Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control

¿Acknowledgments 1 Introduction Background Purpose of Present Study Standard for AnalysisPart I Economics of Vertical Control 2 Transaction Costs The Incentive to Integrate The Welfare Effects Transaction Cost Determinants Advantages and Limitations of Internal Transfers Contractual Alternatives 3 Fixed Proportions and Contractual Alternatives No Incentive for Vertical Control Successive Monopoly Important Product-Specific Services Entry Barriers 4 Variable Proportions and Contractual Alternatives Ownership Integration Tying Arrangements Output Royalties Sales Revenue Royalties Lump-Sum Entry Fees Vertical Controls: Problems in Practice Conclusion 5 Vertical Integration Under Uncertainty Early Studies More Recent Studies Random Demand Random Input Prices 6 Vertical Integration without Contractual Alternatives Regulation and Vertical Integration Monopsony and Vertical Integration Price Discrimination and Vertical Integration Vertical Integration and Downstream Disequilibrium Appendix: A Formal Analysis of Vertical Integration and Downstream DisequilibriumPart II Legal Analysis of Vertical Control 7 Legal Treatment of Ownership Integration Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act Vertical Integration and the Clayton Act Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1968 Market Foreclosure Doctrine The 1982 Merger Guidelines Concluding Remarks 8 Per Se Illegal Contractual Controls Fixing Maximum-Resale Prices Resale Price Maintenance Tying Arrangements Public Policy Assessment 9 Contractual Controls That Are Not Illegal Per Se Introduction Presumptively Legal Controls Exclusive Dealing and Requirements Contracts Territorial Restraints Concluding RemarksPart III Public Policy Analysis 10 Conclusion Alternative Legal Rules Appropriate Antitrust Policy Areas for Future ResearchEpilogueBibliographyIndex