Algorithmic Decision Theory

Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling.- Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks.- Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights.- Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model.- Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination.- Preference Elicitation.- Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist?.- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees.- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals.- Preference Aggregation and Voting.- In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution.- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters.- Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences.- Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation.- Manipulation in Voting.- Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules.- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games.- Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams.- The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.- Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs.- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods.- On Reachable Assignments in Cycles.- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average.- Algorithmic Decision Theory.- Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints.- Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model.- Coalition Formation.- Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice.- Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited.- Stable Matchings.- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching.- Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information.- Participatory Budgeting.- Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules.- Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting.