Does Perception Have Content?
1st Edition
Published on 5. September 2014
352 pages
978-0-19-939524-8 (ISBN)
Description
Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of perception, the question of whether perception has content in the first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments? Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that perception has content?
This volume brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address these and other central questions in the philosophy of perception.
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Berit Brogaard
Does Perception Have Content?
Book
10/2014
Oxford University Press Inc
€155.80
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Berit Brogaard is Professor of Philosophy, University of Miami She is the author of Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions and numerous articles in the philosophy of perception and philosophy of language.
Content
1. Introduction: Does Perception Have Content? Berit Brogaard
Part I: Content Views
2. Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism Bence Nanay
3. Affordances and the Contents of Perception Susanna Siegel
4. Looks, Reasons and Experiences Kathrin Glüer
Part II: Against Strong Content
5. The Problem of the Content View Mark Johnston
6. The Preserve of Thinkers Charles Travis
7. Disjunctivism and the Alleged Nontransitivity of Indiscriminability Diana Raffman
Part III: Reconciliatory Views
8. The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience Susanna Schellenberg
9. Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconciliation Heather Logue
10. On which perceptual phenomena have content and why they have it Benj Hellie
Part IV: Imagistic and Possible-Word Content
11. Image Content Mohan Matthen
12. What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? Michael Tye
Part V: The Constituents of Perceptual Content and the Role of Perception
13. What Does Vision Represent? Bill Lycan
14. Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color Terry Horgan
15. Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience Tomasz Budek and Katalin Farkas
