Convention Constitutionalism

The European Court of Human Rights has been criticized for unduly interfering in democratic decision processes. Some argue that the unelected Strasbourg activists in robes should not interfere with democratic policy decisions that were made nationally. This inaugural lecture analyses this practice of rights-based judicial review by the Strasbourg Court. The first part presents a general legal-philosophical background. It explains that republicans, who emphasize the importance of the democratic way of self-governance, are in favour of weak forms of judicial review. Liberals, who prioritise the constitutionally protected fundamental rights, are in favour of strong judicial review. The second part employs this conceptual toolbox to describe and analyse judicial review as exercised by the Strasbourg Court since its inception in 1959. Should we understand it as strong, weak, or as something in between? I conclude that it is best understood as a weakened form of strong judicial review. The third part provides a normative discussion of the Strasbourg Court in the context of the emerging European constitutional landscape. It starts from the observation that the European Convention on Human Rights is first and foremost a collaboration of Party States that pursue congruent constitutional-democratic projects. This third part investigates the role of judicial review by the European Court in the ongoing dialogue with Party States in cementing a convention constitutionalism through the further strengthening of a European consensus on the content and impact of Convention rights.