Reference, Truth and Reality
Essays on the Philosophy of Language
1st Edition
Published on 2. August 2016
Book
Hardback
358 pages
978-1-138-69181-0 (ISBN)
Description
The papers in this collection discuss the central questions about the connections between language, reality and human understanding. The complex relations between accounts of meaning and facts about ordinary speakers' understanding of their language are examined so as to illuminate the philosophical character of the connections between language and reality. The collection as a whole is a thematically unified treatment of some of the most central questions within contemporary philosophy of language.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 24 mm
Weight
705 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-138-69181-0 (9781138691810)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
07/2018
1st Edition
Routledge
€67.03
Shipment within 10-20 days
E-Book
08/2016
Routledge
€52.49
Available for download
E-Book
08/2016
1st Edition
Routledge
€52.49
Available for download
Person
Mark Platts
Content
1. Introduction Mark Platts 2. Truth and Use Colin McGinn 3. Causal Modalities and Realism Christopher Peacocke 4. Moral Reality and the End of Desire Mark Platts 5. Tarski's Theory of Truth Hartry Field 6. Physicalism and Prmitive Denotation: Field on Tarski John McDowell 8. On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name John McDowell 9. Truth and Singular Terms Tyler Burge 10. Truth-Theory for Indexical Languages Barry Taylor 11. Operators, Predicates and Truth-Theory Colin McGinn 12. Quotation and Saying That John McDowell 13. What Metaphors Mean Donald Davidson 14. Pronouns, Quantifiers and Relative Clauses (1) Gareth Evans 15. 'Most' and 'All': Some Comments on a Familiar Programme, and on the Logical Form of Quantified Sentences David Wiggins