Limiting Leviathan
Published on 24. March 1999
Book
Hardback
288 pages
978-1-84064-024-3 (ISBN)
Description
The enormous growth of the state occurring over much of this century has led the authors of this book to re-examine the proper relationship between the American people and their government. The authors first analyse the case for limiting governmental power and discuss which limits are appropriate, including tax and regulatory limits and electoral, congressional term and constitutional limits. They also examine possible auxiliary sources of state limitation, such as technological and economic limitations, informal order and lessons to be learned from local government. In sum, this book provides a seminal analysis of the necessity of limiting state power in order to preserve human rights.
Limiting Leviathan will be a valuable reference point for scholars of public choice and government institutions.
Limiting Leviathan will be a valuable reference point for scholars of public choice and government institutions.
Reviews / Votes
'The book is an excellent introduction to the various tools and reasons for limiting government. . . . this book is first-rate. The summaries and overviews are unusually well done, and the book would work well as a reader or a second text in a variety of courses. It is intended as an introduction and overview, and it succeeds admirably.' -- Michael C. Munger, The Independent Review 'Limiting Leviathan may be the best early guide to the major political challenge of the 21st century.' -- William A. Niskanen, Cato Institute, USMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cheltenham
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
ISBN-13
978-1-84064-024-3 (9781840640243)
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Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Edited by Donald P. Racheter, Executive Director, Public Interest Institute and Richard E. Wagner, Emeritus Professor of Economics, George Mason University, US
Content
Contents: Preface 1. Faustian Bargains and Constitutional Governance Part I: Why Should Government be Limited? 2. The Purpose and Limits of Government 3. Constitutionally-Limited Government versus Popular Democracy 4. Government: An Expensive Provider Part II: Which Limits on Government are Appropriate? 5. Constitutional Limits Versus Statutory Rules 6. Constitutional Spending Limitations and the Optimal Size of Government 7. Tax Limits 8. Regulatory Limits 9. The Case for Congressional Term Limits is the Same as the Case for Pollution Control 10. Electoral Limits Part III: Are Auxiliary Precautions Needed? 11. Federalist Theory and Polycentricity: Learning from Local Governments 12. Searching for Order: The Costly Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems 13. Technological and Economic Limitations on Governments Index