Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources

Editor's Introduction.- Editor's Introduction.- 1: International Dimensions.- 1 International Environmental Agreements as Games.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Reaching agreement.- 2.1. Identical countries.- 2.2. Cost differences.- 2.3. Benefit differences.- 2.4. Choice of a benchmark.- 2.5. Summary.- 3. Sustaining agreement.- References.- Comments by Henk Folmer.- 2 Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. A static game.- 3. A dynamic game.- 4. The open loop equilibrium without taxes.- 5. The Markov perfect equilibrium without taxes.- 6. Other subgame perfect equilibria.- 7. Pigouvian taxes.- 8. Non-commitment and taxation.- References.- Comments by Otto Keck.- 3 Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation.- 1. Critical loads.- 2. Naive interpretations.- 3. Stock of pollutants - the case of one country.- 4. Stock of pollutants - several countries and the open loop equilibrium.- 5. Closed loop or feed back equilibria.- References.- Comments by Henry Tulkens.- 4 Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Analytical framework.- 3. Asymmetric players and endogenous strategic timing.- 4. N players and strategic team formation.- 5. Conclusion.- References.- Comments by Detlev Homann.- 5 The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The model.- 3. Single stage Cournot model.- 4. Two stage Stackelberg model.- 5. Two stage Cournot model.- 6. Conclusions.- References.- Comments by Marji Lines.- 6 Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints.- 1: The CO2 Problem in Basic Models of Optimal Use of Fossil Fuels.- 2. Background problem on climatic change and global environmental constraints.- 3. Economic studies on the CO2 problem.- 4. Preliminary definitions and the general model.- 5. A simplified model.- 5.1. Necessary conditions.- 5.2. Sufficient conditions.- 5.3. Definition and optimality of equilibrium.- 5.4. Illustration by a phase plane diagram.- 6. A discrete type impact of CO2 emissions.- 7. Further specification of the model.- 8. Discussion.- 2: Technical Change, International Co-operation, and Structural Uncertainty.- 10. A taxonomy of technical change.- 11. Neutral technical change in a general model.- 12. International co-operation.- 13. Structural uncertainty.- 13.1. Modelling uncertainty about critical CO2 levels as uncertainty about a critical, limited natural resource.- 13.2. Treating structural uncertainty.- 13.3. Numerical calculations.- 14. Conclusions and perspectives.- Appendix A: Existence and Uniqueness of the Optimal Solution.- Appendix B: Existence and Stability of Equilibrium.- References.- Comments by Oskar Von Dem Hagen.- Comments by Cees Withagen.- 2: Monitoring and Enforcement.- 7 Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Differences among monitoring and enforcement problems and systems.- 3. Key dimensions of monitoring and enforcement systems.- 3.1. Probability of monitoring.- 3.2. Surprise.- 3.3. Definition of a violation.- 3.4. Penalties and other responses to violations.- 4. Some evidence on European & U.S. choices in monitoring & enforcement.- 5. A glimpse of the future? Recommendations from the U.K. (The "Kinnersley Report").- 6. Concluding comments.- References.- Comments by Heinz Welsch.- 8 The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality - An Application of Principal Agent Theory.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The basic model structure of a modified LEN-model.- 3. The basic model with a beta-distribution of water quality depending on abatement intensity.- 4. Possible extensions.- References.- Comments by Günther knieps.- 9 Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method.- 1. Monitoring point sources of pollution.- 2. Decision theoretical formulation of the problem.- 3. Comparison of the solutions of the simple' simultaneous' and 'leadership' games.- 4. The general inspector leadership game and the Neyman -Pearson lemma.- 5. Application.- 6. Concluding remarks.- References.- Comments by Till Requate.- 10 Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality - A Signaling Game Approach -.- 1. Introduction.- 1: Equilibrium Scenarios with Pooling and Signaling Behavior.- 2. The game model.- 3. A gallery of equilibrium scenarios.- 3.1. Pooled shirking and illegal waste disposal: 'polluter's paradise scenario'.- 3.2. Exploratory accidents and illegal waste disposal due to unqualified control: 'signaling scenarios'.- 3.3. Absence of illegal pollution due to efficient control: 'controller's paradise scenario'.- 3.4. Intermediate illegal pollution: 'constrained polluter's paradise scenario'.- 3.5. Equilibrium scenarios and the multiplicity of equilibria.- 2: Perfect Equilibria and (Unique) Solutions via Equilibrium Selection.- 4. Uniformly perfect pure strategy equilibria.- 5. Comparison of signaling and pooling equilibria.- 5.1. Cell and truncation consistency.- 5.2. Payoff dominance.- 5.3. Risk dominance.- 5.4. Solutions in the range (4.14).- 5.5. The solution in the range (4.15).- 5.6. Discussion of the solution.- 6. Conclusions.- References.- Comments by Aart de Zeeuw.