Judicial Reputation
A Comparative Theory
1st Edition
Published on 31. May 2024
288 pages
978-0-226-29062-1 (ISBN)
Description
Judges are society's elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence.
In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg explain how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned. Judicial Reputation explores how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with-lawyers, politicians, the media, and the public itself-and how institutional structures mediate these interactions. The judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation. Transcending those conventional lenses, Garoupa and Ginsburg employ their long-standing research on the latter to examine the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multicourt systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have had on the reputations of judges in this era.
In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg explain how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned. Judicial Reputation explores how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with-lawyers, politicians, the media, and the public itself-and how institutional structures mediate these interactions. The judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation. Transcending those conventional lenses, Garoupa and Ginsburg employ their long-standing research on the latter to examine the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multicourt systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have had on the reputations of judges in this era.
All prices
More details
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
03/2017
University of Chicago Press
€32.50
Shipment within 10-20 days
Book
11/2015
University of Chicago Press
€99.04
Shipment within 10-20 days
Persons
Nuno Garoupa isprofessor of law at Texas A&M University and holds the chair in research innovation at the Católica Global School of Law, Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon, Portugal.
Tom Ginsburgis the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago Law School and research fellow at the American Bar Foundation.
Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1. A Theory of Judicial Reputation and Audiences
- 2. Pockets of Exception
- 3. Wearing Two Hats: Judges and Nonjudicial Functions
- 4. The Selection and Monitoring of Judges: The Spread of Judicial Councils
- 5. When Courts Collide: Intracourt Relations and the Problem of Audiences
- 6. The Rule of Lawyers: Globalization, International Law, and Judicial Reputation
- 7. Conclusion: The Shift toward the External Audience and Lessons for Reform
- Appendix A: List of Courts Included in the Dataset
- Appendix B: Data on Judicial Councils
- Notes
- Index
