
Computer Security - ESORICS 2021
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The two volume set LNCS 12972 + 12973 constitutes the proceedings of the 26 th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2021, which took place during October 4-8, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Darmstadt, Germany, but changed to an online event due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The 71 full papers presented in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 351 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows:
Part I: network security; attacks; fuzzing; malware; user behavior and underground economy; blockchain; machine learning; automotive; anomaly detection;
Part II: encryption; cryptography; privacy; differential privacy; zero knowledge; key exchange; multi-party computation.More details
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Keynotes
- Algorithms and the Law
- The Politics and Technology of (Hardware) Trojans
- Increasing Trust in ML Through Governance
- The Science of Computer Science: An Offensive Research Perspective
- Contents - Part I
- Contents - Part II
- Network Security
- More Efficient Post-quantum KEMTLS with Pre-distributed Public Keys
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Pre-distributed Keys
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 KEMTLS with Pre-distributed Long-Term Keys
- 3.1 Proactive Client Authentication
- 4 Security Analysis
- 5 Instantiation and Evaluation
- 5.1 Choice of Primitives
- 5.2 Implementation
- 5.3 Handshake Sizes
- 5.4 Handshake Times
- 6 Discussion
- A KEMTLS
- References
- How to (Legally) Keep Secrets from Mobile Operators
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 LIKE Protocols
- 4 Security Model
- 5 Our Protocol
- 6 Security
- 7 Proof-of-Concept Implementation
- 8 Conclusion
- A Model Complements
- B Proof Sketches
- References
- A Formal Security Analysis of Session Resumption Across Hostnames
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Building Blocks
- 2.2 Multi-Stage Key Exchange
- 3 Breaking the Security of Session Resumption Across Hostnames in TLS 1.3
- 3.1 Modeling TLS 1.3 Session Resumption as an MSKE Protocol
- 3.2 The Attack
- 4 Secure SRAH Protocols
- 4.1 Constructing Secure SRAH Protocols
- References
- Attacks
- Caught in the Web: DoS Vulnerabilities in Parsers for Structured Data
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Motivation
- 3 Characteristics of the Vulnerability
- 3.1 Topologies
- 3.2 Traversals
- 3.3 Triggers
- 4 Modelling the Analysis
- 4.1 Preliminaries
- 4.2 Analysis Specification
- 5 Experimental Setup and Evaluation
- 5.1 Approach
- 5.2 Implementation
- 5.3 Libraries for Analysis
- 5.4 Triggers or Entry Points
- 5.5 Evaluation
- 6 Results and Discussion
- 6.1 PDF Vulnerabilities
- 6.2 Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) Vulnerability
- 6.3 YAML Vulnerability
- 6.4 Newly Discovered Security Vulnerabilities
- 6.5 Threats to Validity
- 7 Related Work
- 7.1 Detecting Algorithmic Complexity Vulnerabilities
- 7.2 Traversals/Performance Bugs
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- PoW-How: An Enduring Timing Side-Channel to Evade Online Malware Sandboxes
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Malware and Malware Analysis
- 2.2 PoW for Malware Analysis Evasion
- 2.3 Side-Channel Measurement
- 3 Our Approach: PoW-How
- 3.1 Threat Model
- 3.2 System Design
- 3.3 Performance Profiling
- 3.4 Threshold Estimation
- 3.5 Malware Integration and Testing
- 4 Evaluation
- 4.1 Threshold Estimation and PoW Algorithm Choice
- 4.2 Case Study: Known Malware
- 4.3 Case Study: Fresh Malware Sample
- 5 Security Analysis
- 6 Countermeasures
- 7 Discussion
- 7.1 Ethical Considerations
- 7.2 Bare-Metal Environments
- 7.3 Economical Denial of Sustainability
- 8 Related Work
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- Characterizing GPU Overclocking Faults
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Background
- 1.2 Related Work
- 1.3 Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 CUDA
- 2.2 General GPU Setup
- 2.3 Overclocking
- 2.4 Attack Model
- 3 GPU Faults and Temperature Dependency
- 3.1 Setup
- 3.2 Initial Tests
- 3.3 Basics of Faults
- 3.4 The Relationship Between Faults and Temperature
- 4 Faults Boundaries and Values
- 4.1 The Boundaries of Faults
- 4.2 Byte-Flips and Bit-Flips
- 5 Memory Remnants and Transaction Size
- 5.1 The Basic Memory Transaction Size
- 5.2 A Model of the Memory Remnants Hypothesis:
- 5.3 Experimental Results
- 5.4 A Unified Fault Model
- 6 Countermeasures and Conclusions
- 6.1 Countermeasures
- 6.2 Conclusions
- A Appendix
- A.1 CUDA basics
- A.2 Future Work
- References
- Fuzzing
- ARIstoteles - Dissecting Apple's Baseband Interface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Related Work
- 2.1 Baseband Security Architecture
- 2.2 Baseband Interface Analysis Options on iOS
- 2.3 IOS Shared Libraries
- 3 Apple Remote Invocation Protocol
- 4 Fully-Automated Protocol Dissection
- 5 Automated Reverse-Engineering
- 5.1 Group and TLV Definitions
- 5.2 Type Definitions
- 5.3 Integrating Existing Dissectors
- 5.4 iOS Version Change Tracking
- 6 Fuzzing
- 6.1 Initial Fuzzing Considerations
- 6.2 Building and Optimizing Fuzzers
- 6.3 Crash Evaluation
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- webFuzz: Grey-Box Fuzzing for Web Applications
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contributions
- 2 webFuzz
- 2.1 Instrumentation
- 2.2 Fuzzing Analysis
- 3 Bug Injection
- 3.1 Analysis and Injection
- 3.2 Bug Template
- 4 Evaluation
- 4.1 Code Coverage
- 4.2 Throughput
- 4.3 Vulnerability Detection
- 5 Limitations
- 6 Future Work
- 7 Related Work
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- My Fuzzer Beats Them All! Developing a Framework for Fair Evaluation and Comparison of Fuzzers
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Statistical Evaluations
- 4 Problem Description and Related Work
- 5 Our Methodology
- 5.1 Comparing Fuzzers
- 5.2 Test Set Selection
- 5.3 Seed Sets
- 5.4 Statistical Evaluation
- 5.5 Fuzzing Evaluation Setup
- 5.6 Test Runs
- 6 Experiments
- 6.1 Fuzzers
- 6.2 Seed Set
- 6.3 Run-Time
- 6.4 Number of Trials
- 6.5 Number of Bugs/Targets
- 6.6 Further Insights
- 7 Discussion
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Malware
- Rope: Covert Multi-process Malware Execution with Return-Oriented Programming
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Defenses for Systems and Applications
- 2.2 Distributed Malware
- 3 Challenges for Covert Distributed Malware
- 4 Rope
- 4.1 Architecture
- 4.2 Loader Component
- 4.3 Chunk Crafting and ROP-TxF Layout
- 4.4 Bootstrap Component
- 4.5 Discussion
- 5 Implementation
- 6 Evaluation
- 7 Countermeasures and Wrap-Up
- References
- Towards Automating Code-Reuse Attacks Using Synthesized Gadget Chains
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Shortcomings of State-of-the-Art Approaches
- 3 Design
- 3.1 Gadgets
- 3.2 Logical Encoding
- 3.3 Preconditions and Postconditions
- 3.4 Formula Generation
- 3.5 Algorithm Configuration
- 4 Implementation
- 5 Evaluation
- 5.1 Setup
- 5.2 Finding a Chain
- 5.3 Real-World Applicability
- 5.4 Target-Specific Constraints
- 5.5 Chain Statistics
- 5.6 SGC's Configuration
- 6 Discussion
- 7 Related Work
- 8 Conclusion
- A Modeling
- B dnsmasq CVE-2017-14493
- References
- Peeler: Profiling Kernel-Level Events to Detect Ransomware
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work
- 3 Key Characteristics to Detect Ransomware
- 3.1 Application Contextual Behavior
- 3.2 Application Behavioral Characteristics
- 4 System Design
- 4.1 Overview
- 4.2 System Events Monitor
- 4.3 Malicious Commands Detector
- 4.4 Machine Learning-Based Classifier
- 5 Dataset Collection
- 5.1 Ransomware
- 5.2 Benign Applications
- 6 Evaluation
- 6.1 Detection Accuracy
- 6.2 Effectiveness in Detecting Abused Tools/utilities
- 6.3 Robustness Against Unseen Families
- 7 Conclusion
- A Dataset
- A.1 Ransomware families
- A.2 Benign applications
- References
- User Behaviour and Underground Economy
- Mingling of Clear and Muddy Water: Understanding and Detecting Semantic Confusion in Blackhat SEO
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Search Engine Optimization (SEO)
- 2.2 Blackhat SEO
- 2.3 Semantic-Based Techniques
- 3 Semantic Confusion Detection
- 3.1 System Overview
- 3.2 Datasets
- 3.3 Data Processor
- 3.4 Semantic Analyzer
- 3.5 SEO Collector
- 4 Implementation and Evaluation
- 4.1 Implementation
- 4.2 Evaluation
- 5 Measurement
- 5.1 Overview
- 5.2 SEO Domains
- 5.3 SEO Campaigns
- 5.4 Real-World Deployment
- 6 Practical Issues
- 7 Discussion
- 8 Related Work
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- An Explainable Online Password Strength Estimator
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Background
- 1.2 Contributions
- 2 Rank Estimation and Key Enumeration in Cryptographic Side-Channel Attacks
- 3 Multi-dimensional Models for Passwords
- 3.1 Overview
- 3.2 The Data Corpus
- 3.3 Selecting Dimensions
- 3.4 The Learning Phase
- 3.5 The Estimation Phase
- 3.6 Estimating the Ranks of Unleaked Password Parts
- 3.7 Performance
- 4 Usability of PESrank
- 4.1 A Proof of Concept Study
- 4.2 Explainability
- 5 Comparison with Existing Methods
- 5.1 Comparison to Cracker-Based and Neural Methods
- 5.2 Storage Requirements
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusions
- A Additional Related Work
- A.1 Heuristic pure-estimator approaches
- A.2 Tweakable extensions and variations
- References
- Detecting Video-Game Injectors Exchanged in Game Cheating Communities
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Methodology
- 2.1 Data Collection
- 2.2 Post Analysis
- 2.3 Attachment Analysis
- 2.4 Injector Classifier
- 3 Results
- 3.1 Dataset Characterization
- 3.2 Injectors Classifier
- 3.3 Forum Analysis
- 4 Related Work
- 5 Discussion and Conclusions
- A Analysis Features
- References
- Blockchain
- Revocable Policy-Based Chameleon Hash
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Overview
- 3 Preliminaries
- 3.1 Bilinear Map
- 3.2 Hard Assumption
- 3.3 Access Structure
- 3.4 Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption
- 3.5 Tree-Based Structure for User Revocation
- 4 Revocable Policy-Based Chameleon Hash
- 4.1 System Model
- 4.2 Formal Definition
- 4.3 Security Model
- 5 Revocable Policy-Based Chameleon Hash
- 5.1 Proposed RABE
- 5.2 Proposed RPCH
- 5.3 Applications
- 6 Performance Analysis
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Fair Peer-to-Peer Content Delivery via Blockchain
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Warm-Up: Verifiable Fair Delivery
- 4 Formalizing P2P Content Delivery
- 4.1 System Model
- 4.2 Design Goals
- 5 FairDownload: Fair P2P Downloading
- 5.1 FairDownload Overview
- 5.2 FD: FairDownload Protocol
- 6 FairStream: Fair p2p Streaming
- 6.1 FairStream Overview
- 6.2 FS: FairStream Protocol
- 7 Implementation and Evaluations
- 7.1 Evaluating FairDownload
- 7.2 Evaluating FairStream
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Conclave: A Collective Stake Pool Protocol
- 1 Introduction
- 2 UC Weighted Threshold Signature
- 3 The Collective Stake Pool
- 3.1 Hybrid Protocol Execution
- 3.2 Part 1: Stake Pool Management
- 3.3 Part 2: Participation in Consensus
- 3.4 The Security of the Conclave Collective Stake Pool
- 4 Weighted Threshold ECDSA
- 4.1 Key Generation Protocol Thresh-Key-Gen
- 4.2 Signing Protocol Thresh-Sign
- 4.3 Identifiable Abort
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Probabilistic Micropayments with Transferability
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contribution
- 1.2 Organization of This Paper
- 2 Background
- 3 Ticket Transfer Overview
- 3.1 Outline
- 3.2 Escrow Setup
- 3.3 Payment with Lottery Ticket
- 3.4 Ticket Winning and Revocation
- 4 Ticket Winning Condition
- 4.1 Structure of the Ticket
- 4.2 Ticket Winning Condition
- 5 Proportional Fee Scheme
- 6 Security Design
- 6.1 Detection Methods
- 7 Conclusions
- References
- MiniLedger: Compact-Sized Anonymous and Auditable Distributed Payments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 MiniLedger Model
- 4 MiniLedger Construction
- 4.1 Our Construction
- 4.2 Discussion and Comparisons
- 5 Evaluation
- 6 Conclusion
- A MiniLedger Security and Extensions
- A.1 MiniLedger security
- A.2 Adding Clients for Fine-grained Auditing (MiniLedger+)
- A.3 Additional Types of Audits
- References
- Succinct Scriptable NIZK via Trusted Hardware
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Security Definition
- 4 Our Succinct Scriptable NIZK Construction
- 5 OHWQ Instantiations
- 6 Implementation and Evaluations
- 7 Related Work
- 8 Conclusion
- A SGX implementation
- References
- Machine Learning
- CONTRA: Defending Against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Related Work
- 2.1 Federated Learning
- 2.2 Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning
- 2.3 Existing Defenses Against Poisoning Attacks
- 3 The Threat Model and the Problem
- 3.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
- 3.2 Factors Impacting Defense Designs Against Poisoning Attacks
- 4 The CONTRA Approach
- 4.1 Overview of the CONTRA Design
- 4.2 The CONTRA Algorithm
- 4.3 Discussions
- 5 Experiments
- 5.1 Datasets, Settings, and Baseline
- 5.2 Defense Against Label-Flipping Attacks
- 5.3 Defense Against Backdoor Attacks
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Romoa: Robust Model Aggregation for the Resistance of Federated Learning to Model Poisoning Attacks
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Problem Statement
- 2.1 Federated Learning
- 2.2 Model Poisoning Attack
- 3 Robust Model Aggregation
- 3.1 Asynchronous Model Updating
- 3.2 Lookahead Similarity Measurement
- 3.3 Model Aggregation with Sanitizing Factor
- 4 Security Analysis
- 4.1 FLG: Federated Learning Game
- 4.2 rFLG: Repeated Federated Learning Game
- 5 Evaluation
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- FLOD: Oblivious Defender for Private Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning with Dishonest-Majority
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Preliminaries
- 2.1 Federated Learning
- 2.2 Cryptographic Preliminaries
- 3 Scope and Threat Model
- 4 Design of FLOD
- 4.1 Aggregation Method
- 4.2 Privacy-Preserving Building Blocks
- 4.3 Correctness and Privacy
- 5 Evaluation
- 5.1 Effectiveness Analysis
- 5.2 Efficiency Analysis
- 6 Related Works
- 7 Conclusion
- A Byzantine-Robustness Analysis
- B Proof of Theorem 1
- C MA of ResNet-18 on CIFAR10 with Altering
- D Online Overhead of Free-HD and Private -Clipping
- References
- MediSC: Towards Secure and Lightweight Deep Learning as a Medical Diagnostic Service
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Works
- 3 Preliminaries on Additive Secret Sharing
- 4 System Overview
- 4.1 Architecture
- 4.2 Threat Model
- 5 Our Proposed Design
- 5.1 Secure Linear Layers
- 5.2 Secure Non-linear Layers
- 5.3 Security Analysis
- 6 Performance Evaluation
- 6.1 Microbenchmarks
- 6.2 MediSC's Protocol Performance
- 7 Conclusion
- A Further Implementation Details
- A.1 More Details of Implementation Setting
- A.2 Training Details
- A.3 More Details of Model Architecture
- References
- TAFA: A Task-Agnostic Fingerprinting Algorithm for Neural Networks
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Deep Neural Networks with Rectified Linear Units
- 3 Task-Agnostic Fingerprinting Algorithm
- 3.1 Security Settings of Model Fingerprinting
- 3.2 Overview of TAFA
- 3.3 Fingerprint Extraction
- 3.4 Fingerprint Verification
- 4 Evaluation Settings
- 5 Evaluation Results
- 5.1 Effectiveness of TAFA
- 5.2 Hyperparameter Sensitivity
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusion and Future Directions
- A More Backgrounds on Deep Learning
- B More Evaluation Details and Results
- B.1 Details of Scenarios
- References
- DA3G: Detecting Adversarial Attacks by Analysing Gradients
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Related Work
- 2.1 Adversarial Examples
- 2.2 Attack Methods
- 2.3 Defence Methods
- 3 Threat Models
- 3.1 Grey-Box Threat Model
- 3.2 White-Box Threat Model
- 4 Detecting Adversarial Attacks by Analysing Gradients
- 4.1 Architecture
- 4.2 Training Objectives
- 5 Experimental Setup
- 5.1 Architectural Choices
- 5.2 Data Sets
- 5.3 Attack Methods
- 5.4 Baseline Methods
- 5.5 Experimental Setup
- 6 Evaluation
- 6.1 Basic Grey-Box Detection
- 6.2 Combined Grey-Box Detection
- 6.3 Leave-One-Out Grey-Box Detection
- 6.4 Adaptive White-Box Attacks
- 7 Discussion and Future Work
- 8 Conclusion
- A Network Architectures
- B Adaptive Attacks
- C PGD Attack Step Size
- References
- Common Component in Black-Boxes Is Prone to Attacks
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Threat Model
- 2.1 Embedder, Composite and Victim Models
- 2.2 Adversary's Knowledge and Capability
- 2.3 Attack Scenarios
- 3 Proposed Attack
- 3.1 Substitute Architecture
- 3.2 Training
- 3.3 Adoption in Each Attack Scenario
- 4 Evaluation on Face Classification Task
- 4.1 Dataset
- 4.2 Model Setup
- 4.3 Attack Process
- 4.4 Benchmark of Embedder Extraction
- 4.5 Performance in Attack Scenarios
- 4.6 Observation from Empirical Evidence
- 5 Analysis and Potential Defense
- 5.1 Similar vs Same Component
- 5.2 Noisy Victims
- 5.3 Complexity of Victim Models
- 5.4 Data Distribution
- 6 Conclusion
- A Evaluation on Time Series Audio Data and Speaker Classification
- A.1 Dataset
- A.2 Model Setup
- A.3 Attack Process
- A.4 Benchmark of Embedder Extraction
- A.5 Performance in Attack Scenarios
- References
- LiMNet: Early-Stage Detection of IoT Botnets with Lightweight Memory Networks
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 IoT Botnets
- 2.2 Recurrent Neural Networks
- 2.3 Memory Networks
- 2.4 Graph Representation Learning on Temporal Interaction Networks
- 3 Related Work
- 4 LiMNet: A Lightweight Memory Network for Early-Stage Botnet Detection
- 4.1 LiMNet Architecture
- 4.2 Training LiMNet
- 5 Limitations of Existing Recurrent Models for Early-Stage Botnet Detection
- 6 Evaluation Methodology
- 6.1 Deployment Environment
- 6.2 Datasets
- 6.3 Tasks
- 6.4 State-of-the-Art Recurrent Models for Early-Stage Botnet Detection
- 7 Experimental Results
- 7.1 Experiment 1: Parameter Selection for Recurrent Models
- 7.2 Experiment 2: Recurrent Vs Memory Models
- 7.3 Experiment 3: Inference Speed
- 8 Discussion and Limitations
- 8.1 Dataset Limitations
- 8.2 Issues of Recurrent Models for Early-Stage Botnet Detection
- 9 Conclusion
- A Kitsune vs MedBIoT: Challenges for ML Models
- B Effect of Truncated Backpropagation Through Time
- C Cross-dataset Model Generalization
- References
- Adversarial Activity Detection Using Keystroke Acoustics
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 2 The Significance of Our Work
- 3 Typing Differences in Adversarial and Benign Environments
- 3.1 How These Differences Are Useful in Our Application?
- 4 Threat Model and Adversarial Capabilities
- 4.1 Real World Attack Scenario
- 4.2 Using Keystroke Acoustics Versus Keylogger
- 5 Description of Benign and Adversarial Datasets
- 5.1 Noisiness of the Data
- 6 Text Extraction from Audio
- 6.1 Audio Signal Preprocessing by Signal Mixing and Noise Reduction
- 6.2 Audio Signal Segmentation into Individual Keystroke Sounds
- 6.3 Using MFCCs as Audio Features
- 6.4 Removing Inaudible and Noisy Keystrokes
- 6.5 Clustering Keystroke Sounds into Audio Alphabet
- 6.6 Text Recovery Using Audio Alphabet
- 6.7 Error Correction Using Dictionary
- 7 Adversarial Activity Detection and Classification
- 7.1 Quantifying the Threat Level
- 8 Performance Evaluation of the Proposed Components
- 8.1 Audio Signal Segmentation into Individual Keystroke Sounds
- 8.2 Clustering into Audio Alphabet
- 8.3 Recovering Text from Clusters
- 8.4 Adversarial Activity Detection and Classification
- 9 Conclusion and Future Work
- A Choosing the Number of the Clusters
- B Comparison with Other Work
- C Choosing the Values of and
- D Examples of Adversarial Activity Detection Using Typed Sentences
- E Supplementary Figures and Tables
- References
- Automotive
- Tell Me How You Re-Charge, I Will Tell You Where You Drove To: Electric Vehicles Profiling Based on Charging-Current Demand
- 1 Introduction
- 2 System and Threat Model
- 2.1 System Model
- 2.2 Threat Model
- 3 The EVScout Attack
- 3.1 Attack Overview
- 3.2 Tail Identification
- 3.3 Tail's Features Extraction
- 3.4 Classification Algorithms
- 4 Evaluation
- 4.1 The ACN Infrastructure and Dataset
- 4.2 Algorithm
- 4.3 Numerical Results
- 5 Possible Countermeasures
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- CAN-SQUARE - Decimeter Level Localization of Electronic Control Units on CAN Buses
- 1 Introduction and Motivation
- 1.1 Related Works
- 2 CAN Background and Experimental Setup
- 2.1 CAN Background
- 2.2 Experimental Setup
- 3 Methodology and Results
- 3.1 Concept and Limitations in Previous Approaches
- 3.2 Intrusion Detection and Localization Algorithm
- 4 Experimental Evaluation
- 4.1 Evaluation Scenarios
- 4.2 Results
- 5 Conclusions
- References
- Shadow-Catcher: Looking into Shadows to Detect Ghost Objects in Autonomous Vehicle 3D Sensing
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Related Work
- 3 Threat Model
- 4 3D Shadows as a Physical Invariant
- 5 Shadow-Catcher Design
- 6 Evaluation
- 7 Conclusion
- A Limitation of Prior Art
- B 2D Shadow Region Estimation
- References
- Anomaly Detection
- AutoGuard: A Dual Intelligence Proactive Anomaly Detection at Application-Layer in 5G Networks
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Works
- 3 Background and Threat Model
- 3.1 NSA 5G Core Signaling - Diameter Protocol
- 3.2 Threat Model
- 4 AutoGuard - Architecture
- 5 PM Counters and Statistical Features
- 6 Dual Intelligence Solution
- 6.1 Forecasting with LSTM Networks
- 6.2 Profiling and Anomaly Detection with Autoencoders
- 6.3 Online Proactive Anomaly Detection
- 7 Experiments
- 7.1 Dataset Description
- 7.2 Experimental Settings
- 7.3 Experimental Results
- 8 Conclusion
- 9 Appendix
- 9.1 Effect of the Aggregation Time Window on the Forecasting
- 9.2 Hyper-parameters Tuning for the Forecasting Model
- References
- MORTON: Detection of Malicious Routines in Large-Scale DNS Traffic
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work
- 3 MORTON
- 3.1 Overview
- 3.2 Definitions
- 3.3 Data Processing
- 4 Labeled Evaluation
- 4.1 Dataset
- 4.2 Methods Compared
- 4.3 Evaluation Results
- 5 Real-World Evaluation
- 5.1 Methodology
- 5.2 Evaluation Results
- 5.3 Case Studies
- 6 Deployment Considerations and Limitations
- 7 Discussion
- 8 Conclusions and Future Work
- 35.A Detecting Multiple Host Names
- 35.B Neural Network Parameters
- References
- Iterative Selection of Categorical Variables for Log Data Anomaly Detection*-8pt
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work
- 3 Concept
- 3.1 Correlations of Variables
- 3.2 Definitions
- 3.3 Procedure
- 4 Approach
- 4.1 Sample Data
- 4.2 Variable Filtering
- 4.3 Variable Pairing
- 4.4 Correlation Generation
- 4.5 Validation of Correlations
- 4.6 Correlation Updating and Testing
- 5 Evaluation
- 5.1 Comparison with Association Metrics
- 5.2 Anomaly Detection
- 6 Discussion
- 7 Conclusion
- A Appendix
- A.1 Threshold Parameter Selection
- References
- Author Index
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