Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Published on 3. February 2011
Book
Hardback
344 pages
978-0-19-534114-0 (ISBN)
Description
In Rationality and the Reflective Mind, Keith Stanovich attempts to resolve the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science--the debate about how much irrationality to ascribe to human cognition. He shows how the insights of dual-process theory and evolutionary psychology can be combined to explain why humans are sometimes irrational even though they possess remarkably adaptive cognitive machinery. Stanovich argues that to fully characterize differences in rational thinking, we need to replace dual-process theories with tripartite models of cognition. Using a unique individual differences approach, he shows that the traditional second system (System 2) of dual-process theory must be further divided into the reflective mind and the algorithmic mind. Distinguishing them will allow us to better appreciate the significant differences in their key functions: The key function of the reflective mind is to detect the need to interrupt autonomous processing and to begin simulation activities, whereas that of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of decoupled secondary representations in cognitive simulation.
Stanovich then uses this algorithmic/reflective distinction to develop a taxonomy of cognitive errors made on tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. He presents the empirical data to show that the tendency to make these thinking errors is not highly related to intelligence. Using his tripartite model of cognition, Stanovich shows how, when both are properly defined, rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence, and that IQ tests fail to assess individual differences in rational thought. He then goes on to discuss the types of thinking processes that would be measured if rational thinking were to be assessed as IQ has been.
Stanovich then uses this algorithmic/reflective distinction to develop a taxonomy of cognitive errors made on tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. He presents the empirical data to show that the tendency to make these thinking errors is not highly related to intelligence. Using his tripartite model of cognition, Stanovich shows how, when both are properly defined, rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence, and that IQ tests fail to assess individual differences in rational thought. He then goes on to discuss the types of thinking processes that would be measured if rational thinking were to be assessed as IQ has been.
Reviews / Votes
"Stanovich follows up his fascinating System 1/System 2 distinction with powerful evidence on rationality, cognitive processing, and the role of individual differences. This powerful new book is critical reading for any scholar interested in the current state of dual process models. " --Max H. Bazerman, Straus Professor, Harvard Business School and co-author, Judgment and Managerial Decision Making and Negotiation Genius, Co-author, Judgment andManagerial Decision Making and Negotiation Genius
"In this book Stanovich shows unrivalled mastery of the psychological literatures on thinking, reasoning and decision making. Developing his dual process approach into a tripartite theory of the mind, he differentiates a number of distinct ways in which people can fail to solve judgment and reasoning tasks, several of which are unrelated to conventional measures of intelligence. This work has profound social as well as scientific implications for the
interpretation of intelligence tests and the wider debate about human rationality. Strongly recommend reading for cognitive scientists, educators and test-designers alike. " --Jonathan St B T Evans, Professor of
Cognitive Psychology, Emeritus, School of Psychology University of Plymouth
"Like Keith Stanovich's other work, Rationality and the Reflective Mind is comprehensive, judicious, and insightful. Readers will learn what the fuss about rationality is, why it matters, and how to follow the action as the science unfolds. If Stanovich has his way, readers will witness, and perhaps join, the integration of previously, and sometimes defiantly, isolated research programs." ----Baruch Fischhoff, Howard Heinz University Professor, Department of
Social and Decision Sciences and Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University
"Stanovich deserves great credit for providing us with a book incredibly rich in information and for offering the Meliorist new arguments and an incredibly sophisticated perspective on cognitive architecture." -- Philosophical Psychology
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 23 mm
Weight
681 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-534114-0 (9780195341140)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Keith E. Stanovich is Professor of Human Development and Applied Psychology at the University of Toronto. His book What Intelligence Tests Miss (Yale University Press) received the 2010 Grawemeyer Award in Education. He is the author of five other books and over 200 scientific publications on various topics in cognitive psychology.
Content
Preface ; CHAPTER I: ; Dual-Process Theory and the Great Rationality Debate ; The Great Rationality Debate ; Individual Differences in the Great Rationality Debate ; Dual Process Theory: The Current State of Play ; Properties of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing ; Dual-Process Theory and Human Goals: ; Implications for the Rationality Debate ; The Rest of This Book: Complications in Dual Process Theory ; and Their Implications for the Concepts of Rationality and Intelligence ; CHAPTER II: ; Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind and the Reflective Mind ; Unpacking Type 2 Functioning Using Individual Differences ; Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions ; Partition the Algorithmic and the Reflective Mind ; Intelligence Tests and Critical Thinking Tests ; Partition the Algorithmic from the Reflective Mind ; Thinking Dispositions as Independent Predictors of Rational Thought ; CHAPTER III: ; The Key Functions of the Reflective Mind ; and the Algorithmic Mind that Support Human Rationality ; So-Called "Executive Functioning" Measures Tap the ; Algorithmic Mind and Not the Reflective Mind ; CHAPTER IV: ; The Tri-Process Model and Serial Associative Cognition ; The Cognitive Miser and Focal Bias ; Converging Evidence in the Dual Process Literature ; CHAPTER V: ; The Master Rationality Motive and the Origins of the Nonautonomous Mind ; Metarepresentation and Higher-Order Preferences ; What Motivates the Search for Rational Integration? ; The Master Rationality Motive as a Psychological Construct ; Evolutionary Origins of the Master Rational Motive and Type 2 Processing ; CHAPTER VI: ; A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems ; (with Richard F. West) ; Dual-Process Theory and Knowledge Structures ; The Preliminary Taxonomy ; Heuristics and Biases Tasks in Terms of the Taxonomy ; Multiply-Determined Problems of Rational Thought ; Missing Input from the Autonomous Mind ; CHAPTER VII: ; Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks ; (with Richard F. West) ; Intelligence and Classic Heuristics and Biases Effects ; Belief Bias and Myside Bias ; Why Thinking Biases Do and Do Not Associate with Cognitive Ability ; Cognitive Decoupling, Mindware Gaps, and Override Detection ; in Heuristics and Biases Tasks ; CHAPTER VIII: ; Rationality and Intelligence: Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate ; Intelligence and Rationality Associations in Terms of the Taxonomy ; Summary of the Relationships ; Individual Differences, the Reflective Mind, ; and the Great Rationality Debate ; Skepticism About Mindware-Caused Irrationalities ; CHAPTER IX: ; The Social Implications of Separating ; the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality ; Broad Versus Narrow Concepts of Intelligence ; Intelligence Imperialism ; Intelligence Misidentified as Adaptation and the Deification of Intelligence ; Strategies for Cutting Intelligence Down to Size ; Society's Selection Mechanisms ; CHAPTER X: ; The Assessment of Rational Thought ; (with Richard F. West and Maggie E. Toplak) ; A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking ; Operationalizing the Components of Rational Thought ; The Future of Research on Individual Differences in Rational Thought ; References ; Figures and Tables