Action: An Analysis of the Concept
Published on 31. July 1972
Book
Paperback/Softback
104 pages
978-90-247-1304-2 (ISBN)
Description
During the past decade, there has been considerable interest among philosophers in providing a philosophically satisfactory and helpful ana lysis of a particular type of human behavior called action. As I see it, this interest is a renewal of the efforts of Aristotle, in Ethica Nicomachea, to provide an analysis of voluntary action. Because of this, and because Aristotle's distinctions regarding voluntriety are fundamentally correct, what follows is in some ways a discussion in praise of Aristotle. But I have also argued for an analysis of action which will go some way toward withstanding criticism which can be brought against Aristotle's work as well as criticism which can be brought against the more con temporary efforts of others in the same subject. In Chapter Two, I argue for four conditions which are, when met, jointly necessary and sufficient for a particular item of human behavior on a particular occasion to qualify as a human action. The analysis does not allow us to determine that a particular kind of behavior, such as killing, is always an action.
More details
Edition
Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1972
Language
English
Place of publication
Dordrecht
Netherlands
Publishing group
Springer
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Research
Illustrations
104 p.
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 7 mm
Weight
178 gr
ISBN-13
978-90-247-1304-2 (9789024713042)
DOI
10.1007/978-94-010-2807-3
Schweitzer Classification
Content
I. Introduction.- II. Action.- 1. Doing and Acting.- 2. Bodily Movements and Actions.- 3. "Acts of Will" and Actions.- 4. Mere Doings and Candidates for Action.- 5. Sufferings.- 6. Responsibility as a Necessary Condition for Action.- 7. Bound Actions, Unbound Actions, and Responsibility.- 8. Four Necessary Conditions for Bound Action.- III. Choosing, Deciding, and Doing.- 9. "Choose" and "Decide".- 10. Choosing and Deciding.- 11. Choosing, Deciding, and Doing.- 12. Choosing, Deciding, and Taking.- 13. Choice, Decision, and Deliberation.- IV. Acting, Doing, and Responsibility.- 14. "Perfectly Ordinary Actions" and Ascriptivism.- 15. Doing Something and Being Responsible for Doing It.- 16. Responsibility, What We Do, and the Upshots of What We Do.- 17. Responsibility, Censure, and Punishment.- 18. Action as a Defeasible Concept.- 19. Q3 and Q4.- 20. Voluntary and Involuntary Behavior: A Preliminary.- V. On Describing Actions.- 21. Action: A Review.- 22. Descriptions of Actions.- 23. One Action: One Description.- 24. A Parallel with Epistemology: Doings and Things.- VI. Voluntary and Intentional Behavior.- 25. Aristotle on Voluntary Behavior.- 26. The Legal Concept of Voluntary Behavior.- 27. Austin and The Model Penal Code: Summation and Discussion.- 28. Voluntary and Involuntary Behavior: An Alternative to Aristotle.- 29. Intentional Behavior.- Bibliography of Works Cited.- Index of Authors Cited.