
Practical Knowledge
Selected Essays
Kieran Setiya(Author)
Oxford University Press Inc
Published on 17. November 2016
Book
Hardback
318 pages
978-0-19-046292-5 (ISBN)
Description
In the last forty years, action theory has revitalized moral philosophy. Philosophers have explored the nature of agency, what is involved in acting for a reason, how we know what we are doing, the role of intention, desire, and belief in motivating action, and more. At their most ambitious, philosophers have claimed that action theory is the foundation of ethics. For rationalists or constitutivists, the standards of practical reason derive from the nature of agency as a functional or teleological kind. They are no more mysterious than the standards for being a good clock or a good heart, given the function of clocks and hearts.
In this collection of new and previously published essays, Kieran Setiya defends a causal theory of intentional action on which it is explained by knowledge in intention, a form of practical knowledge that transcends prior evidence. Such knowledge rests on knowing how to do the things we do. The theory is otherwise minimalist: agents need not regard their reasons as good, put means to ends, or adopt particular aims. It follows that we must reject the rationalist or constitutivist approach: the nature of agency is too thin to support the standards of practical reason. But the upshot is not nihilism. Instead, the requirement of means-end coherence is explained by the cognitive aspect of intention; and the standards of practical reason are those of ethical virtue, applied to practical thought.
In this collection of new and previously published essays, Kieran Setiya defends a causal theory of intentional action on which it is explained by knowledge in intention, a form of practical knowledge that transcends prior evidence. Such knowledge rests on knowing how to do the things we do. The theory is otherwise minimalist: agents need not regard their reasons as good, put means to ends, or adopt particular aims. It follows that we must reject the rationalist or constitutivist approach: the nature of agency is too thin to support the standards of practical reason. But the upshot is not nihilism. Instead, the requirement of means-end coherence is explained by the cognitive aspect of intention; and the standards of practical reason are those of ethical virtue, applied to practical thought.
Reviews / Votes
I warmheartedly recommend Practical Knowledge to everyone with a serious interest in action theory, reasons and rationality, and ethics. The writings are sophisticated, so they require familiarity with the basics of the literature. They might be most appreciated by advanced students and specialists. As I wrote before, if Setiya's view is correct that has weighty implications for ethics and views of agency - of what is, for us humans, good to do and why - so the work required by the essays certainly pays off. * Istvan Zoltan Zardai, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice *More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 22 mm
Weight
643 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-046292-5 (9780190462925)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

E-Book
09/2016
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€53.49
Available for download
Person
Kieran Setiya is Professor of Philosophy at MIT. He works in action theory, ethics, and epistemology, and is the author of Reasons without Rationalism (2007) and Knowing Right From Wrong (OUP 2012). His essays range from the nature of rational agency to the place of love in moral philosophy and the resolution of the midlife crisis.
Content
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part One: Action
1. 'Practical Knowledge' (2008)
2. 'Practical Knowledge Revisited' (2009)
3. 'Sympathy for the Devil' (2010)
4. 'Knowledge of Intention' (2011)
5. 'Knowing How' (2012)
6. 'Anscombe on Practical Knowledge' (unpublished)
Part Two: Ethics
7. 'Is Efficiency a Vice?' (2005)
8. 'Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason' (2007)
9. 'What is a Reason to Act?' (2014)
10. 'Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism' (2014)
11. 'Akrasia and the Constitution of Agency' (unpublished)
12. 'Hume on Practical Reason' (2004; revised)
Index
Introduction
Part One: Action
1. 'Practical Knowledge' (2008)
2. 'Practical Knowledge Revisited' (2009)
3. 'Sympathy for the Devil' (2010)
4. 'Knowledge of Intention' (2011)
5. 'Knowing How' (2012)
6. 'Anscombe on Practical Knowledge' (unpublished)
Part Two: Ethics
7. 'Is Efficiency a Vice?' (2005)
8. 'Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason' (2007)
9. 'What is a Reason to Act?' (2014)
10. 'Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism' (2014)
11. 'Akrasia and the Constitution of Agency' (unpublished)
12. 'Hume on Practical Reason' (2004; revised)
Index