 5 Adaptation to Fresh Re-Keying
- 6 Practical Experiments
- 6.1 ATMega328p Leakage Behaviour
- 6.2 Attacks on AES-GCM with Known Inputs
- 6.3 Attack on Fresh Re-Keying
- References
- Evaluation and Improvement of Generic-Emulating DPA Attacks
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Differential Power Analysis
- 2.2 Generic DPA and its limitations
- 2.3 From LR-based DPA to Generic-Emulating DPA
- 3 Alternative Generic-Emulating Distinguishers
- 3.1 Ridge-Based Distinguisher
- 3.2 Lasso-Based Distinguisher
- 4 Generic-Emulating DPAs with Cross-Validation
- 5 Experimental Results
- 5.1 Simulation-Based Experiments
- 5.2 Experiments on Smart Cards
- 6 Conclusion
- A Least Angle Regression
- References
- Transient-Steady Effect Attack on Block Ciphers
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 AES S-box and Masking
- 2.2 Fault-Based Clockwise Collision Analysis
- 3 Transient-Steady Effect Attack
- 3.1 Basic Idea
- 3.2 Attack Scenario on Unmasked S-box
- 3.3 Attack Scenario on Masked S-box
- 4 Experiments and Efficiency
- 4.1 Experiment on Unmasked S-box A
- 4.2 Experiment on Unmasked S-box B
- 4.3 Experiment on Masked S-box C
- 4.4 Efficiency Comparison
- 5 Further Discussion
- 5.1 Key Recovery for Parallel AES Implementation
- 5.2 Attack Scenario for WDDL-AES
- 5.3 Glitch Injection
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Higher-Order Side-Channel Attacks
- Assessment of Hiding the Higher-Order Leakages in Hardware
- 1 Introduction
- 2 GliFreD
- 3 Case Studies
- 3.1 Threshold Implementation
- 3.2 KATAN-32
- 3.3 PRESENT
- 3.4 Implementation
- 4 Empirical Results
- References
- Multi-variate High-Order Attacks of Shuffled Tables Recomputation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminary and Notations
- 3 Masking Scheme with Table Recomputation
- 3.1 Algorithm
- 3.2 Classical Attacks
- 3.3 Classical Countermeasure
- 4 Totally Random Permutation and Attack
- 4.1 Defeating the Countermeasure
- 4.2 Multivariate Attacks Against Table Recomputation
- 4.3 Leakage Analysis
- 4.4 Simulation Results
- 5 An Example on High-Order Countermeasure
- 5.1 Coron Masking Scheme Attack and Countermeasure
- 5.2 Attack on the Countermeasure
- 5.3 Leakage Analysis
- 5.4 Simulation Results on Coron Masking Scheme
- 6 A Note on Affine Model
- 6.1 Properties of the affine model
- 6.2 Theoretical Analysis
- 6.3 Simulation Results
- 7 Practical Validation
- 8 Conclusions and Perspectives
- References
- Leakage Assessment Methodology
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Statistical Background
- 3 Methodology
- 4 Efficient Computation
- 4.1 Incremental One-Pass Computation of All Moments
- 4.2 Variance of Preprocessed Traces
- 4.3 Parallel Computation
- 5 Multivariate
- 6 Case Studies
- 6.1 Framework
- 7 Conclusions
- References
- Physically Unclonable Functions and Hardware Trojans
- Secure Key Generation from Biased PUFs
- 1 Introduction
- 2 PUF-based Key Generation and Bias
- 2.1 General Construction
- 2.2 Entropy Leakage
- 2.3 Entropy Leakage Due to PUF Bias
- 2.4 Effect of PUF Bias on a PUF-based Key Generator
- 3 Debiasing Solutions
- 3.1 Basic Concept
- 3.2 CVN: Classic von Neumann (VN) Debiasing
- 3.3 Pair-Output (2O-VN) and Multi-Pass Tuple-Output VN Debiasing (MP-TO-VN)
- 3.4 -2O-VN: Pair-Output VN Debiasing with Erasures
- 4 Objective Comparison of Debiasing Solutions
- 4.1 Relation Between PUF Bias and Bit Error Rate
- 4.2 Comparison of Debiasing Solutions
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- The Gap Between Promise and Reality: On the Insecurity of XOR Arbiter PUFs
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 1.2 Contribution and Organization
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Arbiter PUF
- 2.2 Evolution Strategies
- 3 The PUF-based RFID Tags
- 4 Attacking the PUF Tags
- 4.1 Machine Learning Attack
- 4.2 Cloning a PUF Tag
- 5 Reliability-Based Machine Learning Attacks
- 5.1 CMA-ES Attack Based on Reliability
- 5.2 Attacking XOR PUFs
- 6 Discussion
- References
- End-To-End Design of a PUF-Based Privacy Preserving Authentication Protocol
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Secure and Private PUF-Based Authentication Protocol
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 Parties and Trust Model
- 2.3 Secure and Privacy-Preserving Authentication Protocol
- 3 Instantiation of Protocol Components
- 3.1 Architecture Assumptions
- 3.2 Design of SRAM PUF
- 3.3 Design of SRAM TRNG
- 3.4 Symmetric Key Encryption and PRF
- 3.5 Design of Fuzzy Extractor
- 3.6 Relevant Data Sizes and Key Lengths in Protocol
- 4 Architecture Design
- 4.1 System Design
- 4.2 Hardware Engine
- 5 Evaluation
- 5.1 Implementation Cost
- 5.2 Performance
- 5.3 Related Work
- 5.4 Benchmark Analysis
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Improved Test Pattern Generation for Hardware Trojan Detection Using Genetic Algorithm and Boolean Satisfiability
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Main Idea and Our Contribution
- 2 GA and SAT in the Context of ATPG for Trojan Detection
- 2.1 Hardware Trojan Models
- 2.2 Genetic Algorithm (GA) for ATPG
- 2.3 SAT for Hard--to--Activate Trigger Conditions
- 3 Improving the Proposed Scheme: Payload Aware Test Set Selection and Test Compaction
- 3.1 Payload Aware Test Vector Selection
- 3.2 Evaluation of Effectiveness
- 4 Experimental Results and Discussion
- 4.1 Experimental Setup
- 4.2 Test Set Evaluation Results
- 4.3 Application to Trojan Diagnosis
- 4.4 Application to Side Channel Analysis Based Trojan Detection
- 5 Conclusions
- References
- Side-Channel Attacks in Practice
- DPA, Bitslicing and Masking at 1 GHz
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 1.2 Contributions
- 2 A Bitsliced AES Implementation
- 3 Developing an Attack
- 3.1 Strategies for Side-Channel Measurements
- 3.2 Experimental Setup
- 3.3 Approach
- 3.4 Attack
- 4 Masking a Bitsliced AES Implementation
- 5 Evaluation of Masked Implementation
- 5.1 Attack When RNG is Off
- 5.2 Attack When RNG is On
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- SoC It to EM: ElectroMagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on a Complex System-on-Chip
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 An Overview of the BeagleBone Platform
- 2.2 Experimental Environment
- 2.3 Leakage Detection and Exploitation Strategy
- 3 Software-Based AES
- 3.1 Experimental Outline
- 3.2 Analysis and Discussion
- 4 Hardware-Based AES
- 4.1 Experimental Outline
- 4.2 Analysis and Discussion
- 5 NEON
- 5.1 Instruction-Level Characterisation
- 5.2 A Concrete Attack on AES
- 5.3 A Theoretical Attack on NORX
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Finding the AES Bits in the Haystack: Reverse Engineering and SCA Using Voltage Contrast
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work
- 3 Voltage Contrast
- 3.1 Static Voltage Contrast
- 3.2 Dynamic Voltage Contrast
- 4 Voltage Contrast Analysis
- 5 Voltage Contrast Side Channel Analysis (VCSCA)
- 5.1 Obtaining Voltage Contrast Traces
- 5.2 Locating AES Bit Wires in a VCSCA
- 5.3 Extracting Additional Netlist Information
- 5.4 Template Attack with VCSCA
- 5.5 Simple VCSCA
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Lattice-Based Implementations
- Efficient Ring-LWE Encryption on 8-Bit AVR Processors
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Research Contributions
- 1.2 Paper Outline
- 2 Background
- 2.1 The Ring-LWE Encryption Scheme
- 2.2 Key Generation, Encryption, and Decryption
- 2.3 Number Theoretic Transform
- 2.4 Gaussian Sampler
- 2.5 Parameter Selection
- 3 Optimization Techniques for NTT Computation
- 3.1 Look-Up Table for Twiddle Factors
- 3.2 Algorithmic Optimizations
- 3.3 Fast Coefficient Multiplication
- 3.4 Fast Reduction of Coefficient-Products
- 3.5 Minimizing the Number of Reduction Operations
- 3.6 Reducing the RAM Consumption
- 4 Optimization of the Knuth-Yao Sampler
- 4.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generation Using AES Accelerator
- 5 Performance Evaluation and Comparison
- 5.1 Experimental Platform
- 5.2 Experimental Results
- 5.3 Comparison with Related Work
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- A Masked Ring-LWE Implementation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 High-Level Overview
- 4 Masked Decoder
- 4.1 Rules
- 4.2 Masked Table Lookup
- 5 Implementation Results
- 5.1 Area
- 5.2 Cycle Count
- 5.3 Comparison with an Elliptic-Curve Cryptosystem
- 5.4 Trade-offs
- 5.5 Maximum Frequency
- 6 Discussion
- 6.1 Error Rates
- 6.2 Comparison with Other Decoding Strategies
- 6.3 Post-Processing
- 6.4 Extension to Higher-Order Security
- 7 Evaluation
- 7.1 PRNG Off
- 7.2 PRNG On
- 7.3 Second-Order Attacks
- 7.4 Horizontal DPA Attacks
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Author Index
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