Because You Promised
A Non-Reductive Account of the Normativity of Promises
Published on 19. May 2026
306 pages
978-1-040-62324-4 (ISBN)
Description
As a moral phenomenon, promises have long received great amounts of attention in philosophical debates within both normative ethics and metaethics. This book defends a novel trust-based form of non-reductivism about promises and promissory normativity.
There is a tension inherent in the ways in which promises feature in our ethical thought. On the one hand, that one is obligated to keep one's promises appears to be one of the most straightforward, unquestionable moral truths around. On the other hand, promissory obligation, as an obligation voluntarily incurred through a performative speech act, has appeared to many as mysterious, and thus in need of a specific explanation. This book sets out from this tension to substantially advance debates both about the nature of promises and promissory normativity, and by extension, normative powers more generally. It develops a comprehensive account of promissory normativity, the "Two-Level Trust View". This view retains the intuitive plausibility of a non-reductive account of promissory normativity, according to which the mere fact that one has validly promised is sufficient to render a breach of promise morally wrong. At the same time, it also provides a powerful and theoretically appealing value-based explanation of our promissory power, a type of explanation traditionally thought to be limited only to reductive accounts of promissory normativity.
Because You Promised will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in normative ethics and metaethics, philosophy of language, political philosophy, and philosophy of law.
There is a tension inherent in the ways in which promises feature in our ethical thought. On the one hand, that one is obligated to keep one's promises appears to be one of the most straightforward, unquestionable moral truths around. On the other hand, promissory obligation, as an obligation voluntarily incurred through a performative speech act, has appeared to many as mysterious, and thus in need of a specific explanation. This book sets out from this tension to substantially advance debates both about the nature of promises and promissory normativity, and by extension, normative powers more generally. It develops a comprehensive account of promissory normativity, the "Two-Level Trust View". This view retains the intuitive plausibility of a non-reductive account of promissory normativity, according to which the mere fact that one has validly promised is sufficient to render a breach of promise morally wrong. At the same time, it also provides a powerful and theoretically appealing value-based explanation of our promissory power, a type of explanation traditionally thought to be limited only to reductive accounts of promissory normativity.
Because You Promised will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in normative ethics and metaethics, philosophy of language, political philosophy, and philosophy of law.
Reviews / Votes
"Bruno's book provides a comprehensive philosophical treatment of promising, one that I believe will become a standard reference for future research. Moreover, it is written in beautifully clear prose and is consistently informed and illustrated by examples, making it accessible even to advanced students. It is essential reading for those working on promising and highly recommended for anyone interested in this fascinating topic."Benjamin Kiesewetter, Bielefeld University, Germany
"This is an excellent discussion of promissory obligation. The book shows a magisterial command of the contemporary and historical literature on promises, and it makes an effective and original contribution to debates about promissory normativity, connecting it to the value of interpersonal trust. Accessible and engaging, it is one of the most illuminating treatments of promises I have encountered."
R. Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley, USA
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Product notice
Reflowable
File size
0,99 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-040-62324-4 (9781040623244)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
05/2026
1st Edition
Routledge
€188.50
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Daniele Bruno is a postdoctoral researcher (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at Humboldt University of Berlin. His research interests lie primarily at the intersection of normative ethics and metaethics. His work has appeared in journals including Philosophical Studies, The Philosophical Quarterly, and Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Content
Chapter 1: Promises and Obligations 1.The Importance of Conceptual Questions about Promises 2. On the Notion of Promissory Obligation 3. The Strong Obligation View 4. Understanding Promises without Obligation - The Intention View 5. The Obligation View Revisited
Chapter 2: Taking Promises at Face Value 1. From Conceptual to Normative Necessity 2. The Case for Taking Promises at Face Value 3. Promising as a Normative Power 4. Normative Powers in Theoretical Context 5. Validity Conditions for Promises 6. Summing Up: The Prima Facie Case for Non-Reductivism
Chapter 3: The Alleged Mystery of Non-Reductivism 1.The Charge of Mystery 2. Bootstrapping Worries 3. Value-Independence as the Core of the Worry 4. Promissory Value-Independence and the Value-Reason Nexus 5.The Value of Promising and Challenges of Vindication 6. What Next?
Chapter 4: Reductive Accounts of Promissory Normativity 1. Types of Reductive Theory 2. Practice Views: Taxonomy and Core Ideas 3. Self-Interest Theories 4. Conventionalist Theories 5. Perlocutionary Theories 6.The Hybrid Account 7. A Limited Kind of Pluralism about Promissory Normativity
Chapter 5: A Trilemma for Reductivism about Promissory Normativity 1. A Blueprint for an Extensionally Adequate Reductive Theory 2. Promises and Trust: An Extensionally Adequate Reductive Theory? 3. The Redundancy Problem for the Reductive Trust View 4. More Overgeneration Worries 5. Laying Out the Trilemma for Reductivism 6. Conventionalism and the Trilemma for Reductivism
Chapter 6: Two-Level Accounts of Promissory Normativity 1. Recapitulation: Between a Rock and a Hard Place 2.The Value of Normative Control 3.Two Types of Value-Based Grounding 4.Two-Level Accounts and Conventionalism 5. Advantages of Two-Level Accounts 6. Challenges and Objections
Chapter 7: The Objection from Wishful Thinking 1. Value-Based Grounding and Wishful Thinking 2. Material and Normative Components of the Promissory Power 3. The Case of Rights to Personal Autonomy 4. Other Cases of B-Type Grounding in the Normative 5. Towards a Possible Explanation of the Results
Chapter 8: On the Value of Promissory Control 1. Accounts of the Value of Promissory Control - How and Why 2. The Social Coordination View 3. The Authority View 4. Grounding Promissory Obligation in the Value of Authority 5. Overgeneration Worries for the Authority View 6. Authority, Obligation, and the Discharging Problem 7. The Value of Involvement and Assurance
Chapter 9: The Two-Level Trust View 1. Normative Control and Assurance: Introducing the Trust View 2.Trust and the Value of Trust Relationships 2. The Warrant-Giving Nature of the Promissory Power 3. Some Important Advantages of the Trust View 4. Potential Objections to the Two-Level Trust View Trust and the Problem of Unserved Interest
Chapter 2: Taking Promises at Face Value 1. From Conceptual to Normative Necessity 2. The Case for Taking Promises at Face Value 3. Promising as a Normative Power 4. Normative Powers in Theoretical Context 5. Validity Conditions for Promises 6. Summing Up: The Prima Facie Case for Non-Reductivism
Chapter 3: The Alleged Mystery of Non-Reductivism 1.The Charge of Mystery 2. Bootstrapping Worries 3. Value-Independence as the Core of the Worry 4. Promissory Value-Independence and the Value-Reason Nexus 5.The Value of Promising and Challenges of Vindication 6. What Next?
Chapter 4: Reductive Accounts of Promissory Normativity 1. Types of Reductive Theory 2. Practice Views: Taxonomy and Core Ideas 3. Self-Interest Theories 4. Conventionalist Theories 5. Perlocutionary Theories 6.The Hybrid Account 7. A Limited Kind of Pluralism about Promissory Normativity
Chapter 5: A Trilemma for Reductivism about Promissory Normativity 1. A Blueprint for an Extensionally Adequate Reductive Theory 2. Promises and Trust: An Extensionally Adequate Reductive Theory? 3. The Redundancy Problem for the Reductive Trust View 4. More Overgeneration Worries 5. Laying Out the Trilemma for Reductivism 6. Conventionalism and the Trilemma for Reductivism
Chapter 6: Two-Level Accounts of Promissory Normativity 1. Recapitulation: Between a Rock and a Hard Place 2.The Value of Normative Control 3.Two Types of Value-Based Grounding 4.Two-Level Accounts and Conventionalism 5. Advantages of Two-Level Accounts 6. Challenges and Objections
Chapter 7: The Objection from Wishful Thinking 1. Value-Based Grounding and Wishful Thinking 2. Material and Normative Components of the Promissory Power 3. The Case of Rights to Personal Autonomy 4. Other Cases of B-Type Grounding in the Normative 5. Towards a Possible Explanation of the Results
Chapter 8: On the Value of Promissory Control 1. Accounts of the Value of Promissory Control - How and Why 2. The Social Coordination View 3. The Authority View 4. Grounding Promissory Obligation in the Value of Authority 5. Overgeneration Worries for the Authority View 6. Authority, Obligation, and the Discharging Problem 7. The Value of Involvement and Assurance
Chapter 9: The Two-Level Trust View 1. Normative Control and Assurance: Introducing the Trust View 2.Trust and the Value of Trust Relationships 2. The Warrant-Giving Nature of the Promissory Power 3. Some Important Advantages of the Trust View 4. Potential Objections to the Two-Level Trust View Trust and the Problem of Unserved Interest
