Reason and Explanation
A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism
Published on 13. August 2014
Book
Hardback
X, 195 pages
978-1-137-01225-8 (ISBN)
Description
In this new explanationist account of epistemic justification, Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. There are no purely autonomous reasons. Rather reasons occur only within an explanatory coherent set of beliefs.
Reviews / Votes
"In this interesting book, Ted Poston delivers an original and powerful defence of explanatory coherentism about justification. . an inspiring monograph that actually advances research in this field Scholars and postgraduates interested in the recent debate on coherentism about epistemic justification should definitely read this book." (Luca Moretti, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 67 (266), January, 2017)
More details
Series
Edition
2014 edition
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Unsewn / adhesive bound
Paper over boards
Illustrations
X, 195 p.
Dimensions
Height: 218 mm
Width: 145 mm
Thickness: 20 mm
Weight
386 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-137-01225-8 (9781137012258)
DOI
10.1057/9781137012265
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
08/2014
1st Edition
Palgrave Macmillan
€53.49
Available for download
Book
01/2014
Palgrave Macmillan
€53.49
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Ted Poston is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Alabama, USA. His primary areas of research are epistemology and philosophy of science. He has written many articles in journals such as
American Philosophical Quarterly, Dialectica, Episteme, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, Res Philosophica,
and
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
.
Content
Series Editors' Preface Preface 1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Conservatism 3. Reasons without First Philosophy 4. Explanation and Justification 5. BonJour and the Myth of the Given 6. Is Foundational a Priori Justification Indispensable? 7. Bayesian Explanationism Index