
Advances in Information and Computer Security
Description
Alles über E-Books | Antworten auf Fragen rund um E-Books, Kopierschutz und Dateiformate finden Sie in unserem Info- & Hilfebereich.
More details
Other editions
Additional editions

Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Contents
- Mathematical Cryptography
- Efficient Multiplication of Somewhat Small Integers Using Number-Theoretic Transforms
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Results
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 RSA
- 2.2 FFT-Based Integer Multiplication
- 2.3 Number-Theoretic Transforms
- 2.4 Modular Reductions and Multiplications
- 2.5 Implementation Targets
- 3 Implementations
- 3.1 High-Level Strategy
- 3.2 Parameter Choices
- 3.3 Chunking and Dechunking
- 3.4 Modular Exponentiation and Table Lookup
- 3.5 Implementation Details for Cortex-M3
- 3.6 Implementation Details for Cortex-M55
- 4 Results
- 4.1 Benchmark Environment
- 4.2 NTT and FNT Performance
- 4.3 Modular Arithmetic: Multiplication, Squaring, Exponentiation
- A Reduction Algorithms for Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M55
- B On Precomputing the Montgomery Constant
- C Table Lookup
- D Pipeline Efficiency of Cortex-M55 Implementation
- E High-level Multiplication Structure
- References
- On Linear Complexity of Finite Sequences: Coding Theory and Applications to Cryptography
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Our Contribution
- 2 Linear-Feedback Shift Registers
- 3 Coding Theory Using Linear Complexity
- 4 Linear Complexity Coset Weight Problems
- 5 Properties of Linear Complexity
- 6 Cryptographic Applications
- A The Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm
- B Optimal Sets of Sequences
- C Application for Decoding Reed-Solomon Codes
- References
- System Security and Threat Intelligence
- Methods of Extracting Parameters of the Processor Caches
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Cache Architecture
- 2.2 Cache Side-Channel Attacks
- 3 Threat Model
- 4 Measuring Cache Access Latency
- 4.1 Random Cache Scan
- 4.2 A Portable Timer
- 5 Methodology of Extraction
- 5.1 Cache Size and Latency of All Levels
- 5.2 Size of a Cache Block
- 5.3 Number of Cache Ways and Sets
- 5.4 Replacement Policy
- 6 Experiment Results
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- KDPM: Kernel Data Protection Mechanism Using a Memory Protection Key
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Memory Protection Key
- 2.2 Kernel Vulnerability
- 3 Threat Model
- 3.1 Environment
- 3.2 Scenario
- 4 Design
- 4.1 Concept
- 4.2 Approach
- 5 Implementation
- 5.1 Protected Kernel Data Management
- 5.2 Implementation 1
- 5.3 Implementation 2
- 6 Evaluation
- 6.1 Security Capability
- 6.2 Performance Evaluation
- 6.3 Evaluation Environment
- 6.4 Security Capability Evaluation Result
- 6.5 Performance Evaluation Result
- 7 Discussion
- 7.1 Security Capability Consideration
- 7.2 Performance Consideration
- 7.3 Limitation
- 7.4 Portability
- 8 Related Work
- 8.1 Comparison
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- CyNER: Information Extraction from Unstructured Text of CTI Sources with Noncontextual IOCs
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Challenges
- 2.1 Cyber Threat Intelligence
- 2.2 NLP
- 2.3 Challenges
- 3 Design and Implementation
- 3.1 Basic Idea and Overview
- 3.2 Information Gathering
- 3.3 Preprocessing
- 3.4 Pretraining
- 3.5 CTI Classification
- 3.6 Named Entity Recognition
- 3.7 Relation Extraction
- 3.8 STIX Generation
- 4 Evaluation
- 4.1 Experimental Setup
- 4.2 Dataset
- 4.3 Result
- 4.4 IOC Coverage
- 4.5 Time-Series
- 5 Discussion
- 5.1 Practicality
- 5.2 Limitation
- 5.3 Research Ethics
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusion
- A Source of CTI
- B Refang Rules
- References
- Symmetric-Key Cryptography
- Birthday-Bound Slide Attacks on TinyJAMBU's Keyed-Permutations for All Key Sizes
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 2 Specifications
- 2.1 Keyed-Permutation Pn
- 2.2 AEAD Mode
- 2.3 Security Claim
- 2.4 Self-similarity of Pn
- 3 Slide Attacks on TinyJAMBU-128
- 3.1 Overview of the Simple Slide Attack
- 3.2 Reducing Data or Memory Complexity
- 4 Attacks Against a Larger Key
- 4.1 Building a Filter
- 4.2 Enhancing a Filter with Chains of Queries
- 4.3 Key-Recovery from Input/Output Pairs
- 4.4 Application on TinyJAMBU-192
- 5 Optimization for Attack on TinyJAMBU-256
- 5.1 1-Bit Filter with a 2-Bit Guess
- 5.2 Key-Recovery from Input/Output Pairs for P256
- 5.3 Complexity of TinyJAMBU-256
- 6 Conclusions
- A Discussions and More Observations
- A.1 Slide Attack with Deterministic Differential Characteristics
- A.2 Attacks on Non-multiple Number of Rounds
- A.3 Implication on the Security of the AEAD Schemes
- References
- Quantum Key Recovery Attacks on 3-Round Feistel-2 Structure Without Quantum Encryption Oracles
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Feistel Structure
- 1.2 Attack Scenarios for Quantum Setting
- 1.3 Related Work
- 1.4 Our Motivation
- 1.5 Our Contribution
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Quantum Gates
- 2.2 Quantum Oracle
- 2.3 Grover's Algorithm
- 2.4 Hosoyamada and Sasaki's Claw-Finding Algorithm
- 2.5 3-Round Feistel-2 Structure
- 2.6 Isobe and Shibutani's Classical MITM Attack on 3-Round Feistel-2 Structure
- 2.7 Quantum DS-MITM Attack on 6-Round Feistel Constructions
- 3 Proposed Attacks
- 3.1 Our KPA
- 3.2 Our CPA
- 4 Non-triviality of Improving Our Attacks Using Another Quantum Algorithm
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Post-quantum Cryptography
- Improving Fault Attacks on Rainbow with Fixing Random Vinegar Values
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 Rainbow
- 2.3 Equivalent Key and Good Key
- 2.4 Known Attacks on Rainbow
- 2.5 Fault Attacks on Rainbow
- 3 Proposed Fault Attacks with Fixing Random Vinegar Values
- 3.1 Fault Attack Model
- 3.2 Fixing All Random Vinegar Values (d=v)After this paper was submitted to IWSEC 2022, Aullbach et al. ch8newspsfault have independently proposed the same attack in the case of d=v.
- 3.3 Fixing Some Random Vinegar Values (d&v)
- 4 Complexity of the Proposed Attacks
- 4.1 Fixing All Random Vinegar Values (d=v)
- 4.2 Fixing Some Random Vinegar Values (d&v)
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Quantum-Resistant 1-out-of-N Oblivious Signatures from Lattices
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Motivation and Contribution
- 1.2 Organization
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 Lattices and the SIS Problem
- 2.3 The Normal Distribution and Rejection Sampling
- 2.4 Forking Lemma
- 3 1-out-of-N Oblivious Signature
- 3.1 Definition
- 3.2 Securities Models
- 4 Proposed Oblivious Signature Scheme from Lattices
- 5 Security Proofs
- 5.1 Unforgeability
- 5.2 Ambiguity
- 6 Theoretical Comparison and Efficiency Analysis
- 7 Conclusion and Future Work
- A Proof of Lemma 2
- B Proof of Lemma 3
- C Proof of Lemma 4
- References
- Advanced Cryptography
- On Extension of Evaluation Algorithms in Keyed-Homomorphic Encryption
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Organization of the Paper
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Basic Definitions and Properties
- 2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
- 2.3 Symmetric Key Encryption
- 2.4 Message Authentication Codes
- 3 Keyed-Homomorphic Public-Key Encryption
- 4 On Extension of the Evaluation Algorithm
- 5 Catalano-Fiore Conversion
- 6 Catalano-Fiore Conversion for KH-PKE
- 6.1 Motivation: The Original Catalano-Fiore Conversion Fails
- 6.2 Catalano-Fiore Conversion for KH-PKE
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Computational Irrelevancy: Bridging the Gap Between Pseudo- and Real Randomness in MPC Protocols
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Basic Notations
- 2.2 Pseudorandom Generators
- 2.3 Secure Multiparty Computation
- 3 Formalising Computational Irrelevancy
- 4 Main Theorem: Case of a Single Adversary
- 4.1 Additional Definitions
- 4.2 The Statement
- 4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
- 5 Main Theorem: Case of Multiple Adversaries
- 6 Related Works
- 6.1 Relation to Information-Theoretic Assumptions
- 6.2 On Random Oracle Vs. Hash Function Ensembles
- 6.3 Relation to Computational Independency of One-Way Functions
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Card-Based Secure Sorting Protocol
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Card-Based Cryptography
- 1.2 Secure Sorting with Cards
- 1.3 Contribution
- 1.4 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Deck of Cards
- 2.2 Pile-Scramble Shuffle
- 2.3 Pile-Shifting Shuffle
- 2.4 Koch-Walzer Sort Protocol
- 3 Our Proposed Secure Sorting Protocol
- 3.1 Overall Flow
- 3.2 How to Securely Sort
- 3.3 Description of Our Protocol
- 3.4 Security
- 3.5 Optimization
- 4 Applications of Card-Based Secure Sorting
- 4.1 Auction
- 4.2 Secure Threshold Function Evaluation
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Author Index
System requirements
File format: PDF
Copy protection: Watermark-DRM (Digital Rights Management)
System requirements:
- Computer (Windows; MacOS X; Linux): Use the free software Adobe Reader, Adobe Digital Editions, or any other PDF viewer of your choice (see eBook Help).
- Tablet/Smartphone (Android; iOS): Install the free app Adobe Digital Editions or another reading app for eBooks, e.g., PocketBook (see eBook Help).
- E-reader: Bookeen, Kobo, Pocketbook, Sony, Tolino and many more (only limited: Kindle).
The file format PDF always displays a book page identically on any hardware. This makes PDF suitable for complex layouts such as those used in textbooks and reference books (images, tables, columns, footnotes). Unfortunately, on the small screens of e-readers or smartphones, PDFs are rather annoying, requiring too much scrolling.
This eBook uses Watermark-DRM, a „soft” copy protection. This means that there are no technical restrictions to prevent illegal distribution. However, there is a personalised watermark embedded in the eBook that can be used to identify the purchaser of the eBook in the event of misuse and to provide evidence for legal purposes.
For more information, see our eBook Help page.