Individuality and Entanglement
The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life
1st Edition
Published on 11. January 2017
384 pages
978-1-4008-8316-5 (ISBN)
Description
A richly transdisciplinary account of some fundamental characteristics of human societies and behavior
In this book, acclaimed economist Herbert Gintis ranges widely across many fields-including economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, moral philosophy, and biology-to provide a rigorous transdisciplinary explanation of some fundamental characteristics of human societies and social behavior. Because such behavior can be understood only through transdisciplinary research, Gintis argues, Individuality and Entanglement advances the effort to unify the behavioral sciences by developing a shared analytical framework-one that bridges research on gene-culture coevolution, the rational-actor model, game theory, and complexity theory. At the same time, the book persuasively demonstrates the rich possibilities of such transdisciplinary work.
Everything distinctive about human social life, Gintis argues, flows from the fact that we construct and then play social games. Indeed, society itself is a game with rules, and politics is the arena in which we affirm and change these rules. Individuality is central to our species because the rules do not change through inexorable macrosocial forces. Rather, individuals band together to change the rules. Our minds are also socially entangled, producing behavior that is socially rational, although it violates the standard rules of individually rational choice. Finally, a moral sense is essential for playing games with socially constructed rules. People generally play by the rules, are ashamed when they break the rules, and are offended when others break the rules, even in societies that lack laws, government, and jails.
Throughout the book, Gintis shows that it is only by bringing together the behavioral sciences that such basic aspects of human behavior can be understood.
In this book, acclaimed economist Herbert Gintis ranges widely across many fields-including economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, moral philosophy, and biology-to provide a rigorous transdisciplinary explanation of some fundamental characteristics of human societies and social behavior. Because such behavior can be understood only through transdisciplinary research, Gintis argues, Individuality and Entanglement advances the effort to unify the behavioral sciences by developing a shared analytical framework-one that bridges research on gene-culture coevolution, the rational-actor model, game theory, and complexity theory. At the same time, the book persuasively demonstrates the rich possibilities of such transdisciplinary work.
Everything distinctive about human social life, Gintis argues, flows from the fact that we construct and then play social games. Indeed, society itself is a game with rules, and politics is the arena in which we affirm and change these rules. Individuality is central to our species because the rules do not change through inexorable macrosocial forces. Rather, individuals band together to change the rules. Our minds are also socially entangled, producing behavior that is socially rational, although it violates the standard rules of individually rational choice. Finally, a moral sense is essential for playing games with socially constructed rules. People generally play by the rules, are ashamed when they break the rules, and are offended when others break the rules, even in societies that lack laws, government, and jails.
Throughout the book, Gintis shows that it is only by bringing together the behavioral sciences that such basic aspects of human behavior can be understood.
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11/2016
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Herbert Gintis is an external professor at the Santa Fe Institute. He is the author, coauthor, or coeditor of a number of books, including Game Theory Evolving, The Bounds of Reason, Unequal Chances, A Cooperative Species, and Game Theory in Action (all Princeton).
Content
Overview xi
1 Gene-Culture Coevolution 1
1.1 Culture Determines Biological Fitness 3
1.2 Reciprocal Causality 7
1.3 The Physiology of Human Communication 9
2 Zoon Politikon: The Evolutionary Origins of Human Socio-political Systems 12
2.1 Accounting for Human Exceptionalism 12
2.2 Models of Political Power 13
2.3 The Moral Basis of Modern Political Systems 16
2.4 The Socio-political Structure of Primate Societies 18
2.5 The Evolutionary History of Primate Societies 22
2.6 Fire and Social Sharing 23
2.7 From Gatherer to Scavenger 24
2.8 Primitive Lethal Weapons 26
2.9 Warfare 30
2.10 Dominance and Reverse Dominance Hierarchies 31
2.11 Are There Egalitarian Nonhuman Primates? 37
2.12 Governance by Consent 38
2.13 Cooperative Mothering: The Evolution of Prosociality 40
2.14 Lethal Weapons and Egalitarianism 40
2.15 The Long-Term Evolution of Human Sociality 42
3 Distributed Effectivity: Political Theory and Rational Choice 45
3.1 Public and Private Spheres 47
3.2 Private and Public Persona 49
3.3 Social Rationality 51
3.4 The Social Rationality of Voter Turnout 55
3.5 The Logic of Distributed Effectivity 59
3.6 Situating Distributed Effectivity 63
4 Power and Trust in CompetitiveMarkets 67
4.1 The Short-Side Power Principle 68
4.2 Power in Competitive Markets 73
4.3 Trust and Integrity 74
4.4 Reputational Equilibrium 79
4.5 Contingent Renewal Labor Markets 80
4.6 I'd Rather Fight than Switch 84
4.7 Regulating Market Power 87
5 Rational Choice Revealed and Defended 88
5.1 The Axioms of Rational Choice 92
5.2 Choice Under Uncertainty 94
5.3 Bayesian Updating with Radical Uncertainty 97
5.4 State-Dependent Preferences 98
5.5 Networked Minds and Distributed Cognition 100
5.6 Limitations of the Rational Actor Model 101
6 An Analytical Core for Sociology 109
6.1 Game Theory 111
6.2 Complexity 115
6.3 Roles, Actors, and the Division of Social Labor 117
6.4 The Socio-psychological Theory of Norms 121
6.5 Socialization and the Internalization of Norms 123
6.6 A Model of Norm Internalization 124
6.7 The Evolution of Social Conventions 126
6.8 The Omniscient Choreographer and Moral Preferences 129
6.9 The Evolution of Norm Internalization 131
6.10 Modeling NetworkedMinds 133
6.11 Class Structure in General Social Equilibrium 135
6.12 Resurrecting Sociological Theory 138
7 The Theory of Action Reclaimed 140
7.1 The Moral and Material Bases of Choice 145
7.2 Carving an Academic Niche for Sociology 148
7.3 The Parsonian Synthesis 150
7.4 The Attempt to Separate Morality from Rationality 153
7.5 Why Did Parsons Fail? 157
7.6 The Flourishing of Middle-Range Theory 160
7.7 High Theory as Interpretation 163
8 The Evolution of Property 165
8.1 The Endowment Effect 166
8.2 Territoriality 168
8.3 Property Rights in Young Children 171
8.4 Respect for Possession in Nonhuman Animals 171
8.5 Conditions for a Property Equilibrium 174
8.6 Property and Antiproperty Equilibria 177
8.7 An Antiproperty Equilibrium 182
8.8 Property Rights as Choreographer 184
9 The Sociology of the Genome 186
9.1 The Core Genome 191
9.2 Inclusive Fitness and Hamilton's Rule 195
9.3 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness 201
9.4 A Generalized Hamilton's Rule 205
9.5 Harmony and Disharmony Principles 207
9.6 The Utterly Selfish Nature of the Gene 208
9.7 Prosocial Genes Maximize Inclusive Fitness 210
9.8 The Boundaries of Inclusive Fitness Maximization 211
9.9 The One Mutation at a Time Principle 212
9.10 The Phenotypic Gambit 213
9.11 The Anatomy of the Core Genome 214
9.12 Explaining Social Structure 218
A1 Hamilton's Rule with General Social Interaction 219
10 Gene-Culture Coevolution and the Internalization of Norms 227
10.1 Norms and Internalization 227
10.2 Socialization and Fitness-Enhancing Norms 229
10.3 Altruism 233
10.4 Copying Phenotypes: The Replicator Dynamic 237
10.5 Why is Altruism Predominantly Prosocial? 238
10.6 The Power of Altruistic Punishment 241
10.7 Final Considerations 243
11 The Economy as Complex Dynamical System 246
11.1 The General Equilibrium Model Explained 247
11.2 The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics 250
11.3 The Market Economy as a Dynamic Game 252
11.4 The Walrasian Economy 253
11.5 Exchange Processes with Private Prices 255
11.6 Strict Nash Equilibria and Stability 256
11.7 The Characterization of Stable Exchange Processes 256
11.8 A Markov Implementation of Walrasian Dynamics 261
11.9 Complex Dynamics 264
12 The Future of the Behavioral Sciences 267
12.1 What are Analytical Foundations? 271
12.2 Cross-Disciplinary Conflicts in the Behavioral Sciences 274
Acknowledgments 279
References 281
Subject Index 341
Author Index 345
1 Gene-Culture Coevolution 1
1.1 Culture Determines Biological Fitness 3
1.2 Reciprocal Causality 7
1.3 The Physiology of Human Communication 9
2 Zoon Politikon: The Evolutionary Origins of Human Socio-political Systems 12
2.1 Accounting for Human Exceptionalism 12
2.2 Models of Political Power 13
2.3 The Moral Basis of Modern Political Systems 16
2.4 The Socio-political Structure of Primate Societies 18
2.5 The Evolutionary History of Primate Societies 22
2.6 Fire and Social Sharing 23
2.7 From Gatherer to Scavenger 24
2.8 Primitive Lethal Weapons 26
2.9 Warfare 30
2.10 Dominance and Reverse Dominance Hierarchies 31
2.11 Are There Egalitarian Nonhuman Primates? 37
2.12 Governance by Consent 38
2.13 Cooperative Mothering: The Evolution of Prosociality 40
2.14 Lethal Weapons and Egalitarianism 40
2.15 The Long-Term Evolution of Human Sociality 42
3 Distributed Effectivity: Political Theory and Rational Choice 45
3.1 Public and Private Spheres 47
3.2 Private and Public Persona 49
3.3 Social Rationality 51
3.4 The Social Rationality of Voter Turnout 55
3.5 The Logic of Distributed Effectivity 59
3.6 Situating Distributed Effectivity 63
4 Power and Trust in CompetitiveMarkets 67
4.1 The Short-Side Power Principle 68
4.2 Power in Competitive Markets 73
4.3 Trust and Integrity 74
4.4 Reputational Equilibrium 79
4.5 Contingent Renewal Labor Markets 80
4.6 I'd Rather Fight than Switch 84
4.7 Regulating Market Power 87
5 Rational Choice Revealed and Defended 88
5.1 The Axioms of Rational Choice 92
5.2 Choice Under Uncertainty 94
5.3 Bayesian Updating with Radical Uncertainty 97
5.4 State-Dependent Preferences 98
5.5 Networked Minds and Distributed Cognition 100
5.6 Limitations of the Rational Actor Model 101
6 An Analytical Core for Sociology 109
6.1 Game Theory 111
6.2 Complexity 115
6.3 Roles, Actors, and the Division of Social Labor 117
6.4 The Socio-psychological Theory of Norms 121
6.5 Socialization and the Internalization of Norms 123
6.6 A Model of Norm Internalization 124
6.7 The Evolution of Social Conventions 126
6.8 The Omniscient Choreographer and Moral Preferences 129
6.9 The Evolution of Norm Internalization 131
6.10 Modeling NetworkedMinds 133
6.11 Class Structure in General Social Equilibrium 135
6.12 Resurrecting Sociological Theory 138
7 The Theory of Action Reclaimed 140
7.1 The Moral and Material Bases of Choice 145
7.2 Carving an Academic Niche for Sociology 148
7.3 The Parsonian Synthesis 150
7.4 The Attempt to Separate Morality from Rationality 153
7.5 Why Did Parsons Fail? 157
7.6 The Flourishing of Middle-Range Theory 160
7.7 High Theory as Interpretation 163
8 The Evolution of Property 165
8.1 The Endowment Effect 166
8.2 Territoriality 168
8.3 Property Rights in Young Children 171
8.4 Respect for Possession in Nonhuman Animals 171
8.5 Conditions for a Property Equilibrium 174
8.6 Property and Antiproperty Equilibria 177
8.7 An Antiproperty Equilibrium 182
8.8 Property Rights as Choreographer 184
9 The Sociology of the Genome 186
9.1 The Core Genome 191
9.2 Inclusive Fitness and Hamilton's Rule 195
9.3 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness 201
9.4 A Generalized Hamilton's Rule 205
9.5 Harmony and Disharmony Principles 207
9.6 The Utterly Selfish Nature of the Gene 208
9.7 Prosocial Genes Maximize Inclusive Fitness 210
9.8 The Boundaries of Inclusive Fitness Maximization 211
9.9 The One Mutation at a Time Principle 212
9.10 The Phenotypic Gambit 213
9.11 The Anatomy of the Core Genome 214
9.12 Explaining Social Structure 218
A1 Hamilton's Rule with General Social Interaction 219
10 Gene-Culture Coevolution and the Internalization of Norms 227
10.1 Norms and Internalization 227
10.2 Socialization and Fitness-Enhancing Norms 229
10.3 Altruism 233
10.4 Copying Phenotypes: The Replicator Dynamic 237
10.5 Why is Altruism Predominantly Prosocial? 238
10.6 The Power of Altruistic Punishment 241
10.7 Final Considerations 243
11 The Economy as Complex Dynamical System 246
11.1 The General Equilibrium Model Explained 247
11.2 The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics 250
11.3 The Market Economy as a Dynamic Game 252
11.4 The Walrasian Economy 253
11.5 Exchange Processes with Private Prices 255
11.6 Strict Nash Equilibria and Stability 256
11.7 The Characterization of Stable Exchange Processes 256
11.8 A Markov Implementation of Walrasian Dynamics 261
11.9 Complex Dynamics 264
12 The Future of the Behavioral Sciences 267
12.1 What are Analytical Foundations? 271
12.2 Cross-Disciplinary Conflicts in the Behavioral Sciences 274
Acknowledgments 279
References 281
Subject Index 341
Author Index 345
