Social Choice and Individual Values
Published on 8. May 2020
114 pages
978-1-83974-442-6 (ISBN)
Description
Kenneth Arrow's monograph "e;Social Choice and Individual Values"e; and a theorem within it created modern social choice theory, a rigorous melding of social ethics and voting theory with an economic flavor. The work culminated in what Arrow called the "e;General Possibility Theorem,"e; better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible requirements. The result generalizes the voting paradox, which shows that majority voting may fail to yield a stable outcome.-Print ed.
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Content
- Intro
- COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
- DEDICATION
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
- CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
- 1. THE TYPES OF SOCIAL CHOICE
- 2. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
- CHAPTER II - THE NATURE OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE
- 1. MEASURABILITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF UTILITY
- 2. A NOTATION FOR PREFERENCES AND CHOICE
- 3. THE ORDERING OF SOCIAL STATES
- 4. A DIGRESSION ON RATIONALITY AND CHOICE
- CHAPTER III - THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION
- 1. FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE
- 2. POSITIVE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
- 3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
- 4. THE CONDITION OF CITIZENS' SOVEREIGNTY
- 5. THE CONDITION OF NON-DICTATORSHIP
- 6. THE SUMMATION OF UTILITIES
- CHAPTER IV - THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
- 1. THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
- 2. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION
- CHAPTER V - THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS
- 1. THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES
- 2. TWO INDIVIDUALS AND THREE ALTERNATIVES
- 3. PROOF OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM
- 4. INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM
- CHAPTER VI - THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ASSUMPTIONS
- 2. THE POSSIBILITY THEOREM UNDER INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
- 3. QUASI-ORDERINGS AND COMPATIBLE WEAK ORDERINGS
- 4. AN EXAMPLE
- 5. A ONE-COMMODITY WORLD
- 6. GROUP CHOICE IN THE THEORY OF GAMES
- 7. DISTRIBUTIONAL ETHICS COMBINED WITH INDIVIDUALISM
- CHAPTER VII - SIMILARITY AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL WELFARE JUDGMENTS
- 1. COMPLETE UNANIMITY
- 2. THE CASE OF SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES
- 3. THE IDEALIST POSITION AND THE CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS
- 4. KNOWLEDGE AND THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES
- 5. PARTIAL UNANIMITY
- 6. THE DECISION PROCESS AS A VALUE
- REFERENCES
