Direct Belief
An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief
1st Edition
Published on 26. April 2012
X, 157 pages
978-1-61451-082-6 (ISBN)
Description
Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as a case study in pragmatic explanation, dealing also with methodological issues about context-sensitivity in language and the relation between semantics and pragmatics.
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Book
04/2012
1st Edition
De Gruyter Mouton
€149.95
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Person
Jonathan Berg, University of Haifa, Israel.
Content
1 - Preface [Seite 6]
2 - Acknowledgements [Seite 8]
3 - Introduction [Seite 12]
4 - Chapter 1: The instability of belief ascriptions (and how not to explain it) [Seite 18]
4.1 - 1. From language to thought [Seite 18]
4.2 - 2. Accommodating shifty intuitions [Seite 21]
4.3 - 3. The appeal to ambiguity [Seite 23]
4.3.1 - 3.1. Lexical ambiguity [Seite 23]
4.3.2 - 3.2. Syntactic ambiguity [Seite 28]
4.3.3 - 3.3. Multigrade status [Seite 32]
4.3.4 - 3.4. The persistence of shifty intuitions [Seite 35]
4.4 - 4. The indexical view [Seite 35]
4.4.1 - 4.1. Implicit modes of presentation [Seite 35]
4.4.2 - 4.2. Hidden-indexical semantics [Seite 38]
4.4.3 - 4.3. Articulated indexicality [Seite 47]
4.5 - 5. Semantic indeterminacy [Seite 51]
4.5.1 - 5.1. Incompleteness [Seite 51]
4.5.2 - 5.2. Similarity [Seite 53]
4.5.3 - 5.3. Hopelessness [Seite 57]
4.6 - 6. Direct belief [Seite 59]
4.7 - 7. Summary [Seite 60]
5 - Chapter 2: The pragmatics of substitutivity [Seite 65]
5.1 - 1. Truth and appropriateness [Seite 65]
5.2 - 2. Conversational implicature [Seite 67]
5.3 - 3. Implicated normalcy [Seite 68]
5.4 - 4. Normalcy for belief ascriptions [Seite 71]
5.5 - 5. Variations on verbatim acceptability [Seite 74]
5.6 - 6. Identity beliefs [Seite 81]
5.7 - 7. Availability [Seite 86]
5.8 - 8. Semantic intuitions [Seite 93]
5.9 - 9. Iterability [Seite 102]
5.10 - 10. Other pragmatic accounts of substitution failure [Seite 106]
5.10.1 - 10.1. Soames and what is said [Seite 106]
5.10.2 - 10.2. Thau and what is implicated [Seite 110]
5.11 - 11. Summary [Seite 114]
6 - Chapter 3: Conceptions, belief, and "inner speech" [Seite 119]
6.1 - 1. The medium view of conceptions [Seite 119]
6.2 - 2. The behavior problem [Seite 122]
6.2.1 - 2.1. The problem [Seite 122]
6.2.2 - 2.2. The Higher Order View of conceptions [Seite 124]
6.2.3 - 2.3. A solution to the problem [Seite 125]
6.3 - 3. Suspended belief [Seite 126]
6.4 - 4. The inner speech picture of thought [Seite 134]
6.5 - 5. Thinking in words [Seite 141]
6.5.1 - 5.1. Silent uttering [Seite 141]
6.5.2 - 5.2. Imagining [Seite 145]
6.6 - 6. Two paradigms of belief [Seite 148]
6.7 - 7. Summary [Seite 151]
7 - References [Seite 154]
8 - Index [Seite 164]
2 - Acknowledgements [Seite 8]
3 - Introduction [Seite 12]
4 - Chapter 1: The instability of belief ascriptions (and how not to explain it) [Seite 18]
4.1 - 1. From language to thought [Seite 18]
4.2 - 2. Accommodating shifty intuitions [Seite 21]
4.3 - 3. The appeal to ambiguity [Seite 23]
4.3.1 - 3.1. Lexical ambiguity [Seite 23]
4.3.2 - 3.2. Syntactic ambiguity [Seite 28]
4.3.3 - 3.3. Multigrade status [Seite 32]
4.3.4 - 3.4. The persistence of shifty intuitions [Seite 35]
4.4 - 4. The indexical view [Seite 35]
4.4.1 - 4.1. Implicit modes of presentation [Seite 35]
4.4.2 - 4.2. Hidden-indexical semantics [Seite 38]
4.4.3 - 4.3. Articulated indexicality [Seite 47]
4.5 - 5. Semantic indeterminacy [Seite 51]
4.5.1 - 5.1. Incompleteness [Seite 51]
4.5.2 - 5.2. Similarity [Seite 53]
4.5.3 - 5.3. Hopelessness [Seite 57]
4.6 - 6. Direct belief [Seite 59]
4.7 - 7. Summary [Seite 60]
5 - Chapter 2: The pragmatics of substitutivity [Seite 65]
5.1 - 1. Truth and appropriateness [Seite 65]
5.2 - 2. Conversational implicature [Seite 67]
5.3 - 3. Implicated normalcy [Seite 68]
5.4 - 4. Normalcy for belief ascriptions [Seite 71]
5.5 - 5. Variations on verbatim acceptability [Seite 74]
5.6 - 6. Identity beliefs [Seite 81]
5.7 - 7. Availability [Seite 86]
5.8 - 8. Semantic intuitions [Seite 93]
5.9 - 9. Iterability [Seite 102]
5.10 - 10. Other pragmatic accounts of substitution failure [Seite 106]
5.10.1 - 10.1. Soames and what is said [Seite 106]
5.10.2 - 10.2. Thau and what is implicated [Seite 110]
5.11 - 11. Summary [Seite 114]
6 - Chapter 3: Conceptions, belief, and "inner speech" [Seite 119]
6.1 - 1. The medium view of conceptions [Seite 119]
6.2 - 2. The behavior problem [Seite 122]
6.2.1 - 2.1. The problem [Seite 122]
6.2.2 - 2.2. The Higher Order View of conceptions [Seite 124]
6.2.3 - 2.3. A solution to the problem [Seite 125]
6.3 - 3. Suspended belief [Seite 126]
6.4 - 4. The inner speech picture of thought [Seite 134]
6.5 - 5. Thinking in words [Seite 141]
6.5.1 - 5.1. Silent uttering [Seite 141]
6.5.2 - 5.2. Imagining [Seite 145]
6.6 - 6. Two paradigms of belief [Seite 148]
6.7 - 7. Summary [Seite 151]
7 - References [Seite 154]
8 - Index [Seite 164]
