
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
Springer (Publisher)
Published on 12. February 2009
Book
Hardback
XXII, 274 pages
978-1-84800-937-0 (ISBN)
Description
The project of writing this monograph was conceived in August 2006. It is a m- ter of delight and satisfaction that this monograph would be published during the centenary year (May 27, 2008 - May 26, 2009) of our dear alma mater, the Indian Institute of Science, which is truly a magni cent temple and an eternal source of inspiration, with a splendid ambiance for research. Studying the rational behavior of entities interacting with each other in or- nized or ad-hoc marketplaces has been the bread and butter of our research group here at the Electronic Commerce Laboratory,Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science. Speci cally, the application of game th- retic modeling and mechanism design principles to the area of network economics was an area of special interest to the authors. In fact, the dissertations of the s- ond, third, and fourth authors (Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam, and Hastagiri Prakash) were all in this area.
Dinesh Garg's Doctoral Thesis, which later won the Best Dissertation Award at the Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science for the academic year 2006-07, included an interesting chapter on applying the brilliant work of Roger Myerson (Nobel laureate in E- nomic Sciences in 2007) to the topical problem of sponsored search auctions on the web. Ramasuri's Master's work applied mechanism design to develop robust broadcastprotocolsin wireless adhoc networkswhile Hastagiri's Master's work - veloped resource allocation mechanisms for computational grids.
Dinesh Garg's Doctoral Thesis, which later won the Best Dissertation Award at the Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science for the academic year 2006-07, included an interesting chapter on applying the brilliant work of Roger Myerson (Nobel laureate in E- nomic Sciences in 2007) to the topical problem of sponsored search auctions on the web. Ramasuri's Master's work applied mechanism design to develop robust broadcastprotocolsin wireless adhoc networkswhile Hastagiri's Master's work - veloped resource allocation mechanisms for computational grids.
Reviews / Votes
"The book consists of six chapters. . This is one of the first monographs that deals solely with algorithmic mechanism design. . it will be useful to researchers in computer science, operations research, e-commerce, and multiagent systems. The book is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course in computer science and operations research. . In any case, the book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers." (Haris Aziz, ACM Computing Reviews, April, 2009)
More details
Series
Edition
2009 ed.
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Research
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Illustrations
45 s/w Abbildungen
XXII, 274 p. 45 illus.
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 18 mm
Weight
594 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-84800-937-0 (9781848009370)
DOI
10.1007/978-1-84800-938-7
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Y. Narahari | Dinesh Garg | Ramasuri Narayanam
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
Book
10/2010
Springer
€128.39
Shipment within 15-20 days

Y. Narahari | Dinesh Garg | Ramasuri Narayanam
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
E-Book
04/2009
1st Edition
Springer
€117.69
Available for download
Content
From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics.- Foundations of Mechanisms Design.- Strategic Form Games.- Dominant Strategy Equilibria.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- Bayesian Games.- Social Choice Functions.- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem.- Properties of Social Choice Functions.- Bayesian Implementation.- Revenue Equivalence Theorem.- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions.- Internet Advertising.- Sponsored Search Auction.- Individual Rationality.- Computational Complexity.- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing.- The G-DSIC Mechanism.- The G-BIC Mechanism.- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism.- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols.- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol.- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol.- Key Applications Areas.