The Architecture of Government
Rethinking Political Decentralization
Published on 2. July 2007
Book
Paperback/Softback
348 pages
978-0-521-69382-0 (ISBN)
Description
Since the days of Montesquieu and Jefferson, political decentralization has been seen as a force for better government and economic performance. It is thought to bring government 'closer to the people', nurture civic virtue, protect liberty, exploit local information, stimulate policy innovation, and alleviate ethnic tensions. Inspired by such arguments, and generously funded by the major development agencies, countries across the globe have been racing to devolve power to local governments. This book re-examines the arguments that underlie the modern faith in decentralization. Using logical analysis and formal modeling, and appealing to numerous examples, it shows that most are based on vague intuitions or partial views that do not withstand scrutiny. A review of empirical studies of decentralization finds these as inconclusive and mutually contradictory as the theories they set out to test.
Reviews / Votes
"This superb book deconstructs political decentralization. Shifting power from central to local governments is widely touted as the key instrument for the creation of effective, responsive government. The evidence does not support these claims, argues Treisman. Using game theory to probe the logic of arguments, and empirical research to test them, Treisman challenges the assumptions that underlie much of the common wisdom being disseminated to guide the design of public institutions. This book needs to be read by policy makers and researchers, from the World Bank to constitution writers and politically engaged citizens the world around."Peter Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
College/higher education
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Illustrations
4 Tables, unspecified
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 19 mm
Weight
508 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-69382-0 (9780521693820)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
12/2007
1st Edition
Cambridge University Press
€30.99
Available for download
Book
07/2007
Cambridge University Press
€80.00
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Daniel Treisman is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (1999), and (with Andrei Shleifer) Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (2000). A recipient of fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Hoover Institution, and the Smith Richardson Foundation, he has published broadly in academic journals including the American Political Science Review, the American Economic Review, the British Journal of Political Science, and World Politics, as well as policy journals such as Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. In 2007-8, Treisman will serve as Lead Editor of the American Political Science Review.
Content
1. Introduction; 2. The political process; 3. Administrative efficiency; 4. Competition among governments; 5. Fiscal policy and redistribution; 6. Fiscal coordination and incentives; 7. Citizens and government; 8. Checks, balances, and freedom; 9. Acquiring and using knowledge; 10. Ethnic conflict and secession; 11. Data to the rescue?; 12. Conclusion: rethinking decentralization.