
Justifying Blame
Why Free Will Matters and Why it Does Not
Maureen Sie(Author)
Rodopi (Publisher)
Published on 1. January 2005
Book
Paperback/Softback
151 pages
978-90-420-1744-3 (ISBN)
Description
This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, "morally monstrous-like" crimes and weak-willed actions of some.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Leiden
Netherlands
Publishing group
Brill
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Unsewn / adhesive bound
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 10 mm
Weight
240 gr
ISBN-13
978-90-420-1744-3 (9789042017443)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Maureen Sie was born in 1966, in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. She is employed as Assistant Professor of Meta-ethics at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Her research concerns questions of Meta-ethics and theories of moral responsibility. Her most recent publication is the co-edited volume Reasons of One's Own (Ashgate, 2004). Her previous publications on the subject of responsibility are: "Responsibility in Autonomy Undermining Circumstances," Ethical Perspectives, 5, (1998), pp. 30-35; "Goodwill, Determinism and Justification," Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers (eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, (1998), pp. 113-129; "Freedom and Blameworthiness," Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Ton van den Beld (ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), pp. 113-128; "Mad, Bad, or Disagreeing? On Moral Competence and Responsibility," Philosophical Explorations, 3 (September). Assen: Van Gorcum, (2001), pp. 262-281.
Content
Editorial Foreword by Gerhold K. Becker
Foreword by Paul Russell
Preface
ONE Responsibility, Determinism, and Freedom
TWO Practical Compatibilism and Ultimacy Pessimism
THREE Freedom and Blameworthy Actions
FOUR Blameworthy Actions and Normative Disagreements
FIVE Ultimacy Pessimism and the Question of Authority
Works Cited
Glossary
About the Author
Index
Foreword by Paul Russell
Preface
ONE Responsibility, Determinism, and Freedom
TWO Practical Compatibilism and Ultimacy Pessimism
THREE Freedom and Blameworthy Actions
FOUR Blameworthy Actions and Normative Disagreements
FIVE Ultimacy Pessimism and the Question of Authority
Works Cited
Glossary
About the Author
Index