New frontiers of antitrust 2014
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Persons
EU Commissioner for Competition.
Chairman, Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, The Hague.
Chairman, Competition Appeal Tribunal, London.
Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and Professor of Law, George Mason University, Washington DC.
Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Brussels.
Ministre délégué à l'Économie sociale et solidaire, Paris.
Directrice générale, DGCCRF, Paris.
Professeur agrégé des Facultés de droit (droit privé, 1982), elle a rejoint en 2007 l'Université Paris II-Panthéon Assas. Rattachée au Collège européen de Paris, elle est en charge des cours de droit de la concurrence dans plusieurs masters, dont ceux de droit de l'Union européenne. En 2009, Laurence Idot a été nommée membre du collège de l'Autorité française de la Concurrence. Depuis sa thèse de doctorat d'État en droit (« Le contrôle des pratiques restrictives de concurrence dans les échanges internationaux », sous la dir. de B. Goldman, Paris II, 1981), une grande majorité de ses travaux (ouvrages et articles) porte sur le droit de la concurrence. Laurence Idot est également co-directrice de la revue Europe et présidente du comité scientifique de la revue Concurrences.
Director General, DG COMP, Brussels.
Professor, George Washington Law School, Washington DC.
Président, Autorité de la concurrence, Paris.
Associate, Shearman & Sterling, London.
President, Bundeskartellamt, Bonn.
Economist, MAPP, Paris.
Partner, Shearman & Sterling, London.
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, White House, Washington.
Partner, Norton Rose Fulbright, Paris.
Hearing Officer, European Commission, Brussels, Visiting Professor, King's College London.
Commissaire, Federal Trade Commission, Washington DC, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Washington DC.
Content
- Intro
- Couverture
- Title
- Collection
- Copyright
- Presentation
- Allocution d'ouverture
- État de l'Union : L'antitrust en Europe en 2013-2014
- Concurrence et croissance pour l'après-crise
- I. Dans quel contexte sommes-nous aujourd'hui ?
- 1. Situation
- 2. Secteurs à fort potentiel
- 3. Rôle de la concurrence
- II. Actions
- 1. Aides d'État
- 2. Fusions
- 3. Antitrust et cartels
- III. Conclusion
- Part I - Detection of anticompetitive practices: Should existing tools be revised or new tools introduced? Leniency, market surveys, financial reward.
- Introduction
- I. Pourquoi ?
- II. Comment ?
- III. Qui ?
- Beyond Leniency
- The importance of innovation in the detection of anticompetitive practices
- I. Introduction
- II. Traditional detection tools
- 1. Tip-offs and signals
- 2. Leniency
- 3. Whistleblowers
- 4. Dawn raids and digital investigation
- 5. Market studies
- 6. Economic screens
- III. Detecting market problems using social media
- 1. ConsuWijzer
- 2. Social media and detection
- 3. ACM agenda
- IV. Information exchange between authorities
- 1. Information exchange between national oversight authorities
- 2. Information exchange between international authorities
- V. Opportunities for enhancement
- VI. Conclusion
- Part II - Patents: Can antitrust authorities contribute to fixing the dysfunctional patent system?
- Introduction
- Patent assertion entities and antitrust: A competition cure for a litigation disease?
- I. Is there a PAE « antitrust » problem?
- 1. The evidence does not suggest an antitrust problem
- 2. A litigation problem calls for a litigation solution
- II. The antitrust tradition of inhospitality to new business models
- III. Conclusion
- National courts and EU regulators: Institutional relations in the patent wars
- I. What is the concern with injunctions for SEPs?
- II. EU competition law limits, but does not exclude, the ability to obtain injunctive relief for SEPs
- III. Do legal limits on injunctions render an injunction request in itself unlawful?
- 1. Tension with fundamental principles of law
- 2. Who commits the restriction anyway?
- IV. There are alternatives for clarifying the law on injunctions
- V. Application of EU competition rules outside court proceedings
- VI. Towards a holistic approach to patent issues under EU competition law
- VII. Conclusion
- Part III - European Competition Network 10 years after & EC Regulation 1/2003: Can cooperation be extended to merger control and advocacy?
- Introduction
- I. Procedural aspects of horizontal cooperation in the field of merger control in Europe
- 1. Building the tools for cooperation
- 2. The alignment of procedural agendas in the context of divergent national frameworks
- II. Substantive aspects of horizontal cooperation in the field of merger control in Europe
- 1. Bridging the gap: The shift towards the SIEC test and increased exchanges on substance amongst authorities
- 2. Towards a fully harmonized substantive test?
- III. Conclusion
- Principle vs. pragmatism and hard cases make bad law
- I. Introduction
- II. What the ECN does
- III. Private enforcement
- IV. Where is the ECN deficient?
- V. The ECN and advocacy
- VI. The ECN and merger control
- VII. Conclusion: The ECN going forward
- Divergent decisions in national merger control: How can cooperation between national competition authorities be facilitated?
- I. Introduction: Divergent national merger decisions
- II. What are the reasons for different outcomes?
- 1. Differences in the substantive tests
- 2. Differences in the definition of a concentration
- 3. Differences in the procedural rules
- 4. Differences in the timing of investigations
- III. How to avoid divergent outcomes?
- 1. Stop-the-clock provision for parallel in-depth investigations
- 2. Facilitate referrals to the EU Commission?
- 3. Extend the scope of the ECN to merger control?
- IV. Conclusion
- Ten years of Regulation 1/2003: A retrospective
- I. Introduction
- II. Genesis
- 1. Modernisation group
- 2. White Paper on Modernisation, legislative proposal and final compromise
- III. Results
- 1. National competition authorities and the European Competition Network
- 2. National courts
- 3. European Commission
- Cooperation within the European Competition Network: State of play report and reflections on anticompetitive practices and merger control
- I. Ten years of Regulation 1/2003 have yielded mixed results
- 1. Limitations on NCA investigative powers are not specific enough
- 2. Divergent negotiated procedures
- II. Control of cross-border concentrations: Yes to cooperation, but not unless there is harmonisation
- 1. Status report: A pernicious lack of harmonisation
- 2. Points to consider in view of a potential reform
- Part IV - Restructuring firms in the context of crisis: What role for merger policy?
- Introduction
- Merger policy in times of economic crisis
- EU merger control in times of crisis: Versatility in orthodoxy
- Restructuring firms in the context of crisis: What role for merger policy? - A UK perspective
- I. Introduction
- II. Application of the EU merger rules in the context of the 2007-2008 financial crisis
- 1. Quick decisions and derogations from the suspension obligation, where necessary
- 2. No « public interest » test: The standard competition analysis applies
- 3. Article 21(4) legitimate interests
- 4. Effects-based analysis and the appropriate counterfactual
- 5. Failing firm defence
- 6. Efficiencies
- III. UK case study: Lloyds TSB/HBOS
- 1. Government-brokered merger
- 2. Grant of state aid
- 3. State aid restructuring
- 4. ICB recommendations
- 5. Possibility of intervention under the UK markets regime
- IV. Conclusion
- Conclusion - L'action de groupe à la française comme outil de dissuasion et de répression des pratiques anticoncurrentielles
- Discours de clôture
- Table of Contents
