Income-Tested Transfer Programs
The Case for and Against
Published on 10. May 2014
576 pages
978-1-4832-6049-5 (ISBN)
Description
Income Tested Transfer Programs: The Case for and Against covers the proceedings of the 1979 conference of leading scientists, sponsored by the Institute for Research on Poverty. The contributors consider the contribution of social science knowledge and analysis in settling the arguments in the debate about the merits of income testing in transfer programs. This text is divided into 13 chapters and begins with an overview of the history, stigmatization processes, and social cohesion of the program. The succeeding chapters define the terms "income-tested and "non-income-tested, as well as the historical importance of the income-testing issue. The discussion then shifts to the development of both income-tested and non-income tested programs in the United States. These topics are followed by surveys of the income support system and the issues in the income-testing debate. The remaining chapters provide evidence that most Americans have too much income testing in the overall income maintenance system. These chapters also present a reform agenda designed to reduce the role of income testing. This book will be of value to social scientists, social welfare workers, and researchers.
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01/1982
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Content
List of Figures and TablesContributorsForeword1 Introduction Terms and Concepts Historical Importance of the Income-Testing Issue Our Current Income Support System The Issues and the Papers2 Stigma in Income-Tested Programs Stigmatization Processes The Stigma of Poverty The Intensified Stigma of Charity Responses to Stigmatization Stigma in Other Income-Tested Programs Conclusion: Income Testing as an Intensifier of the Poverty Stigma Discussion Discussion Discussion: Modeling the Decision to Apply for Welfare3 Income Testing and Social Cohesion What Is Social Cohesion? Argument 1: Universal Programs Are Less Likely to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Are Income-Tested Programs Argument 2: Universal Programs Are No Less Likely, Perhaps Even More Likely, to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Income-Tested Programs Conclusion Discussion4 Income Testing and Politics: A Theoretical Model A Political Model The Politics of Income Testing Conclusion Discussion Discussion Discussion5 Social Policy Development in Europe and America: A Longer View on Selectivity and Income Testing When and Why Social Insurance Benefits and Educational Opportunities Became More Widely Extended Trends Toward Universality of Coverage in Social Insurance and Education Universality and Selectivity in Contemporary American Policies Epilogue Discussion Discussion: Ideology, Education, and Social Security6 A Simulation Analysis of the Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Alternative Program Structures: The Negative Income Tax Versus the Credit Income Tax Introduction and Major Findings Methodology Results from the Simulations Conclusion Discussion Discussion7 Taxpayer Behavior and the Design of a Credit Income Tax Introduction Antecedents of the CIT Definition of the Tax-Transfer Unit Accounting Period and Procedures Definition of Taxable Income Administrative Arrangements Surtax Considerations Categorization for Benefits Costs of Administration and Compliance The Role of the CIT in Public Finance Political Economy and CIT Implementation Appendix 7.A: Elements of Taxable Income for CIT Appendix 7.
