Locke on Personal Identity
Consciousness and Concernment
Published on 9. October 2011
Book
Hardback
280 pages
978-0-691-14757-4 (ISBN)
Description
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves - yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
Reviews / Votes
"[E]legant and provocative... There is no denying that the case he makes in this short but compelling book is a powerful one."--Barry Dainton, Times Literary Supplement "This book will appeal to Locke scholars and those interested in Locke's account of personal identity."--ChoiceMore details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
New Jersey
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Trade binding
Illustrations
4 line illus.
Dimensions
Height: 203 mm
Width: 127 mm
Weight
454 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-691-14757-4 (9780691147574)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Galen Strawson taught philosophy at the University of Oxford for twenty years before moving to Reading University in 2001. His many books include "Freedom and Belief" and "Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics".
Content
Preface xi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2 : "Person" 5 Chapter 3: "Person ... is a forensic term" 17 Chapter 4: Concernment 22 Chapter 5: Consciousness 30 Chapter 6:"Consciousness ... is inseparable from thinking" 42 Chapter 7 : "From the inside" 50 Chapter 8 : "Person" Locke's Definition 58 Chapter 9 : Consciousness Is Not Memory 72 Chapter 10 : Personal Identity 77 Chapter 11 : Psychological Connectedness 88 Chapter 12 : Transition (Butler Dismissed) 93 Chapter 13 : "But next ... ": Personal Identity without Substantial Continuity 97 Chapter 14 : "And therefore ... ": [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfers 110 Chapter 15 : "A fatal error of theirs" 119 Chapter 16 : A Fatal Error of Locke's? 125 Chapter 17 : Circularity? 131 Chapter 18 : The Distinction between [P] and [S] 135 Chapter 19 : Concernment and Repentance 139 Chapter 20 : Conclusion 150 Postface 157 Appendix 1 : "Of Identity and Diversity" by John Locke 163 Appendix 2 : A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity by Edmund Law 233 References 253 Index 257