Freedom As a Value
A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sarte
1st Edition
Published on 15. December 2013
262 pages
978-0-8126-9863-3 (ISBN)
Description
This dramatic re-evaluation of Sartre's ethical theory establishes its author as a leading American exponent of phenomenology and wins many new followers for Sartre in the English-speaking world.
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Book
10/1988
Open Court Publishing Co ,U.S.
€31.00
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Person
David Detmer is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University Calumet and Executive Editor of Sartre Studies International.
Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Chapter 1: Freedom
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Sartre's Arguments for Freedom
- 1.2.1 The First Argument: Consciousness is Not What it Is
- 1.2.1.1 The rejection of the phenomenal reduction
- 1.2.1.2 The transcendence of the ego
- 1.2.1.3 Acts, Roles, Psychic States and Emotions
- 1.2.2 The Second Argument: Consciousness Is What it is Not
- 1.2.2.1 Imagination
- 1.2.2.2 Doubt
- 1.2.2.3 Destruction
- 1.2.2.4 Interrogation
- 1.2.2.5 Perception
- 1.2.2.6 The experience of absence
- 1.3 The Nature of Freedom
- 1.3.1 The Omnipotence Objection
- 1.3.1.1 Limitations to freedom
- 1.3.1.1.1 Faticity
- 1.3.1.1.2 Coefficient of adversity
- 1.3.1.1.3 Situation
- 1.3.1.1.4 Human condition
- 1.3.1.1.5 Practcio-inert
- 1.3.1.1.6 Counter-finality
- 1.3.1.1.7 My relations with others
- 1.3.1.2 The omnipotence objection answered
- 1.3.2 The Inconsistency Objection
- 1.3.2.1 Different senses of freedom
- 1.3.2.1.1 Dous Sartre recognize a need to distinguish between different senses of freedom?
- 1.3.2.1.2 Does Sartre in fact distinguish between different senses of freedom?
- 1.3.2.1.3 Are Sartre's distinctions between different senses of freedom relevant?
- 1.3.2.1.4 Ontological freedom and pratical freedom
- 1.3.2.1.5 An objection to Sartre's ontological freedom
- 1.3.2.1.6 Some difficulties with Sartre's practical freedom
- 1.3.2.2 The inconsistency objection answered
- 1.3.2.2.1 Desan
- 1.3.2.2.2 Merleau-Ponty
- 1.3.3 The Radical Break Objection
- 1.3.3.1 Sartre's Testimony
- 1.3.3.2 Errors of the radical break theorists
- 1.3.3.3 Radical conversion
- 1.3.3.4 The radical break objection answered
- 1.4 Conclusion
- Chapter 2: Values
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 The Subjectivity of Values and the Subjectivity of Value-Judgments
- 2.2.1 The Compatibility of the Subjectivity of Values and the Objectivity of Value-Judgments
- 2.3 Sartre's Arguments for Ethical Subjectivism
- 2.3.1 The Experience of Values as "Lacks
- 2.3.1.1 Criticism of the argument from the experience of values as "lacks
- 2.3.2 The Distinction Between Facts and Values
- 2.3.2.1 Criticism of the argument from the distinction between facts and values
- 2.3.3 The Hierarchy of Projects
- 2.3.3.1 Criticism of the argument from the hierarchy of projects
- 2.3.4 The Nonexistence of God
- 2.3.4.1 Criticism of the argument from the nonexistence of God
- 2.3.5 Irresolvable Moral Dilemmas
- 2.3.5.1 Criticism of the argument from irresolvable moral dilemmas
- 2.4 General Crticisms of Sartre's Ethical Subjectivism
- 2.4.1 The Moral Equivalence of All Free Actions
- 2.4.2 The Authentic Torturer Problem
- 2.4.3 The Groundlessness of the Value of Authenticity
- 2.4.4 The Absurdity of Total Subjectivism
- 2.4.5 The Coefficient of Adversity in Our Value Experience
- 2.4.6 Responsibility
- 2.4.7 Anguish
- 2.4.8 Repentance
- 2.5 Conclusion
- Chapter 3: Freedom as a Value
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Sartre's Ethical Objectivism
- 3.2.1 Freedom and Needs
- 3.3 The Problem of Justification
- 3.3.1 Intuition
- 3.3.1.1 What does Sartre mean by "intuition"?
- 3.3.1.2 Are Sartre's claims about intuition true?
- 3.3.1.3 Can intuition give us ethical knowledge?
- 3.4 Subjectivism and Objectivism in Sartre
- 3.5 Sartre's Contribution to Ethics
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
