
Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance
The Case for Common Law
Edward Elgar Publishing
Published on 28. December 2009
Book
Paperback/Softback
192 pages
978-1-84980-027-3 (ISBN)
Description
Capitalism has outperformed all other systems and maintained a positive growth rate since it began. Svetozar Pejovich makes the case within this book that a major reason for the success of capitalism lies in the efficiency-friendly incentives of its basic institutions, which continuously adjust the rules of the game to the requirements of economic progress. The analysis throughout is consistent and is supported by evidence. Key components of the proposed theory are the rule of law, the market for institutions, the interaction thesis, the carriers of change, and the process of changing formal and informal institutions.This book will be of great interest to academics and students of law and economics, new institutional economics, comparative systems and public choice throughout the world and especially in East Asia and South America where institutional issues are being debated.
Reviews / Votes
'Almost everyone will gain something of value from reading this book. For those who work in the new institutional economics, Pejovich provides a thoughtful treatment of how common-law and civil-law systems affect personal freedoms and rule of law. The book's larger market, however, will comprise educated lay readers, who will gain a deeper appreciation of the foundations of capitalism in the developed world and of the dynamics of interrelated institutional and economic change.' -- Lee J. Alston, The Independent Review '. . . a well written, easily read book which casts light on many aspects of law and on questions which are or should be debated in our law schools. . . well laid out and presented. . . Its subject matter makes it essential reading for all those studying comparative law and of course law and economics and even for those studying legislation. It would be more than useful for those engaged in property law, the law of contract and administrative and public law. In other words it would be useful and challenging reading for just about all law teachers and students as well as practitioners who wish to think about the basics of what they are doing. Its easy combination of history, comparative technique, legal fundamentals and economics with no maths would even make it an excellent reader for LAWS 101.' -- Bernard Robertson, New Zealand Law Journal 'Professor Pejovich has written an impressive lot on comparative economic systems, institutions, policies and broader social aspects of economic development. . . His long work in the field quite predictably made him able to present his views and findings in an ever clearer, more orderly and more profoundly argued way. . . This is one of the rare books in which the author is well aware of what he is talking about and makes sure that the same goes for his readers.' -- Ljubomir Madzar 'Professor Pejovich has ranged expertly across such seemingly disparate areas as legal systems, culture, economics and public choice theory to give us a thoroughly convincing roadmap for a nation's economic success. The rule of law, enforcement of private contracts, private property rights and an independent judiciary are the basic building blocks. But the common law system, as compared to the civil law system emanating from the European continent, also gets a lot of the credit. This is an erudite, yet happily readable work that takes a lot of the mystery out of differential economic performance among nations.' -- Henry G. Manne, George Mason University School of Law, USMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cheltenham
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
ISBN-13
978-1-84980-027-3 (9781849800273)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Svetozar Pejovich, Professor Emeritus, Texas A&M University, US, Honorary Doctorate, University of Belgrade, Serbia and Professor of Law and Economics, University of Donja Gorica, Montenegro; with contributions from Enrico Colombatto, Professor of Economics, School of Economics, University of Turin, Italy
Content
Contents:
Foreword by Leonard P. Liggio
Preface and Acknowledgments
PART I: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
1. The Game and the Rules of the Game
2. Transaction Costs
PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNITY INTO MODERN SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE RULE OF LAW AND CAPITALISM
3. From the Middle Ages to Capitalism
4. Capitalism and the Rule of Law
Appendix: Afraid to be Free: Dependency as Desideraturm
James M. Buchanan
5. The Law of Contract and the Judiciary
6. The Economic Functions of the Constitution
7. Private Property Rights
8. Capitalism, Economic Freedom and Performance
9. The Rule of Law and Capitalism: An Overview
PART III: TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
10. The Method of Analysis
11. The Interaction Thesis
12. The Carriers of Change: The Role of Entrepreneurs
13. Formal Institutions
14. Informal Institutions or Cultural Traditions: The Role of Pathfinders
15. Efficiency-Friendly Institutional Change within the Structure of Tradition
Index
Foreword by Leonard P. Liggio
Preface and Acknowledgments
PART I: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
1. The Game and the Rules of the Game
2. Transaction Costs
PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNITY INTO MODERN SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE RULE OF LAW AND CAPITALISM
3. From the Middle Ages to Capitalism
4. Capitalism and the Rule of Law
Appendix: Afraid to be Free: Dependency as Desideraturm
James M. Buchanan
5. The Law of Contract and the Judiciary
6. The Economic Functions of the Constitution
7. Private Property Rights
8. Capitalism, Economic Freedom and Performance
9. The Rule of Law and Capitalism: An Overview
PART III: TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
10. The Method of Analysis
11. The Interaction Thesis
12. The Carriers of Change: The Role of Entrepreneurs
13. Formal Institutions
14. Informal Institutions or Cultural Traditions: The Role of Pathfinders
15. Efficiency-Friendly Institutional Change within the Structure of Tradition
Index