
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Oxford University Press
Published on 4. September 2003
Book
Hardback
328 pages
978-0-19-925736-2 (ISBN)
Description
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally.
Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.
Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.
Reviews / Votes
... an attractive volume ... Combining all the references together at the end proved to be very helpful as did the fine index ... this volume represents an important contribution to action theory, philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and should be read by anyone who works in these areas. * Journal of Moral Philosophy * ...a valuable resource for anyone interested in the nature of rational action. * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 22 mm
Weight
658 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-925736-2 (9780199257362)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Sarah Stroud | Christine Tappolet
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Book
12/2007
Oxford University Press
€77.80
Shipment within 15-20 days

Edited By Sarah Stroud And Christine Tappolet
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
E-Book
09/2003
1st Edition
Oxford University Press
€166.52
Available for download
Persons
Stroud, Sarah (Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Canada) / Tappolet, Christine (Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Canada)
Editor
Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Canada
Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Canada
Content
Introduction ; 1. Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion ; 2. How is Strength of Will Possible? ; 3. Akrasia, Collective and Individual ; 4. Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action ; 5. Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement ; 6. Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation ; 7. The Work of the Will ; 8. Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly ; 9. Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons ; 10. Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory ; 11. Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality