The Range of Reasons
in Ethics and Epistemology
Published on 15. December 2021
Book
Hardback
242 pages
978-0-19-289395-6 (ISBN)
Description
The Range of Reasons contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person's actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person's beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against; possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle.
Reviews / Votes
The book is swarming with excellent arguments...This is an excellent book. * Nathaniel Sharadin, Ethics * This is an excellent book. It is original, provocative, and sophisticated. The level of scholarship is truly admirable. * Chris Howard, McGill University * The novelty of Whiting's analysis is his effort to account not only for the large variety of reason-giving activities that people engage in but also what all those activities-in all their different contexts-have in common. The analysis is meticulous...Highly recommended. * Choice * In his wonderful new book, Whiting defends a novel account of normative reasons. To my knowledge, he offers the first modal account of normative reasons. [...] Whiting should be lauded for his bold and imaginative intervention into these debates about foundational normative issues. * Clayton Littlejohn, Asian Journal of Philosophy * Daniel Whiting's excellent new book [...] makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on reasons and normativity. At this point, a good deal has been written on normative reasons, and it is no easy thing to make novel and promising arguments. Yet, this is what Whiting manages to do. Hopefully, his book will receive the attention it deserves [...] We strongly recommend consulting Whiting's book to appreciate the explanatory power of his view in both ethical and epistemic realms. * Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star, Asian Journal of Philosophy * A reader can't fail to appreciate the high level of detail of the analyses, the depth of the discussion and the care with which the author tries to address even the tiniest issues. [...] I would highly recommend [...] this extremely well informed, ambitious and thought-provoking book. * Davide Fassio, Logos & Episteme * Daniel Whiting develops a novel modal theory of reasons that unifies the different roles that reasons play across the practical and epistemic domains [...] The way it is naturally and elegantly extended from one notion of reason to another and then again from the practical to the epistemic is a stunning feat. * Bowen Chan, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * This book is ambitious, rigorous, and very carefully argued. * Miriam McCormick, Asian Journal of Philosophy * Tightly argued [...] wide-ranging [...] impressive. * Antti Kauppinen, Mind *More details
Edition
1
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 231 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 23 mm
Weight
522 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-289395-6 (9780192893956)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
12/2021
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€48.99
Available for download
E-Book
12/2021
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€48.99
Available for download
Person
Daniel Whiting is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton, where he was Head of Department from 2016-19. He is the current Director of the Mind Association. His publications numerous journal articles as well as Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018) and Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018), both co-edited with Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way. He led an international network on 'Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics' (2019-21) and was Principal Investigator on the research project 'Normativity: Epistemic and Practical' (2013-15), both supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Before joining Southampton, Daniel studied and taught at the University of Reading.
Content
1: Introduction
2: Reasons and Their Roles
3: Justifying and Demanding
4: A Modal Theory of Reasons
5: Possessing Reasons
6: Subjective Reasons
7: Truth
8: Knowledge
9: Rational Belief
10: Conclusion
2: Reasons and Their Roles
3: Justifying and Demanding
4: A Modal Theory of Reasons
5: Possessing Reasons
6: Subjective Reasons
7: Truth
8: Knowledge
9: Rational Belief
10: Conclusion