Rationality Through Reasoning
Published on 7. June 2013
328 pages
978-1-118-60910-1 (ISBN)
Description
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of howpeople are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do,built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality andreasoning that differs significantly from much existingphilosophical thinking.
* Develops an original account of normativity, rationality andreasoning significantly different from the majority of existingphilosophical thought
* Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning thatexplains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather thansomething that happens in us
* Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that theconnection between rationality and reasons is much less close thanmany philosophers have thought
* Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including ownedoughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements,instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning,following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connectionsbetween intentions and beliefs, and much else.
* Offers a new answer to the 'motivation question' ofhow a normative belief motivates an action.
Reviews / Votes
"Rationality Through Reasoning is clearly written, and itcontains many discussions with other experts in this genre ofanalytic philosophy, such as Gilbert Harman, Niko Kolodny, andDerek Parfit, to whom the book is dedicated." (Ethical Perspectives, 1 March 2014) "This book is a masterclass in how to deploy illuminatingexamples and penetrating analyses to illuminate the connectionsbetween reasons, rationality, what ought to be done andintention." -- Frank Jackson, The Australian NationalUniversity "We ought to be deeply grateful to John Broome for having shedso much light on the nature of rationality, reasons and reasoning.His book will set a new standard of clarity in the discussion ofthese difficult but fundamental topics." -- Paul Boghossian, New York UniversityMore details
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J. Broome
Rationality Through Reasoning
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Wiley
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Person
John Broome is White's Professor of MoralPhilosophy at the University of Oxford, a fellow of Corpus ChristiCollege, Oxford, and an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at theAustralian National University. He is the author of amongst othersWeighing Goods (1991), Ethics Out of Economics(1999), Weighing Lives (2004), and Climate matters(2012).
Content
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 This book 4
Notes 6
2 Ought 8
2.1 The meaning of 'ought' 8
2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts 9
2.3 Owned and unowned oughts 12
2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts 25
Notes 29
3 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 31
3.1 Sidgwick's View 31
3.2 The need to decide 34
3.3 Objective and prospective oughts 36
3.4 Valuing prospects 41
3.5 Summary 45
Notes 45
4 Reasons 46
4.1 Introduction and preliminaries 46
4.2 Pro toto reasons 49
4.3 Pro tanto reasons 51
4.4 Most reason 62
4.5 Ownership of reasons 65
5 Responding to Reasons 71
5.1 Rationality and responding to reasons 71
5.2 The quick objection 74
5.3 Attitudinal reasons 75
5.4 Sufficiency of reasons 82
Notes 87
6 Responding to Reason-Beliefs 88
6.1 The Enkratic Condition 88
6.2 Meeting your own standards 91
6.3 Responding correctly to P-beliefs 101
6.4 Conclusion 107
Notes 108
7 Requirements 109
7.1 Two sorts of requirement 109
7.2 Property requirements 110
7.3 Source requirements 116
7.4 Logic for requirements? 119
7.5 Ought 126
Notes 129
8 Conditional Requirements 132
8.1 Application and content 132
8.2 Conditional requirements of rationality 134
Notes 146
Appendix to Chapter 8 148
9 Synchronic Rationality 149
9.1 Introduction and method 149
9.2 Consistency 154
9.3 Deduction 157
9.4 Instrumental Rationality 159
9.5 Enkrasia 170
9.6 Bayesian requirements 175
Notes 175
10 Diachronic Rationality 177
10.1 Persistence of Intention 177
10.2 The rationality of doing as you decide 181
10.3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs 185
Notes 69
10.4 Basing prohibitions and basing permissions 186
Notes 191
11 Rationality and Normativity 192
11.1 The Normative Question 192
11.2 More on rationality and reasons 193
11.3 Is rationality derivatively normative? 197
11.4 Is rationality non-derivatively normative? 204
Notes 205
12 Higher-Order Reasoning 206
12.1 The reasoning process 206
12.2 Reasoning through an intention 210
12.3 Reasoning with judgement-sensitive attitudes 216
12.4 One more point 219
Notes 220
13 First-Order Reasoning 221
13.1 The reasoning process 221
13.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for reasoning 225
13.3 Operating on contents 231
13.4 Reasoning as activity 235
13.5 Reasoning at the first order 242
13.6 The direction of reasoning 243
13.7 Correct belief reasoning 246
Notes 248
14 Practical Reasoning 250
14.1 Reasoning with attitudes other than beliefs 250
14.2 Correctness 255
14.3 Choosing a means 261
14.4 Hypothesizing 264
Notes 265
15 Explicit Reasoning 267
15.1 Markers 267
15.2 Bayesian and expressivist reasoning 275
15.3 Reasoning with absences 278
15.4 Theoretical and practical reasoning 281
15.5 Intention reasoning with other markers 285
Notes 286
16 Enkratic Reasoning 288
16.1 Enkratic reasoning 288
16.2 Humean objections 291
16.3 Conclusion 294
Notes 294
Bibliography 295
Index 303
