
Knowing Our Own Minds
Oxford University Press
Published on 19. October 2000
Book
Paperback/Softback
460 pages
978-0-19-924140-8 (ISBN)
Description
Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of other people's mental attributes: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The next two look at the role of our knowledge of our own psychological states in our functioning as rational agents. The third group of essays examine the tension between the distinctive characteristics of self-knowledge and arguments that psychological content is externally -- socially and environmentally -- determined. The final pair of chapters extend the discussion to knowledge of one's own language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.
Reviews / Votes
This excellent and wide ranging collecton of papers contains important and original contributions to the key current debate about the nature and extent of a subject's knowledge of the content of her thoughts and utterances ... This collection constitutes a key resource for those interested in the nature of a subject's knowledge of the content of her thoughts and utterances ... the collection is useful in challenging some of the traditional assumptions about self-knowledge ... For those interested in the compatability of externalism and privileged access, the collection contains new contributions on this topic which will undoubtedly be key to the on-going debate in this area. * Jessica Brown, Mind, Vol.110, No.438, April 2001 *More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 25 mm
Weight
699 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-924140-8 (9780199241408)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Crispin Wright | Barry C. Smith | Cynthia MacDonald
Knowing Our Own Minds
Book
10/1998
Oxford University Press
€94.80
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
Barry C. Smith is Lecturer in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, London.
Crispin Wright is a Fellow of the British Academy and Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St Andrews; he was formerly Nelson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Cynthia Macdonald is Professor of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Crispin Wright is a Fellow of the British Academy and Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St Andrews; he was formerly Nelson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Cynthia Macdonald is Professor of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Editor
Professor of Logic and MetaphysicsProfessor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of St Andrews, Scotland
Lecturer in PhilosophyLecturer in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London
Reader in PhilosophyReader in Philosophy, University of Manchester
Content
Introduction ; 1. Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy ; 2. Response to Crispin Wright ; 3. Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge ; 4. An Eye Directed Outward ; 5. Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge ; 6. Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact of Grammar - A Dichotomy Rejected ; 7. Self-Knowledge and Resentment ; 8. Reason and the First Person ; 9. What the Externalist can know A Priori ; 10. Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge ; 11. Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant ; 12. First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs ; 13. The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience ; 14. On Knowing One's Own Language ; 15. On Knowing One's Own Language ; Index