
Direct Reference
From Language to Thought
Francois Recanati(Author)
Wiley (Publisher)
1st Edition
Published on 6. July 1997
Book
Paperback/Softback
436 pages
978-0-631-20634-7 (ISBN)
Description
This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Hoboken
United Kingdom
Publishing group
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 231 mm
Width: 153 mm
Thickness: 24 mm
Weight
652 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-631-20634-7 (9780631206347)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Francois Recanti
The author is Senior Researcher at CNRS/CREA. Paris. He has published many papers and several books on the philosophy of language, including Meaning and Force (1988).
The author is Senior Researcher at CNRS/CREA. Paris. He has published many papers and several books on the philosophy of language, including Meaning and Force (1988).
Content
Preface. Part I: Direct Reference in Language and Thought.
I.1 De re Communication.
1. Direct Reference and Linguistic Meaning: Rigidity de jure. .
2. Singular Propositions and Thoughts.
3. The Communication of de re Thoughts.
I.2 From Language to Thought.
4. Linguistic and Psychological Modes of Presentation.
5. The Meaning and Cognitive Significance of Indexical Expressions.
I.3 De re Thoughts.
6. De re Modes of Presentation.
7. Egocentric Concepts vs. Encyclopedia Entries.
I.4 Proper Names.
8. The Meaning of Proper Names.
9. Answering Kripke's Objections.
10. Proper Names in Thought.
I.5 The Two-Component Picture: A Defence.
11. Narrow Content and Psychological Explanation.
12. Externalism and the Two-Component Picture.
Part II: The Pragmatics of Direct Reference.
II.1 Methodological Preliminaries.
13. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.
14. Primary Pragmatic Processes.
II.2 Referential/Attributive.
15. The Referential Use of Definite Descriptions.
16. The Descriptive Use of Indexicals.
II.3 Belief Reports.
17. Belief Reports and Conversational Implicatures.
18. Belief Reports and the Semantics of That-Clauses.
19. Comparison with Other Accounts.
20. How Ambiguous are Belief Sentences?.
Bibliography.
Index.
I.1 De re Communication.
1. Direct Reference and Linguistic Meaning: Rigidity de jure. .
2. Singular Propositions and Thoughts.
3. The Communication of de re Thoughts.
I.2 From Language to Thought.
4. Linguistic and Psychological Modes of Presentation.
5. The Meaning and Cognitive Significance of Indexical Expressions.
I.3 De re Thoughts.
6. De re Modes of Presentation.
7. Egocentric Concepts vs. Encyclopedia Entries.
I.4 Proper Names.
8. The Meaning of Proper Names.
9. Answering Kripke's Objections.
10. Proper Names in Thought.
I.5 The Two-Component Picture: A Defence.
11. Narrow Content and Psychological Explanation.
12. Externalism and the Two-Component Picture.
Part II: The Pragmatics of Direct Reference.
II.1 Methodological Preliminaries.
13. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.
14. Primary Pragmatic Processes.
II.2 Referential/Attributive.
15. The Referential Use of Definite Descriptions.
16. The Descriptive Use of Indexicals.
II.3 Belief Reports.
17. Belief Reports and Conversational Implicatures.
18. Belief Reports and the Semantics of That-Clauses.
19. Comparison with Other Accounts.
20. How Ambiguous are Belief Sentences?.
Bibliography.
Index.