
Security and Cryptography for Networks
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The two-volume set LNCS 14973 and 14974 constitutes the proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2024, which took place in Amalfai, Italy, during September 11-13, 2024.
The 33 full papers included in the proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 90 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows:
Part I: Zero Knowledge; foundations; protocols; voting systems;
Part II: Homomorphic encryption; symmetric key encryption; cryptanalysis; key management; blockchains.
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Invited Speakers
- Random Number Generation and Extraction
- Lattice-Based Cryptography, the Picture Way
- Contents - Part I
- Contents - Part II
- Zero Knowledge
- NIZKs with Maliciously Chosen CRS: Subversion Advice-ZK and Accountable Soundness
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Results
- 2 Technical Overview
- 2.1 Subversion Advice-ZK NIZK
- 2.2 Accountable Soundness
- 2.3 Related Work
- References
- Succinct Non-subsequence Arguments
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 1.3 Related Works
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs)
- 2.3 Multilinear Extension (MLE)
- 2.4 Polynomial Commitment Schemes (PCSs)
- 2.5 Sumcheck Protocol and Lookup Protocol from Sumcheck
- 3 Handling (Non-)Subsequence Arguments
- 4 Description of Succinct Non-subsequence Arguments
- 4.1 Notations
- 4.2 Transformations
- 4.3 Description for Non-subsequence Arguments from Sumcheck
- 4.4 Efficiency
- A Proof of Lemma 1
- References
- zk-Bench: A Toolset for Comparative Evaluation and Performance Benchmarking of SNARKs
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Motivation
- 2.1 Public-Key Cryptography
- 2.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)
- 2.3 Practical Implementation of Pre-processing SNARKs
- 3 Architecture
- 3.1 Backend
- 3.2 User Interface
- 4 Selected Arithmetic Libraries and Tools for ZKP Development
- 4.1 Arithmetic Libraries
- 4.2 Tools for ZKP Development
- 5 Benchmark Results
- 5.1 Arithmetics
- 5.2 Circuits
- 6 Runtime Estimation
- 7 Discussion
- 8 Conclusion
- A Detailed Goals for zk-Bench
- B Related Work
- C Limitations
- References
- Hybrid Zero-Knowledge from Garbled Circuits and Circuit-Based Composition of -Protocols
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Techniques
- 1.3 Related Works
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Affine Predicate and Affine Commitment
- 2.2 Garbling Scheme
- 2.3 -Protocol
- 2.4 Building Blocks
- 3 Generalized Affine Garbling with Common Labels
- 4 Shuffled Label Commitment
- 4.1 Syntax
- 4.2 Construction
- 4.3 Performance
- 5 Hybrid ZK from GC
- 5.1 CCZK: Generic Compiler from GC to -Protocols
- 5.2 Extension to Commit-and-Prove
- 5.3 Performance
- 6 General Composition of -Protocols
- References
- How (Not) to Simulate PLONK
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 PLONK
- 1.2 Our Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 zk-SNARKs
- 2.2 The PLONK Construction
- 3 PLONK is Statistically Zero-Knowledge
- 4 Old PLONK is Not Statistically Zero-Knowledge
- 5 Conclusion
- A Proofs
- A.1 ZK Implies WI
- A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
- References
- Foundation
- Exponential Quantum One-Wayness and EFI Pairs
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Results
- 1.2 Proof Outline
- 1.3 Concurrent Work
- 1.4 Paper Outline
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Basic Notations
- 2.2 Computational Model for Adversaries
- 2.3 Pairwise-Independent Hash Family
- 2.4 Shadow Tomography
- 2.5 EFI Pairs and Quantum Bit Commitments
- 3 Inefficiently-Verifiable One-Way State Generators (IV-OWSGs)
- 4 EFI Pairs Imply IV-OWSGs
- 5 Exponentially-Secure IV-OWSGs Imply EFI Pairs
- References
- Round Efficient Byzantine Agreement from VDFs
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 The VDF Model
- 1.2 Byzantine Agreement in the VDF Model
- 1.3 A Lower Bound on Communication Complexity for BA
- 1.4 Implications of Our Results and Related Work
- 2 Our Model
- 2.1 Definitions
- 3 Graded Public Key Infrastructure (GPKI)
- 4 Achieving Byzantine Agreement
- 5 Communication Complexity in the VDF Model
- References
- Universal Vector Commitments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Vector Commitments
- 2.2 Universal Accumulators
- 2.3 Cuckoo Hashing
- 3 Universal Vector Commitments
- 4 Universal Vector Commitments from Merkle Trees
- 4.1 Construction
- 5 Universal Vector Commitments from Universal Accumulators
- 5.1 Construction
- 6 Universal Accumulators from Vector Commitments
- 6.1 Construction
- 6.2 Instantiations
- 6.3 Generically Upgrading to VC to UVC
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Adversaries and Leakage
- 2.2 Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography
- 2.3 Key-Exchange
- 2.4 Oblivious Transfer
- 3 Security Definitions with Leakage
- 3.1 Computational Model and Leakage
- 3.2 Security Definitions
- 4 A Leakage-Resilient Single OT Protocol
- 4.1 Black-Box Simulation-Based Security
- 4.2 Security Against Side-Channel Adversaries
- 5 A Leakage-Resilient Sequential OT
- 6 Variants
- References
- Protocols
- Client-Aided Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Related Work
- 1.3 Roadmap
- 2 Technical Overview
- 3 Preliminaries
- 3.1 Specialized Two-Party Computation
- 3.2 Machine Learning Algorithms
- 4 Client-Aided Protocols
- 4.1 Client-Aided Inner Product
- 4.2 Client-Aided Sign Check
- 4.3 Client-Aided ReLU
- 4.4 Client-Aided Division
- 5 Performance Evaluation
- 5.1 Implementation Details
- 5.2 Linear Regression
- 5.3 Logistic Regression
- 5.4 Neural Networks
- References
- Encrypted Multi-map that Hides Query, Access, and Volume Patterns
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 STE and Building Blocks
- 3.1 Structured Encryption (STE)
- 3.2 EMM and EDX Functionality
- 3.3 Non-recursive Position-Based ORAM
- 4 Generic Protocol EMM
- 4.1 EMM Protocol Overview
- 4.2 Extended Functionality
- 4.3 Algorithms of EMM Protocol
- 5 Protocol Instantiations
- 6 Complexity Analysis
- 7 Implementations and Experiments
- A Structured Encryption (STE) Definitions
- A.1 STE Security Definition
- B Extended Functionality for EDX
- C Algorithms for Auxiliary Class BidStack
- D Implementations and Experiments
- References
- CaSCaDE: (Time-Based) Cryptography from Space Communications DElay
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Modeling Communication Delays
- 4 Proofs of Sequential Communication Delays
- 4.1 Modelling Proofs of Sequential Communication Delay
- 5 Verifiable Delay Functions
- 6 Delay Encryption
- A Practical Considerations
- References
- On the Concrete Security of Non-interactive FRI
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Results
- 1.2 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Reed-Solomon Codes
- 2.2 Non-interactive Proofs and Concrete Security
- 3 Non-interactive Security of the FRI Protocol
- 3.1 Provable and Conjectured Security of FRI
- 3.2 Grinding
- 3.3 Other FRI Optimizations
- 4 Concrete Security Analysis of Non-interactive FRI
- 4.1 Non-interactive Security of FRI Parameters in Practice
- 4.2 Parameter Analysis
- 4.3 Parameter Suggestions for FS-FRI
- References
- Scalable Agreement Protocols with Optimal Optimistic Efficiency
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 2 Technical Overview
- 2.1 Optimistic/Pessimistic Agreement
- 2.2 A Best-Possible Optimistic/Pessimistic Framework
- 2.3 Secure MPC
- 3 The Model and Problem Definitions
- 3.1 The Model
- 3.2 Problem Definitions
- 4 Preliminaries
- 4.1 Secure Computation
- 4.2 (Attacker-Dependent) Complexity Measures of Protocols
- 5 Propagating Failure Detection
- 5.1 Failure Detection Functionalities
- 5.2 Propagating Knowledge of Failures
- 6 Optimistic/Pessimistic Combiner Framework
- 7 Applications
- References
- Voting Systems
- Efficient Universally-Verifiable Electronic Voting with Everlasting Privacy
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Computational Assumptions
- 2.2 Linearly-Homomorphic Signatures
- 3 FHS as a Secure LH-Sign-RTag
- 3.1 Linearly-Homomorphic Signature with Randomizable Tags
- 3.2 Security Properties
- 4 Our Global Voting System
- 4.1 Format of the Ballot
- 4.2 Tally Computation and Verification
- 4.3 Security Properties
- 4.4 Verifiable Ballot Under Linear Relations
- 4.5 Receipt-Freeness and Randomization
- 4.6 Global Security
- 5 Efficiency
- 5.1 Complexity and Communications
- 5.2 Examples of Elections
- 5.3 Benchmarks
- References
- Shuffle Arguments Based on Subset-Checking
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Zero-Knowledge Argument
- 2.2 Pedersen Multicommitment
- 2.3 Assumptions
- 2.4 Proof of Knowledge of Pedersen Commitment Opening
- 2.5 Inner Product Argument
- 2.6 Set Proofs and Range Proofs
- 3 New Sub-arguments and Assumptions
- 3.1 Showing that the Values and Randomness in Two Commitments Must be the Same
- 3.2 Showing that Commitment's Randomizer Is the Same Value in the Exponent of H
- 3.3 Showing that the (Weighted) Sum of Committed Elements is Equal to v
- 3.4 Showing that the Messages in Several Commitments are the Same
- 3.5 Additional Assumptions
- 4 The Main Technique
- 4.1 Basic Shuffle
- 4.2 Challenge-Response Subargument
- 4.3 Main Body of the Shuffle Argument
- 4.4 ElGamal Shuffle
- 4.5 Efficiency
- References
- Practical Traceable Receipt-Free Encryption
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Other Related Works
- 1.3 Overview and Techniques
- 1.4 Paper Roadmap
- 2 Building Blocks
- 2.1 Traceable Receipt-Free Encryption
- 2.2 Computational Setting
- 2.3 Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
- 2.4 Groth-Sahai Proof System
- 3 Construction
- 4 Performance and Comparison
- 5 Application to E-Voting
- References
- Author Index
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