Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security

Name: Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security | 43rd International Conference, SAFECOMP 2024, Florence, Italy, September 18-20, 2024, Proceedings
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43rd International Conference, SAFECOMP 2024, Florence, Italy, September 18-20, 2024, Proceedings

Andrea Ceccarelli Mario Trapp Andrea Bondavalli Friedemann Bitsch(Editor)

Springer (Publisher)

Published on 8. September 2024

XVII, 316 pages

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978-3-031-68606-1 (ISBN)

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Content

Intro
Preface
Organization
Contents
Fault Injection and Tolerance
In-Memory Zero-Space Floating-Point-Based CNN Protection Using Non-significant and Invariant Bits
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 Proposed Methodology
3.1 Identification of non-Significant bits
3.2 Location of invariant bits
4 Case Study: LeNet-5 and GoogLeNet
4.1 Locating Non-Significant Bits
4.2 Locating Invariant Bits
4.3 Proposed Error Correcting Codes
4.4 Overhead Estimation of the Proposed ECCs
5 Discussion
6 Conclusions
References
A Failure Model Library for Simulation-Based Validation of Functional Safety
1 Introduction
2 Related Work
3 A Failure Model Library for Simulation-Based FI
3.1 Failure Model Collection
3.2 Failure Model Semantics
4 Case Study
5 Limitations
6 Conclusion
References
Strategic Resilience Evaluation of Neural Networks Within Autonomous Vehicle Software
1 Introduction
2 Autonomous Driving Frameworks
2.1 L4 System: LBC
2.2 L2 System: OpenPilot
2.3 Driving Simulator: CARLA
3 Methodology
3.1 Vulnerable Weights: Taylor Guided Fault Injection (TGFI)
3.2 Experimental Campaigns
4 Resilience Evaluation
4.1 Resilience of L4 LBC
4.2 Resilience of L2 OpenPilot
5 Mitigation
5.1 L4 LBC: Ranger
5.2 L2 OpenPilot: Driver Intervention
6 Case Studies and Discussion
6.1 Importance of Layer Depth for Resilience
6.2 Sensitivity to Single and Multi-bit Faults
6.3 Lessons Learned from L4 LBC and L2 OpenPilot
7 Related Work
8 Conclusions
References
System and Software Safety Assurance
Reconciling Safety Measurement and Dynamic Assurance
1 Introduction
2 Conceptual Background
3 Motivating Example
3.1 Baseline Safety
3.2 Practical Drift
4 Framework
4.1 Defining Safety Metrics and Indicators
4.2 Updating and Revising the Operational Risk Assessment
4.3 Characterizing the Change to Safety Risk
4.4 Numerical Examples
5 Towards Formal Foundations
6 Concluding Remarks
References
Safety Invariant Engineering for Interlocking Verification
1 Introduction
2 Safety Invariants
2.1 Requirements
2.2 Current Solutions
3 Property Engineering
3.1 Eliciting Safety Properties from Standards
3.2 Reducing the Number of False Positives
3.3 Redefining What the Property Violation Is
3.4 Regression Testing of Developed Safety Invariants
4 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Assurance Case Synthesis from a Curated Semantic Triplestore
1 Introduction
2 The Rapid Assurance Curation Kit (RACK)
3 Automated GSN Synthesis from RACK
3.1 The GSN Ontology
3.2 Project-Specific GSN Pattern Example
3.3 Automated Synthesis of GSN Fragments Using Patterns
3.4 GUI Support for GSN Generation and Analysis
4 Related Work
5 Conclusion
References
CyberDS: Auditable Monitoring in the Cloud
1 Introduction
2 Motivating Example
3 Monitoring Approach
3.1 Specification Language
3.2 Security Monitor
3.3 Tamper-Proof Claim Database and Auditability
4 Claim Revision Control
4.1 Revision Model
4.2 Monitoring with Revisions
5 Implementation and Experimental Results
6 Discussion
7 Related Work
7.1 Runtime Monitoring
7.2 Auditability of System Events
8 Conclusion
References
Automated Driving Systems
Anatomy of a Robotaxi Crash: Lessons from the Cruise Pedestrian Dragging Mishap
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 Terminology
2.2 Crash Context and Overview
3 Crash Details
3.1 Crash Timeline
3.2 Crash Analysis
3.3 Potential Lessons
4 The Immediate Response
4.1 Immediate Response Timeline
4.2 Post-Crash Analysis
4.3 Potential Lessons
5 Organizational Response
5.1 Organizational Response Analysis
5.2 Potential Lessons
6 Conclusions
References
Comprehensive Change Impact Analysis Applied to Advanced Automotive Systems
1 Introduction
2 Background on CIA for Incremental Safety Assurance
3 Running Example
4 Original Vehicle Family Models Stage 0
4.1 HARA Metamodels
4.2 HAZOP Metamodels
4.3 Verification Metamodel
4.4 Instance Models
4.5 Instances for Stage 0
5 CIA After a Change to the Battery Management System
5.1 Identifying Direct Changes - Stage 1
5.2 Identifying Potential Impacts in the System - Stage 2
5.3 Confirming Actual Impacts in the System - Stage 3
5.4 Identifying Potential Impacts in the Assurance Case - Stage 4
5.5 Confirming Actual Impacts in the Assurance - Stage 5
5.6 Incremental Assurance - Stages 6 and 7
6 Discussion
7 Conclusion
References
A Case Study of Continuous Assurance Argument for Level 4 Automated Driving
1 Introduction
2 Related Work
3 A Case Study in a Local City
3.1 Top Level of Assurance Case for Level 4 Automated Driving
3.2 GSN Module M2 for Identification of Risk and Hazard
3.3 GSN Module M4 for Evaluation and Validation
4 A Toolchain of an Assurance Case Tool and a Monitoring System
5 Lessons Obtained from the Case Study
6 Concluding Remarks
References
Security of Safety-Critical Systems
TitanSSL: Towards Accelerating OpenSSL in a Full RISC-V Architecture Using OpenTitan Root-of-Trust
1 Introduction
2 Background and Related Works
3 Hardware Architecture
4 TitanSSL Software Architecture
4.1 Application Processor
4.2 Security Controller
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Comparison with Software Implementation
5.2 OpenTitan Firmware Analysis
6 Security Assumptions and Implications
7 Conclusion
References
A Lightweight and Responsive On-Line IDS Towards Intelligent Connected Vehicles System
1 Introduction
2 Methodology
2.1 System Overview
2.2 Threat Model
2.3 ML-BF Model
2.4 Feature Engineering
2.5 Blacklist Filter
3 Implementation
3.1 Testbed Setting
3.2 Dataset Selection
3.3 Data Pre-processing
3.4 Machine Learning Approaches Adoption
3.5 Model Training
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Evaluation Metrics
4.2 Detection Performance
4.3 Computational Consumption
4.4 Analysis and Discussion
5 Related Work
5.1 Machine Learning for Intrusion Detection in ICV
5.2 Lightweight IDS in ICV
5.3 Responsive IDS in ICV
6 Conclusion
References
Evaluating the Vulnerability Detection Efficacy of Smart Contracts Analysis Tools
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 Related Works
4 Experimental Study Methodology
5 Experimental Study Results
5.1 RQ1: Contests Versus Vulnerabilities
5.2 RQ2: Tools Versus Vulnerabilities
5.3 RQ3: Tools in Theory Versus Tools in Practice
5.4 RQ4: Analysis Complexity Versus Tool Efficacy
6 Conclusions
References
Safety-Security Analysis via Attack-Fault-Defense Trees: Semantics and Cut Set Metrics
1 Introduction
2 Related Work
3 Case Study: Gridshield
4 Background
5 Attack-Fault-Defense Trees
5.1 Formal Definition of AFDT
5.2 Gridshield AFDT
6 Qualitative Analysis of AFDT
7 Safety and Security Dependencies via MCS
8 Conclusion and Future Work
References
Safety Verification
Coyan: Fault Tree Analysis - Exact and Scalable
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Computing Unreliability Values
4 Unreliability Through WMC of Tseitin Transformation
5 Implementation
6 Experimentation
6.1 Benchmarks
6.2 Results
6.3 Industrial Benchmarks
7 Concluding Remarks
References
Safety Argumentation for Machinery Assembly Control Software
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 EN ISO 13849:2023
2.2 Assurance Cases
2.3 Contract-Based Design
3 SAMACS: Safety Argumentation for Machinery Assembly Control Software
4 Case Study
4.1 Establishment of Software Responsibility
4.2 Definition of Software Safety Goals
4.3 Identification of Software Safety Requirements
4.4 Definition of Contracts
4.5 Identification of Verification Techniques and Evidence Provision
4.6 Composing the Safety Case Arguments
5 Discussion
6 Related Work
7 Conclusions and Future Work
References
Sound Non-interference Analysis for C/C++
1 Introduction
2 Sound Static Source Code Analysis
3 Data and Control Flow Errors
4 Data and Control Flow Analysis
5 Taint Analysis
5.1 Modeling Interference
5.2 Signal Flow Analysis
5.3 Freedom of Interference Between Software Components
6 Experimental Results
7 Related Work
8 Conclusion
References
Autonomous Systems
A Dynamic Assurance Framework for an Autonomous Survey Drone
1 Introduction
2 Related Literature
3 Case Study and Monitor Examples
3.1 Monitoring Battery State and Required Power Consumption
3.2 Monitoring and Predicting Task Scheduling and Executing Times
3.3 Reconfigurations Calculation
4 Dynamic Assurance Case Approach
4.1 Battery Monitor Assurance Case
4.2 Discussion
4.3 Online Monitoring Interface
5 Conclusions
References
Redefining Safety for Autonomous Vehicles
1 Introduction
2 Existing Safety Definitions
2.1 ISO 26262
2.2 ISO 21448
2.3 ANSI/UL 4600
2.4 Other Safety Definitions
3 Examples of AV Safety Problems
4 What is Missing from Safety Definitions
4.1 Open World Environment
4.2 Self-enforcement of Operational Limitations
4.3 Ad Hoc Systems of Systems
4.4 Legal and Ethical Constraints
5 A Proposal for More Robust Definitions
5.1 What Needs to be Addressed?
5.2 Proposed Safety-Related Definitions
6 Conclusions
References
Author Index

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Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security

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