Making Men Moral
Civil Liberties and Public Morality
1st Edition
Published on 6. April 1995
256 pages
978-0-19-102960-8 (ISBN)
Description
Contemporary liberal thinkers commonly suppose that there is something in principle unjust about the legal prohibition of putatively victimless immoralities. Against the prevailing liberal view, Robert P. George defends the proposition that `moral laws' can play a legitimate, if subsidiary, role in preserving the `moral ecology' of the cultural environment in which people make the morally significant choices by which they form their characters and influence, for good or ill, the moral lives of others. George shows that a defence of morals legislation is fully compatible with a `pluralistic perfectionist' political theory of civil liberties and public morality.
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04/1995
Clarendon Press
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Content
- Cover
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1. The Central Tradition: Its Value and Limits
- I. The 'Perfectionism' of the Central Tradition
- II. Aristotle on the Role of the Polis in Making Men Moral
- III. Aquinas on the Moral Aims of Law and Government
- IV. A Critique of Aristotle and Aquinas
- V. The Value and Limits of Perfectionist Law and Policy
- 2. Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin Debate
- I. The Hart-Devlin Debate
- II. Devlin's Legal Moralism
- III. Hart's Critique of Devlin
- IV. A Communitarian Reinterpretation of the Disintegration Thesis
- V. The Central Tradition versus Devlinism
- 3. Individual Rights and Collective Interests: Dworkin on 'Equal Concern and Respect'
- I. Introduction
- II. A Critique of Dworkin on Individual Rights and Collective Interests
- III. Dworkin's Liberalism and the 'Right to Privacy' in American Political Debate
- IV. Dworkin's Revised Argument from the Principle of Equality
- V. Dworkin's Recent Critique of Moral Paternalism
- VI. Conclusion
- 4. Taking Rights Seriously: Waldron on 'The Right To Do Wrong'
- I. Rights and Wrongs
- II. 'Rights' and the Grounds of Duties not to Interfere with Moral Wrongdoing
- III. Taking Rights Seriously: Moral Rights and Humanly Important Choices
- 5. Anti-Perfectionism and Autonomy: Rawls and Richards on Neutrality and the Harm Principle
- I. Two Types of Liberalism
- II. Rawlsian Anti-Perfectionism
- III. Anti-Perfectionism and Autonomy
- 6. Pluralistic Perfectionism and Autonomy: Raz on 'The Proper Way to Enforce Morality'
- I. Perfectionist Liberalism
- II. Joseph Raz's Perfectionism
- III. The Value of Autonomy
- IV. Perfectionist Autonomy and the Harm Principle
- 7. Toward a Pluralistic Perfectionist Theory of Civil Liberties
- I. Introduction
- II. Freedom of Speech
- III. Freedom of the Press
- IV. Privacy
- V. Freedom of Assembly
- VI. Freedom of Religion
- VII. Conclusion
- List of Works Cited
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
