Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
Published on 31. December 2013
978-1-107-59669-6 (ISBN)
Description
Presenting state-of-the-art research into methods of wireless spectrum allocation based on game theory and mechanism design, this innovative and comprehensive book provides a strong foundation for the design of future wireless mechanisms and spectrum markets. Prominent researchers showcase a diverse range of novel insights and approaches to the increasing demand for limited spectrum resources, with a consistent emphasis on theoretical methods, analytical results and practical examples. Covering fundamental underlying principles, licensed spectrum sharing, opportunistic spectrum sharing, and wider technical and economic considerations, this singular book will be of interest to academic and industrial researchers, wireless industry practitioners, and regulators interested in the foundations of cutting-edge spectrum management.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
24 Tables, black and white; 10 Halftones, unspecified; 100 Line drawings, unspecified
File size
5,70 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-107-59669-6 (9781107596696)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Tansu Alpcan | Holger Boche | Michael L. Honig
Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
Book
12/2013
Cambridge University Press
€157.70
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
Tansu Alpcan is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of Melbourne, and co-author of Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach (2011). Holger Boche is a Professor in the Institute of Theoretical Information Technology, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, and a Fellow of the IEEE. Michael L. Honig is a Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Northwestern University. He is a Fellow of the IEEE. H. Vincent Poor is the Dean of Engineering and Applied Science and Michael Henry Strater University Professor of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University, New Jersey. He is a co-author of Principles of Cognitive Radio (2012), and a Fellow of the IET and the IEEE.
Content
Part I. Theoretical Fundamentals: 1. Games and mechanisms for networked systems: incentives and algorithms A. K. Chorppath, T. Alpcan and H. Boche; 2. Competition in wireless systems via Bayesian interference games S. Adlakha, R. Johari and A. Goldsmith; 3. Reacting to the interference field M. Debbah and H. Tembine; 4. Walrasian model for resource allocation and transceiver design in interference networks E. A. Jorswieck and R. Mochaourab; 5. Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach A. Kakhbod, A. Nayyar, S. Sharma and D. Teneketzis; 6. Performance and convergence of multiuser online learning C. Tekin and M. Liu; 7. Game-theoretic solution concepts and learning algorithms S. M. Perlaza and S. Lasaulce; Part II. Cognitive Radio and Sharing of Unlicensed Spectrum: 8. Cooperation in cognitive radio networks: from access to monitoring W. Saad and H. V. Poor; 9. Cooperative cognitive radios with diffusion networks R. L. G. Cavalcante, S. Stanczak and I. Yamada; 10. Capacity scaling limits of cognitive multiple access networks E. Nekouei, H. Inaltekin and S. Dey; 11. Dynamic resource allocation in cognitive radio relay networks using sequential auctions T. Wang, L. Song and Z. Han; 12. Incentivized secondary coexistence D. Zhang and N. B. Mandayam; Part III. Management and Allocation of Licensed Spectrum: 13. Self-organizing context-aware small cell networks: challenges and future opportunities A. Khanafer, W. Saad and T. Basar; 14. Economic viability of dynamic spectrum management J. Huang; 15. Auction driven market mechanisms for dynamic spectrum management G. Iosi?dis and I. Koutsopoulos; 16. Enabling sharing in auctions for short-term spectrum licenses I. A. Kash, R. Murty and D. C. Parkes; 17. Economic models for secondary spectrum lease: a spatio-temporal perspective A. Al Daoud, M. Alanyali and D. Starobinski; 18. How to use a strategic game to optimize the performance of CDMA wireless network synchronization G. Bacci and M. Luise; 19. Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses S. Loertscher and L. M. Marx.
