Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
Essays on the Lottery Paradox
Published on 27. January 2021
280 pages
978-1-108-39000-2 (ISBN)
Description
We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical (yes/no) and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' - at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
Worked examples or Exercises; 4 Line drawings, black and white
File size
6,61 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-108-39000-2 (9781108390002)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
02/2021
Cambridge University Press
€105.50
Shipment within 15-20 days
Content
Introduction Igor Douven; 1. Rational belief and statistical evidence: blame, bias, and the law Dana Nelkin; 2. Knowledge attributions and lottery cases: a review and new evidence John Turri; 3. The psychological dimension of the lottery paradox Jennifer Nagel; 4. Three puzzles about lotteries Julia Staffel; 5. Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified Martin Smith; 6. Rethinking the lottery paradox: a dual processing perspective Igor Douven and Shira Elqayam; 7. Rational belief in lottery- and preface-situations: impossibility results and possible solutions Gerhard Schurz; 8. Stability and the lottery paradox Hannes Leitgeb; 9. The lottery, the preface and epistemic rule consequentialism Christoph Kelp and Francesco Praolini; 10. Beliefs, probabilities, and their coherent correspondence Kevin Kelly and Hanti Lin; 11. The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: a general impossibility theorem Franz Dietrich and Christian List; Bibliography; Index.
