Caging the Beast
A theory of sensory consciousness
1st Edition
Published on 30. June 2003
X, 183 pages
978-90-272-9662-7 (ISBN)
Description
A major obstacle for materialist theories of the mind is the problem of sensory consciousness. How could a physical brain produce conscious sensory states that exhibit the rich and luxurious qualities of red velvet, a Mozart concerto or fresh-brewed coffee? Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness offers to explain what these conscious sensory states have in common, by virtue of being conscious as opposed to unconscious states. After arguing against accounts of consciousness in terms of higher-order representation of mental states, the theory claims that sensory consciousness is a special way we have of representing the world. The book also introduces a way of thinking about subjectivity as separate and more fundamental than consciousness, and considers how this foundational notion can be developed into more elaborate varieties. An appendix reviews the connection between consciousness and attention with an eye toward providing a neuropsychological instantiation of the proposed theory. (Series A)
More details
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
06/2003
John Benjamins Publishing Co
€95.40
Shipment within 10-15 days
Person
Content
- Caging the Beast
- Editorial page
- Title page
- LCC page
- Dedication page
- Table of contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1: On sensory consciousness
- 1. Caging the beast
- 2. Internal sense: A good trap
- 3. Second sense: A better trap
- 4. Purely verbal?
- Chapter 2: On higher-order theories of consciousness
- 1. The higher-order explanation of state consciousness
- 1.1. Higher-order thought theory
- 1.2. Objections to the higher-order thought theory or playing the shell game
- 1.3. Higher-order perception theory
- 1.4. Objections to the higher-order perception theory
- 2. Formulating an alternative: A flat theory of sensory consciousness
- 2.1. Dretske's trouble spot
- 2.2. Spot-sight and thimble-seeking
- 3. Conclusion
- Chapter 3: Solving the problem of Spot-sight
- 3.1. Coordinating sensory consciousness
- 3.1.a. The best approximation of the world
- 3.1.b. Representing `now'
- 3.1.c. Decision and action
- 3.2. What good is a second sense?
- 3.3. Spot-sight again
- Chapter 4: Subjectivity
- 4.1. Subjective authority
- 4.2. Special facts or special access?
- 4.2.a. On what it's like
- 4.2.b. Nagel's funny facts
- 4.2.c. Point of view provides a special route, not special facts
- 4.3. Subjectivity as the view from here
- 4.3.a. Tokens in a language of thought
- 4.3.b. The reciprocality of subject and object
- 4.3.c. Egocentric maps
- 4.4. Deflating (and re-inflating) subjectivity
- Chapter 5: Testing the theory
- 5.1. Troubles with functionalism
- 5.1.a. Chauvinism
- 5.1.b. Liberalism
- 5.2. The hard problem
- 5.3. On Rosenthal
- 5.4. Dealing with Dennett
- 5.4.a. The Camera Obscura argument
- 5.4.b. The bizarre category of the objectively subjective
- Appendix: A Speculative Hypothesis
- a.1. Attention as the coordination of sensory representations
- a.2. Locating sensory consciousness
- a.2.a. Many senses or one?
- a.2.b. Looking for the second sense
- a.2.c. A home for conscious sensory states
- Notes
- References
- Index
- The series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
