The Moral Problem

Michael Smith argues that the alleged inconsistency of (1) "Moral judgements express our beliefs"; (2) "A person's moral judgements tell us what she is disposed to do"; and (3) "To explain what someone does we need to mention more than just her beliefs, her desires must be mentioned as well" is the organizing problem of much contemporary meta-ethics. Theories are shaped by which of these claims they reject, and they are damned in the process, as (1) - (3) should all be accepted. But is this possible? Smith argues that it is. The key lies in an interpretation of the idea that moral facts are facts about our reasons for action. Topics discussed include: cognitive versus expressivist accounts of moral judgement; internalist versus externalist accounts of the relation between moral judgement and the will; Humean versus anti-Humean theories of motivation; and hypothetical versus categorical imperative accounts of practical rationality.