
Practices and Principles
Approaches to Ethical and Legal Judgment
Mark Tunick(Author)
Princeton University Press
Published on 10. December 2000
Book
Paperback/Softback
256 pages
978-0-691-07079-7 (ISBN)
Description
A Japanese woman living in California attempts parent-child suicide, an ancient Japanese custom called "oyako-shinju," in order to rid herself of shame upon learning that her husband has a mistress. She survives, but her two children are drowned in the attempt. Since her attempt was made in accordance with the standards of Japanese culture, should she be tried by the standards and laws of the United States? Are there universally valid moral principles that dictate what is right? Or are moral judgments culturally relative, ultimately dictated by conventions and practices that vary among societies? In Practices and Principles, Mark Tunick takes up the debate between universalists and relativists, and, in political philosophy, between communitarians and liberals, each of which has roots in an earlier debate between Kant and Hegel. Tunick focuses on three case studies: promises, contract law, and the Fourth Amendment issue of privacy. In his analysis, he rejects both uncritical deference to social practice and draconian adherence to principles when making legal and ethical judgments. He argues that we do not always need to choose between abstract principles and social practices.
Sometimes we appeal to both; sometimes we need to appeal to shared social norms; and sometimes, where there is no ethical community, we can appeal only to principles. Ultimately, Tunick rejects simplified arguments that force us to choose between either practices or principles, universalism or relativism, and liberalism or communitarianism.
Sometimes we appeal to both; sometimes we need to appeal to shared social norms; and sometimes, where there is no ethical community, we can appeal only to principles. Ultimately, Tunick rejects simplified arguments that force us to choose between either practices or principles, universalism or relativism, and liberalism or communitarianism.
Reviews / Votes
"The central question in this lucid and thoughtful book is, what force do the existence of practices, customs, and traditions have when we make legal and ethical judgments? Tunick's answer is that as much as we need principles to criticize our practices, practices still matter for legal and ethical judgement."--Ethics "Practical and beneficial as a reference for research. As a whole, anyone with strong affection for the area of philosophy will likely enjoy the style and substance offered in Practices and Principles."--New York Law Journal "Tunick ... does a fine job of arguing against those approaches that reify absolute principles and those that rely solely on the justifying power of agreed-upon social practice... The truth, asserts Tunick, lies somewhere in between, in the unresolvable tension that arises when practice and principle collide and transform each other... [Tunick's] writing style is clear and relatively jargon-free... Recommended."--ChoiceMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
New Jersey
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
College/higher education
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 15 mm
Weight
415 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-691-07079-7 (9780691070797)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

E-Book
10/2022
1st Edition
Princeton University Press
€57.49
Available for download
Person
Mark Tunick is Associate Professor of Political Science, The Honors College, at Florida Atlantic University. He is the author of Punishment: Theory and Practice and Hegel's Political Philosophy: Interpreting the Practice of Legal Punishment (Princeton).
Content
Ch. 1Introduction3Ch. 2Kant versus Hegel19Kant's Principle Conception21Hegel's Criticism of Kant's Principle Conception30Hegel on the Importance of Social Practice34Implications43Kant or Hegel: Principles without Practice or Principles Immanent in Practice?48Ch. 3Promises50The Problem50Scanlon's Example54Principle Conceptions of Promising58Scanlon's Principles M and F83Conclusion: Practices and the Obligation to Keep Promises90Ch. 4Contracts96Problems in Contract Law96Principles104Practices and Principles in Contract Law133Ch. 5Privacy137The Problem137Determining the Reasonableness of Expectations of Privacy: Practice or Principles?144Incorporating Practice and Principle in Fourth Amendment Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Analysis: The Mischance Principle Applied172Ch. 6Practices, Principles, and Contemporary Political Theory191The Role of Social Practice in Ethical and Legal Judging193Contemporary Political Theorists on the Role of Social Practice199Practices and Principles204Practices, Principles, and the Liberal-Communication Debate209Practices, Principles, and the Relativism-Universalism Debate217Bibliography223Index of Cases235General Index237