
Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2011
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Content
- Intro
- Title
- Preface
- Organization
- Table of Contents
- Tutorial 1
- Tor and the Censorship Arms Race: Lessons Learned
- Tutorial 2
- Elliptic Curves for Applications
- Side-Channel Attacks
- PKDPA: An Enhanced Probabilistic Differential Power Attack Methodology
- Introduction
- Probable Key Differential Power Analysis
- Initialization of the Attack
- Iterative DoM Test
- Probable Key Extraction
- Key Frequency Analysis
- Probable Key Progression
- Analytical Framework for Optimal Window-Size
- The Probable Key Matrix
- Experimental Results
- Case-Study 1: AES
- Case-Study 2: Masked AES
- A Comparative Study
- Conclusion
- References
- Formal Analysis of the Entropy / Security Trade-off in First-Order Masking Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks
- Introduction
- Description of the Rotating Tables Countermeasure
- Rationale
- Modelization
- Information Theoretic Evaluation of the Countermeasure
- Security against CPA and 2O-CPA
- Resistance against First-Order Correlation Attacks
- Resistance against Second-Order Correlation Attacks
- Expression of opt(1,2) as a Function of an Indicator f
- Functions f: F24 F2 That Cancel opt(1,2)
- Functions f: F25 F2 That Cancel opt(1,2)
- Exploring More Solutions Using SAT-Solvers
- Mapping of the Problem into a SAT-Solver
- Existence of Low Hamming Weight Solutions for n=8
- Exploration of Solutions for n=8 and a Fixed Card[J ]
- Conclusions and Perspectives
- References
- Square Always Exponentiation
- Introduction
- Background on Exponentiation on Embedded Devices
- Square-and-Multiply Algorithms
- Side-Channel Analysis on Exponentiation
- Distinguishing Squarings from Multiplications
- Square Always Countermeasure
- Principle
- Atomic Algorithms
- Performance Analysis
- Security Considerations
- Parallelization
- Parallelized Algorithms
- Cost of Parallelized Algorithms
- Practical Results
- Conclusion
- References
- An Enhanced Differential Cache Attack on CLEFIA for Large Cache Lines
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- The CLEFIA Structure
- Cache Attacks on CLEFIA
- Enhancing the Differential Cache Attack
- Why the Attack in rebeiro:11 Fails for Large Cache Lines?
- The Proposed Differential Cache Attack
- Attacking a Feistel Structure from Cache Traces
- The New Differential Cache Attack against CLEFIA
- Determining RK0 and RK1
- Determining RK2WK0 and RK3WK1
- Determining RK4 and RK5
- Distinguishing between a Cache Hit and Miss
- Effect of Cache Line Size on the Number of Encryptions
- Countermeasures Suited for Large Cache Lines
- Conclusion
- References
- Partial Key Exposure: Generalized Frameworkt o Attack RSA
- Introduction
- Our Contribution
- General Attacks Based on Partial Knowledge of d
- Attacks Using the Partial Knowledge of k
- Attack on ISO/IEC 9796-2
- Conclusion
- References
- Invited Talk 1
- The Yin and Yang Sides of Embedded Security
- Secret-Key Cryptography, Part 1
- Mars Attacks! Revisited:
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Our Contribution
- Notation
- Outline
- Description of MARS
- The Cryptographic Core
- Differential Attack on 12 Core Rounds of MARS
- The Distinguisher
- Subkey Recovery
- Attacking the MARS Key Scheduler
- Analysis of the Attack
- Conclusion
- References
- Linear Cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher - Trails and Samples Everywhere
- Introduction
- A Description of PRINTcipher
- The Key
- The Standard Permutation
- The Key-Dependent Permutation
- Other Notation
- Existing Work on PRINTcipher
- Linear Cryptanalysis
- On the Importance of Finding Many Samples
- Some Initial Observations
- The S-Box
- The Permutation b and the S-box
- A Key Bit Distinguisher
- General Attack Idea
- A Detailed Example
- More Linear Trails on One Round of PRINTcipher
- Guessing Keybits for Partial Encryption and Decryption
- Experimental Results
- Analyzing the Attack Complexity
- Reaching the Limit: 28 Rounds
- On More Rounds of PRINTcipher: Complementary Trails
- More Attacks on 27/28 Rounds
- On False Positives
- Using Complementary Trails to Distinguish on 24-Round Trails
- Samples Are Independent (Enough)
- Partial Encryption and Decryption for 29 Rounds
- Conclusion
- References
- Practical Attack on 8 Rounds of the Lightweight Block Cipher KLEIN
- Introduction
- Brief Description of KLEIN
- A Collection of Differential Characteristics
- Observations
- The Collection of Characteristics
- Comparison with the Lower Bounds
- Attacking KLEIN
- Finding and Exploiting Neutral Bits
- Distinguisher for 7 Rounds
- Distinguisher for 8 Rounds
- Key-Recovery for 7 Rounds
- Key-Recovery for 8 Rounds
- Experimental Verification
- Conclusion
- References
- On Related-Key Attacks and KASUMI: The Case of A5/3
- Introduction
- MISTY and KASUMI
- Related-key Attacks and KASUMI
- Related-key Attacks and A5/3
- Existing Related-key Attacks
- Revised Related-key Attacks
- Implications and Observations
- Conclusion
- References
- Invited Talk 2
- Cryptology: Where Is the New Frontier?
- Secret-Key Cryptography, Part 2
- Analysis of the Parallel Distinguished Point Tradeoff
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Parallel DP
- Complexity of the pD Tradeoff
- Experiment Results
- Comparison of Tradeoff Algorithms
- pD versus DP
- pD versus Rainbow
- Conclusion
- References
- On the Evolution of GGHN Cipher
- Introduction
- Organization of the Paper
- Short Cycles in GGHN(n, m)
- Evolution of a Randomized Variant of GGHN Cipher
- Towards Estimating the Actual GGHN PRGA
- Conclusion
- References
- HiPAcc-LTE: An Integrated High Performance Accelerator for 3GPP LTE Stream Ciphers
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Brief Overview of SNOW 3G and ZUC
- SNOW 3G and ZUC: Similarities and Dissimilarities in Design
- Integration of SNOW 3G and ZUC
- Integrating the Main LFSR
- Integrating the FSM
- Integrating the LFSR Update Function
- Final Design of the Pipeline
- ASIC Implementation of the Integrated Hardware
- Critical Path
- Performance Results
- Comparison with Existing Designs
- Fault Detection and Protection in HiPAcc-LTE
- Conclusion
- References
- Addressing Flaws in RFID Authentication Protocols
- Introduction
- Related Works
- Privacy Works
- O-FRAP and O-RAP Protocols
- Song-Mitchell's Protocols
- Privacy Model
- Ouafi-Phan Model
- The O-FRAP+ Protocol
- Review O-FRAP+
- Our Attacks on O-FRAP+
- The SMP Protocol
- Review SMP
- Our Attacks on SMP
- The HRAP Protocol
- Review HRAP
- Our Attacks on HRAP
- The Improved HRAP Protocol
- HRAP's Defects
- Procedure of the Improved HRAP
- Security and Privacy Analysis
- Conclusion
- References
- Hash Functions
- Practical Analysis of Reduced-Round Keccak
- Introduction
- Keccak Description and Notations
- Differential Distinguisher
- Searching Differential Paths
- Conditional Differentials and Free Bits
- Best Differential Paths
- Distinguisher on 4 Rounds of the Hash Function
- Implementation of the Distinguisher
- Near-Collisions for 3 Rounds on the 256-bit Hash Function
- Hash Function Collisions on 2 Rounds
- Practical (Second) Preimages on 2 Rounds of the 256-bit Hash Function
- Main Scheme
- Finding Partial Solutions
- Matching 48 Slices with 16 Slices
- Implementation Remarks
- Dealing with the Padding
- Conclusion
- References
- Boomerang Distinguisher for the SIMD-512 Compression Function
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Higher-Order Differentials and Hash Function
- Description of SIMD
- SIMD Step Function
- Application on SIMD-512
- Searching for Characteristics
- Independency of the Characteristics
- Complexity of the Attack
- Extending the Attack to the Compression Function
- Distinguisher for the Compression Function
- Complexity of the Attack
- Conclusions and Discussion
- References
- Lightweight Implementations of SHA-3 Candidates on FPGAs
- Introduction and Motivation
- Methodology
- Assumptions and Goals
- Tools and Result Generation
- Interface and Protocol
- Area Minimization Techniques
- Performance Metrics
- Implementations
- BLAKE
- Grøstl
- JH
- Keccak
- Skein
- Results and Conclusions
- Implementation Results
- Comparison with Other Reported Results
- Conclusions
- References
- Pairings
- Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing for Cloud-Based Key Management
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Definitions
- Access Trees
- Cryptographic Assumptions
- An Efficient Scheme without Random Oracles
- System Implementation
- Security Proof for Our Construction
- References
- On Constructing Families of Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves with Variable Discriminant
- Introduction
- Constructing Complete Families with Variable Discriminant
- Constructing Sparse Families
- Conclusion
- References
- Attractive Subfamilies of BLS Curves for Implementing High-Security Pairings
- Introduction
- Background
- Particularly Friendly Subfamilies
- Using the Four Classes x0 7,16,31,64 8mu(mod6mu72)
- The Other Congruency Classes
- Choosing Simple Lines: Twisting vs. Untwisting
- The Final Exponentiation
- Example Curves
- References
- Invited Talk 3
- Stone Knives and Bear Skins: Why Does the Internet Run on Pre-historic Cryptography?
- Protocols
- The Limits of Common Coins: Further Results
- Introduction
- Outline
- Preliminaries
- Our Results
- Proofs
- Proof of [thm:main]Theorem 1
- Proof of [thm:generalized]Theorem 3
- Conclusions and Open Problems
- References
- Secure Message Transmission in Asynchronous Directed Graphs
- Introduction
- Related Work
- A Motivating Example
- Organization and Our Contribution
- Model and Definitions
- Characterizing Asynchronous Networks for Las Vegas (0, )-SMT
- Sufficiency
- Necessity
- Las Vegas (0, )-SMT and PSMT
- All Pairs PSMT
- Characterizing Asynchronous Networks for Monte Carlo (0, )-SMT
- References
- Towards a Provably Secure DoS-Resilient Key Exchange Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy
- Introduction
- Just Fast Keying Protocol and Its DOS Vulnerabilities
- Smith et al.'s Analysis of JFK in Meadows Framework
- A New DoS Vulnerability in JFK
- Cost Calculations
- Basic Security of the JFK Protocol
- Resisting Other Type of DoS Attacks in JFK
- BPV-JFK
- BPV Generator
- The BPV-JFK Protocol and Its Security Analysis
- Efficiency Comparison and Parameter Sizes
- On the Security of JFK
- Cost Calculations for BPV-JFK
- Analysing the BPV-JFK Protocol in the Stebila et al. Model
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Tutorial 3
- Software Optimizations for Cryptographic Primitives on General Purpose x86 64 Platforms
- The Tutorial-Introduction
- References
- Author Index
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