The Value of Consumer Data in the Digital Economy
1st Edition
Published on 22. May 2026
250 pages
978-3-7489-4827-8 (ISBN)
Description
Consumer data has long been the currency of the digital economy - but how is its value determined, who is permitted to trade it, and when do 'free' offers come at a price? This volume provides a comprehensive overview: the GDPR and the Data Act, common law perspectives, the review of terms and conditions ('ius pretium'), and the implications of monetisation for contract types and structures. In addition, the volume addresses issues of fairness beyond consumer protection, IoT data, market failure in the B2C sector, and the determination of data values (assets, data trading, databases).
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Alberto De Franceschi | Reiner Schulze | Dirk Staudenmayer
The Value of Consumer Data in the Digital Economy
Book
05/2026
1st Edition
Nomos
€89.00
Available immediately
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Content
- Preface
- The Value of Consumer Data in the Digital Economy - Introduction|Alberto De Franceschi / Reiner Schulze / Dirk Staudenmayer
- I. Overview
- II. Challenges for research
- 1. Trading Consumer Data
- a) The tension between the Data Act and the General Data Protection Regulation
- b) Contract law and data protection
- c) The Common Law Perspective
- 2. The "Monetisation" of Consumer Data
- a) Judicial price review
- b) Consequences of 'monetisation'
- 3. The Value of Consumer Data in and Beyond the Data Act
- 4. The Determination of the Value of Data
- III. Conclusion
- I. Trading Consumer Data: Background and General Framework
- Personal Data as Object of Trade - The Regulatory Framework of the Data Act and the GDPR|Andreas Sattler
- I. Introduction
- II. Personal Data: An object of trade - not of transfer
- III. No legal basis in the Data Act
- 1. Can Art. 4 and 5 DA serve as a legal basis for processing?
- 2. No legal basis in Art. 6 (2) lit. b DA
- IV. Consent as an instrument for synchronising DA and GDPR
- 1. Necessity for the fulfillment of the contract, Art. 6 (1) lit. b GDPR
- 2. Processing as a legitimate interest, Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR
- 3. Consent to the processing, Art. 6 (1) lit. a / Art. 9 (2) lit. a GDPR
- V. Complexity of consent management for multi-relational data
- 1. Voluntariness of consent
- 2. Informed consent
- 3. Consent for specific purposes
- VI. Conclusion
- The value of consumer data: a common law perspective|Christian Twigg-Flesner
- I. Introduction
- Why a "common law perspective"?
- II. The status of data in English Law
- III. The Economic Value of Data: Contracts and Consideration
- IV. The Regulatory Context
- V. The Data (Use and Access Act 2025)
- VI. The primacy of contracts
- Unfair Terms and Consumer Data Access Agreements
- Contract Classification
- VII. Conclusion
- II. The "Monetisation" of Consumer Data
- Judicial Price Reviews and Fixing of Fair Prices by Judges: From Iustum Pretium to Modern Regulation of Data|Hans Schulte-Nölke
- I. From late antique price reviews to natural law codifications
- II. Economic liberalism and Adam Smith's market ideology of 'natural prices'
- III. Replacement of the laesio enormis by usury in 19th century
- IV. A 'renaissance' of laesio enormis in the 20th century
- V. Criticism from the economic analysis of law
- VI. Need to differentiate from administrative price controls
- VII. Prices set by standard terms and judicial price review
- VIII. Prices of SEPs: FRAND Requirements
- IX. Price and Value of Data
- 1. Value of data in the early digital age
- 2. Personal data
- 3. Product-generated non-personal data: FRAND again
- X. Overall findings and outlook for judicial price review
- Consequences of the monetisation of consumer data for contract type and contract structure|Martin Schmidt-Kessel
- I. Separating the levels
- 1. GDPR separates privacy from contract (Separation Principle)
- 2. Recent EU legislation confirming the Separation Principle
- 3. First Consequences
- II. Controlling data and data holding as services in the interest and on behalf of another actor
- 1. Controlling personal data
- 2. Data holding
- a. General rules on data access obligations (Artt. 8-13 DA)
- b. Holding IoT device data (Artt. 3-7, 13 DA)
- 3. The position of the third-party data recipient
- 4. Implications for data use by the data holder
- 5. Consequences
- III. Use of data as object of a contract
- 1. Indications by GDPR
- 2. Indications by the Data Act
- 3. Indications by the Directive 2019/770
- a. Transfer of data as kind of payment by the consumer
- b. Supply of data as supply of digital content to the consumer
- 4. Conclusions
- IV. Ancillary duties and data contracts
- V. Mixed contracts as the new normal
- VI. General Conclusions
- III. The Value of Consumer Data in and Beyond the Data Act
- Data Act Beyond Consumer Protection: The Fairness Problem|Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell
- I. Monetising and Mobilising Data Value in the Market: The Context
- I.1. Goals and scope of the Data Act: the blurred distinction between personal and non-personal data
- I.2. Data Act and consumer protection: an initial assessment
- II. Parties in the Data Sharing Ecosystem: Consumers, Micro-and SMEs and Enterprises
- II.1. The unfairness problem in the B2B data sharing market: a structural, relational, and functional problem
- II.2. - Consumers in the Data Act
- III. Combating unfairness in data sharing: beyond consumer protection
- Beyond the EU Data Act: Value of IoT Data, Market Failures, and Consumer Choice in the B2C Sector|Wolfgang Kerber and Karsten K. Zolna
- I. Introduction
- II. Market failure problems on the markets for non-personal and personal IoT data in B2C IoT contexts
- II.1. Economics of IoT data governance and the data use contracts about IoT data
- II.2. Market failure problems on markets for personal data
- II.3. Market failure problems for data use contracts about personal and non-personal data of IoT devices
- II.4. Intermediate results and conclusions
- III. New discussions about minimum standards of choice regarding personal data
- III.1. Introduction
- III.2. Competition law, market dominance, data protection law, and choice
- III.3. Tying prohibition in data protection law, "consent or pay" models, and the EDPB Opinion 08/24
- III.4. More choice: Recent developments in Californian privacy law
- III.5. Choice of consumers regarding personal data: Some critical reflections
- IV. Future policy options for governance of IoT data in B2C contexts: An exploratory discussion
- IV.1. Introduction
- IV.2. Direct compensation for personal / non-personal IoT data
- IV.3. More choice: Minimum standards of choice for users of IoT devices in B2C contexts
- IV.3.1. Reasons why consumers do not have sufficient choice regarding their IoT data and IoT devices
- IV.3.2. A right for data collection-free IoT devices: A case for applying "consent or pay" models in B2C IoT contexts?
- IV.3.3. Minimum standards of choice for users of IoT devices: More granular choice and termination rights
- IV.3.4. More far-reaching solutions for the control of consumers over their IoT devices and IoT data
- V. Conclusions
- IV. The Determination of the Value of Data
- Data as an asset and data trade|Fernando Gómez Pomar and Mireia Artigot Golobardes
- I. Data as a cornerstone of markets and as an asset allowing its holder to take profit-maximizing actions
- II. Economic elements of data exchanges in data markets
- 1. Data as a public good
- 2. Data is the lifeblood of AI
- 3. The collection, processing, use and sharing of data are ripe with significant externalities
- i) Network effects and data network effects
- ii) Negative externalities in data interactions
- iii) Policy measures available for correcting data negative externalities
- IV. Data assets are remarkably complex to value
- V. Conclusions
- Are databases a tradeable asset?|Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich
- 1. The case
- 2. The outcome of Case C-693/22
- 3. The open issues
- 4. Final issues
- a) Some comparative insights
- b) Databases and accountancy rules
- c) Contractual solutions
- The EU Data Act - First impressions|Herbert Zech
- I. The aims of the Data Act: efficient use of data and fair reward
- II. Markets: we should wait and see whether they work
- III. Problems with market solutions
- IV. Are there alternatives?
- V. Re-introducing the fair share
