Introduction: A Valuable but Contested Concept

"Objectivity" is an important theoretical concept with diverse applications in our collective practices of inquiry. It is also a concept attended in recent decades by vigorous debate, debate that includes but is not restricted to scientists and philosophers. The special authority of science as a source of knowledge of the natural and social world has been a matter of much controversy. In part because the authority of science is supposed to result from the objectivity of its methods and results, objectivity has been described as "essentially contested" and even "embattled." The concept of objectivity has important but disputed applications outside of scientific practices as well. Philosophers, psychologists, and theologians debate whether there is an objective basis for ethical claims and demands. Legal scholars debate what it would mean for laws to be objectively derivable from basic assumptions about justice and equality. One aim of this book is to guide readers through the often volatile debates over the nature and value of objectivity. Another aim is to contribute to that debate through certain themes that will shortly be introduced.

Objectivity is posited of many things: of questions or subject matters, of methods (procedures) or results (products) of collective inquiry, and of course of inquirers-persons-themselves. Objective questions are thought of as those which can be answered by recourse only to factual evidence; subjective questions, by contrast, include things like matters of taste or personal preference. But so far we have only examples of uses of the concept of objectivity. What about a definition? John Dewey wrote that the time for definition is at the end of inquiry, not at the beginning. Dewey has a point, since an uncritically accepted definition places limits on the usefulness of a concept. Still, it will be helpful to have a working definition to start from, recognizing that further examination may lead to qualifications or refinements. Let's define objectivity in its primary epistemic sense as a set of norms that obliges persons or groups of persons to apply impersonal modes of reason in the course of their inquiries or deliberations. This working definition makes objectivity a characteristic of our processes of inquiry (our general motivations and specific strategies) and, derivatively, of the products of those inquiries. Complying with norms of objectivity involves methodically avoiding known sources of error. Establishing and complying with norms of scientific objectivity also serves the social function of promoting trust in what science and technology produce (empirical studies, theories, technical innovations, etc.). To call the results (products) of inquiry objective is on a social level to endorse those products as trustworthy due to characteristics of the process by which they were produced.

Our working definition, to be clear, is of what is typically called cognitive or epistemic objectivity; it does not try to capture the secondary sense of objectivity intended by such phrases as "the objective world." Speaking of running an "objective test" or producing an "objectively written" news report emphasizes characteristics of a process or a product. But objective world-talk speaks neither of procedures nor products of inquiry, but rather elicits a mental image of a world of facts or a static physical reality conceived as separate from and prior to all of our strategies of inquiry. Could objectivity be what belongs to the object of thought rather than to a knowing subject? This would make objectivity something static and absolute, and thus very different from the degree concept we have previously described. This book will take a different tack and argue that objective world-talk really isn't a kind of objectivity even though it is a long-standing connotation of the word. This ontological sense of objectivity, as it is called in the literature, might still be philosophically interesting. Its defenders, as we will see in Part I, even view the robust metaphysical realism that it presupposes as a necessary condition for making any sense of epistemic objectivity. However, accepting this claim draws us into a swarm of issues surrounding realism and antirealism, on which the present account will try to stay neutral.

Drawing attention to how norms of objectivity attach both to processes and to products of inquiry makes objectivity relevant to every intellectual interest in truth or knowledge. This is why objectivity's primary sense is said to be cognitive or epistemic objectivity. Like "justification" and "rationality," which are its most closely associated terms in the field of epistemology (the theory of knowledge), objectivity is a normative concept. That is to say, this concept instills a burden on our thinking, insofar as we value the epistemic goods of true belief, knowledge, and understanding: a burden to reason in ways which are true to the objects we study, which distinguish fact from opinion, and which avoid modes of reasoning or decision-making that are biased, idiosyncratic, or arbitrary. Also, like justification and rationality, objectivity as here understood is a degree concept: a process or product of inquiry can have more or less of it. Examining empirical facts and proceeding as logically as we can from those facts to inferences that may be based upon them are certainly things that heighten the rational confidence we have in the products of inquiries. But as almost every textbook on the theory of knowledge points out, even a high level of rational justification for our beliefs does not, strictly speaking, guarantee their truth. This recognition of our fallibility, on the other hand, should not deter our attempts to make our ways to seeking knowledge as well justified and resistant to error as we can make them.

Our initial characterization of objectivity still allows that what norms it instantiates may be quite domain-specific: what objectivity means to actual disciplines or fields of study may differ with the type of things that each discipline studies, so that norms of objectivity are not one-size-fits-all. Also, the very expectation or "obligation" to reason impersonally or impartially comes not only from the nature of the objects of study but also from the social roles we inhabit. Some degree of objectivity, we have said, may be incumbent upon all truth seekers, constraining the ways we represent the world and our experiences. But objectivity is not expected of us in all areas of life, just as not all questions are objective questions. The social roles of parent, student, counselor, scientist, and public-policy maker, for example, bring with them certain role-specific obligations to impersonal or impartial reasoning that are not incumbent upon others.

"Objectivity" is a noun, but when we take our focus to be the more active, adjectival, or adverbial uses-what it means to conduct oneself as an "objective inquirer" or for the job performance of employees to be "objectively assessed"-some contrast terms may come readily to mind. While we would not want key philosophical concepts to have a primarily negative sense, proscribing or excluding certain things, philosophical concepts are often articulated in part by examining their relationship with other concepts with which they are closely associated or contrasted. Contrast terms to the "objective" include "subjective," "personal," "partial," "biased," and "idiosyncratic."

Treating objectivity as a normative epistemic concept bearing upon practices of inquiry leads to the expectation that the specific meanings and functions of the concept have changed over time and will continue to change with the growth of knowledge. Those who have done historical studies highlight both how norms of scientific objectivity differ by specific field, and how prevailing conceptions of objectivity in any given discipline reflect that discipline's changing state of investigative techniques. One commonality that Daston and Galison (2010) think transcends this particularity is that prevailing norms of scientific objectivity always function to identify and exclude a specific notion of "scientific subjectivity." The normativity of the concept of objectivity for Daston and Galison is largely found in the prescription to avoid certain practices or ways of thinking deemed unsound or unscientific. Such prescriptions can be quite detailed, and the leading or paradigmatic way of thinking about what constitutes objective procedures and results continues to evolve as the sciences themselves have evolved.

Let's consider some initial examples of cognitive objectivity in action. The following are just a few instances in which a social practice brings with it certain expectations of objectivity on the part of a person or collective, a procedure, and/or a product of inquiry:

• a team of scientists record, compile, and report data from their experiment
• a team of sports referees confer to decide whether they should reverse a call on the basis of what they each report seeing, or on the basis of replay footage, together with their knowledge of the rulebook
• a nonpartisan political group deliberates over how to design, run, and prepare a report on attitudes toward health care initiatives
• a journalist decides to do "objective reporting" in contrast to editorial...