From Valuing to Value
A Defense of Subjectivism
Published on 17. November 2016
Book
Hardback
322 pages
978-0-19-871264-0 (ISBN)
Description
Subjective accounts of well-being and reasons for action have a remarkable pedigree. The idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about-that something is valuable because it is valued-has appealed to a wide range of great thinkers. But at the same time this idea has seemed to many of the best minds in ethics to be outrageous or worse, not least because it seems to threaten the status of morality. Mutual incomprehension looms over the discussion. From Valuing to Value, written by an influential former critic of subjectivism, owns up to the problematic features to which critics have pointed while arguing that such criticisms can be blunted and the overall view rendered defensible. In this collection of his essays David Sobel does not shrink from acknowledging the real tension between subjective views of reasons and morality, yet argues that such a tension does not undermine subjectivism. In this volume the fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and revealed to be rather plausible and well-motivated, while the most influential criticisms of subjectivism are straightforwardly addressed and found wanting.
Reviews / Votes
This book is a substantial achievement ... I unhesitatingly recommend it to anyone interested in reasons, well-being or rationality. * Luke Elson, Analysis * The book is a showcase of first-rate value theory in the analytic tradition, tightly situated in debates about the nature of well-being and the nature of normative reasons, with a few forays into moral theory and moral psychology. * Owen C. King, Utilitas * Sobel's book is an extremely fair and subtle examination of subjectivism as well as of some arguments against subjectivism such as Parfit's and Scanlon's critiques. All essays in this collection two of them are co-authored by David Copp are very clearly written, contain lots of well-grounded arguments and are therefore of greatest interest for those who tend to think that subjectivism is true as well as for those who tend to think that this account is wrong. * Tobias Gutmann, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice * Sobel's essays in this book are some of the finest ever written in moral philosophy. Whatever one's favoured theory of value, I hope we can all agree that this book is an invaluable resource. * Ben Bramble, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 22 mm
Weight
649 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-871264-0 (9780198712640)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
05/2019
Oxford University Press
€55.40
Shipment within 15-20 days
E-Book
11/2016
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€22.99
Available for download
E-Book
11/2016
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€22.99
Available for download
Person
David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy.
Content
Introduction
1: Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral
2: Full Information Accounts of Well-Being
3: On the Subjectivity of Welfare
4: Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration
5: Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?
6: Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action
7: Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action
8: (co-authored with David Copp): Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire
9: Varieties of Hedonism
10: (co-authored with David Copp): Morality and Virtue
11: Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste
12: The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection
13: Subjectivism and Idealization
14: Parfit s Case Against Subjectivism
15: Subjectivism and Proportionalism
1: Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral
2: Full Information Accounts of Well-Being
3: On the Subjectivity of Welfare
4: Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration
5: Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?
6: Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action
7: Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action
8: (co-authored with David Copp): Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire
9: Varieties of Hedonism
10: (co-authored with David Copp): Morality and Virtue
11: Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste
12: The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection
13: Subjectivism and Idealization
14: Parfit s Case Against Subjectivism
15: Subjectivism and Proportionalism