Insurance and Risk Management
Published on 31. October 2008
Book
Hardback
1032 pages
978-1-84720-333-5 (ISBN)
Description
There is a broad range of literature on the economics of insurance and risk management. This timely publication contains recent theoretical contributions to the economics of insurance and presents empirical tests and applications of the theory to many different insurance markets. It also offers important insights into the factors influencing corporate risk management decisions, and the theoretical underpinnings for why corporations with well-diversified shareholders would reduce risk. This two-volume set will be an essential resource to everyone with an interest in these important subjects.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cheltenham
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 244 mm
Width: 169 mm
ISBN-13
978-1-84720-333-5 (9781847203335)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Edited by Gregory R. Niehaus, Professor of Finance and Insurance and Associate Dean for Research and Academics, Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, US
Content
Contents:
Volume I: Economics of Insurance Markets
Acknowledgements
Introduction Gregory R. Niehaus
PART I RISK POOLING, INSURER CAPITAL AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
1. John M. Marshall (1974), 'Insurance Theory: Reserves versus Mutuality'
2. George Zanjani (2002), 'Pricing and Capital Allocation in Catastrophe Insurance'
3. Lawrence A. Berger, J. David Cummins and Sharon Tennyson (1992), 'Reinsurance and the Liability Insurance Crisis'
4. David Mayers and Clifford Smith (1988), 'Ownership Structure Across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance'
5. Bruce D. Smith and Michael Stutzer (1995), 'A Theory of Mutual Formation and Moral Hazard with Evidence from the History of the Insurance Industry'
PART II ADVERSE SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
6. Alma Cohen (2005), 'Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market'
7. John Cawley and Tomas Philipson (1999), 'An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance'
8. Georges Dionne and Neil A. Doherty (1994), 'Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets'
9. Keith J. Crocker and Arthur Snow (1986), 'The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry'
10. Eric W. Bond and Keith J. Crocker (1991), 'Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information'
11. Michael Hoy and Michael Ruse (2005), 'Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets'
PART III PRICING AND UNDERWRITING CYCLES
12. Ralph A. Winter (1994), 'The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets'
13. J. David Cummins and Patricia Danzon (1997), 'Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets'
14. Scott E. Harrington and Patricia M. Danzon (1994), 'Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets'
PART IV MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
15. Scott E. Harrington and Greg Niehaus (1998), 'Race, Redlining, and Automobile Insurance Prices'
16. J. David Cummins, Richard D. Phillips and Mary A. Weiss (2001), 'The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance'
17. Anthony J. Barkume and John W. Ruser (2001), 'Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance Pricing: The Case of Workers' Compensation'
18. John H. Cochrane (1995), 'Time-Consistent Health Insurance'
Name Index
Volume II: Corporate Risk Management
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I THEORY ON WHY AND HOW FIRMS MANAGE RISK
1. David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1982), 'On the Corporate Demand for Insurance'
2. Clifford W. Smith and Rene M. Stulz (1985), 'The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies'
3. Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein (1993), 'Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies'
4. Peter M. DeMarzo and Darrell Duffie (1995), 'Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting'
5. Gregory W. Brown and Klaus Bjerre Toft (2002), 'How Firms Should Hedge'
6. Frank Fehle and Sergey Tsyplakov (2005), 'Dynamic Risk Management: Theory and Evidence'
PART II EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON WHY AND HOW FIRMS MANAGE RISK
7. David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1990), 'On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market'
8. Christopher Geczy, Bernadette A. Minton and Catherine Schrand (1997), 'Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives'
9. Michael Faulkender (2005), 'Hedging or Market Timing? Selecting the Interest Rate Exposure of Corporate Debt'
10. John R. Graham and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1999), 'Tax Incentives to Hedge'
11. George Allayannis and James P. Weston (2001), 'The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value'
12. Peter Tufano (1996), 'Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry'
13. Yanbo Jin and Philippe Jorion (2006), 'Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers'
PART III MEASURING RISK AND ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
14. Kevin Dowd and David Blake (2006), 'After VaR: The Theory, Estimation, and Insurance Applications of Quantile-Based Risk Measures'
15. Joshua V. Rosenberg and Til Schuermann (2006), 'A General Approach to Integrated Risk Management with Skewed, Fat-tailed Risks'
16. Scott E. Harrington, Greg Niehaus and Kenneth J. Risko (2002), 'Enterprise Risk Management: The Case of United Grain Growers'
Name Index
Volume I: Economics of Insurance Markets
Acknowledgements
Introduction Gregory R. Niehaus
PART I RISK POOLING, INSURER CAPITAL AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
1. John M. Marshall (1974), 'Insurance Theory: Reserves versus Mutuality'
2. George Zanjani (2002), 'Pricing and Capital Allocation in Catastrophe Insurance'
3. Lawrence A. Berger, J. David Cummins and Sharon Tennyson (1992), 'Reinsurance and the Liability Insurance Crisis'
4. David Mayers and Clifford Smith (1988), 'Ownership Structure Across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance'
5. Bruce D. Smith and Michael Stutzer (1995), 'A Theory of Mutual Formation and Moral Hazard with Evidence from the History of the Insurance Industry'
PART II ADVERSE SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
6. Alma Cohen (2005), 'Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market'
7. John Cawley and Tomas Philipson (1999), 'An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance'
8. Georges Dionne and Neil A. Doherty (1994), 'Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets'
9. Keith J. Crocker and Arthur Snow (1986), 'The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry'
10. Eric W. Bond and Keith J. Crocker (1991), 'Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information'
11. Michael Hoy and Michael Ruse (2005), 'Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets'
PART III PRICING AND UNDERWRITING CYCLES
12. Ralph A. Winter (1994), 'The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets'
13. J. David Cummins and Patricia Danzon (1997), 'Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets'
14. Scott E. Harrington and Patricia M. Danzon (1994), 'Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets'
PART IV MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
15. Scott E. Harrington and Greg Niehaus (1998), 'Race, Redlining, and Automobile Insurance Prices'
16. J. David Cummins, Richard D. Phillips and Mary A. Weiss (2001), 'The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance'
17. Anthony J. Barkume and John W. Ruser (2001), 'Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance Pricing: The Case of Workers' Compensation'
18. John H. Cochrane (1995), 'Time-Consistent Health Insurance'
Name Index
Volume II: Corporate Risk Management
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I THEORY ON WHY AND HOW FIRMS MANAGE RISK
1. David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1982), 'On the Corporate Demand for Insurance'
2. Clifford W. Smith and Rene M. Stulz (1985), 'The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies'
3. Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein (1993), 'Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies'
4. Peter M. DeMarzo and Darrell Duffie (1995), 'Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting'
5. Gregory W. Brown and Klaus Bjerre Toft (2002), 'How Firms Should Hedge'
6. Frank Fehle and Sergey Tsyplakov (2005), 'Dynamic Risk Management: Theory and Evidence'
PART II EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON WHY AND HOW FIRMS MANAGE RISK
7. David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1990), 'On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market'
8. Christopher Geczy, Bernadette A. Minton and Catherine Schrand (1997), 'Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives'
9. Michael Faulkender (2005), 'Hedging or Market Timing? Selecting the Interest Rate Exposure of Corporate Debt'
10. John R. Graham and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1999), 'Tax Incentives to Hedge'
11. George Allayannis and James P. Weston (2001), 'The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value'
12. Peter Tufano (1996), 'Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry'
13. Yanbo Jin and Philippe Jorion (2006), 'Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers'
PART III MEASURING RISK AND ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
14. Kevin Dowd and David Blake (2006), 'After VaR: The Theory, Estimation, and Insurance Applications of Quantile-Based Risk Measures'
15. Joshua V. Rosenberg and Til Schuermann (2006), 'A General Approach to Integrated Risk Management with Skewed, Fat-tailed Risks'
16. Scott E. Harrington, Greg Niehaus and Kenneth J. Risko (2002), 'Enterprise Risk Management: The Case of United Grain Growers'
Name Index