
Free Will
Gary Watson(Editor)
Oxford University Press
2nd Edition
Published on 30. January 2003
Book
Paperback/Softback
472 pages
978-0-19-925494-1 (ISBN)
Description
The new edition of this highly successful text will once again provide the ideal introduction to free will. This volume brings together some of the most influential contributions to the topic of free will during the past 50 years, as well as some notable recent work.
Topics explored in this collection include: the relation between necessity, acting freely, and freedom to act otherwise; different accounts of the capacity for free agency, and the ways in which it can be compromised; grounds for scepticism about free agency and discussions of the relation between free will and responsibility.
Topics explored in this collection include: the relation between necessity, acting freely, and freedom to act otherwise; different accounts of the capacity for free agency, and the ways in which it can be compromised; grounds for scepticism about free agency and discussions of the relation between free will and responsibility.
More details
Series
Edition
2nd Revised edition
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Edition type
Revised edition
Dimensions
Height: 206 mm
Width: 135 mm
Thickness: 25 mm
Weight
490 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-925494-1 (9780199254941)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Gary Watson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside.
Content
Introduction ; 1. Human Freedom and the Self ; 2. An Argument for Incompatibilism ; 3. Free Will, Praise and Blame ; 4. Freedom and Resentment ; 5. Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism ; 6. Are We Free to Break the Laws? ; 7. Freedom and Practical Reason ; 8. Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility ; 9. Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities ; 10. Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism ; 11. The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility ; 12. Freedom ; 13. Agent Causation ; 14. Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will ; 15. Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism ; 16. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person ; 17. Free Agency ; 18. The Significance of Choice ; 19. Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility ; 20. Freedom in Belief and Desire ; 21. Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action ; 22. Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections ; Notes on the contributors ; Selected bibliography ; Index of names