Algorithmic Game Theory
First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Paderborn, Germany, April 30 - May 2, 2008, Proceedings
Published on 25. April 2008
Book
Paperback/Softback
XI, 363 pages
978-3-540-79308-3 (ISBN)
Description
ThisvolumecontainsthepaperspresentedattheFirstInternationalSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2008) held from April 30 to May 2 in Paderborn, Germany. The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from computer science, economics and mathematics to present and discuss original research at the intersection of algorithms and game theory. It is intended to cover all important areas of algorithmic game theory, such as: solution concepts in game theory; game classes (e. g. , bimatrix, potential, Bayesian); exact and appro- mate computation of equilibria; convergence and learning in games; complexity classesingametheory;algorithmicaspectsof?xed-pointtheorems;mechanisms, incentives and coalitions; cost-sharing algorithms and analysis; computational aspects of market equilibria; computational problems in economics, ?nance, - cision theory and pricing; auction algorithms and analysis; price of anarchy and its relatives; representations of games and their complexity; economic aspects of distributed computing and the Internet; network formation on the Internet; congestion, routing and network design games; game-theoretic approaches to networking problems; Byzantine game theory.
There were 60 submissions. Each submission was reviewed by three P- gramme Committee members. The committee decided to accept 28 papers. The programme also included three invited talks from outstanding researchers ChristosPapadimitriou,NobelMemorialPrizewinnerReinhardSeltenandPaul Spirakis. We would like to thank all the Programme Committee members and the external reviewers who assisted them in their work. The members of the Organizing Committee as well as the developer of the EasyChair conference system deserve our gratitude for their contributions throughout the preparations.
There were 60 submissions. Each submission was reviewed by three P- gramme Committee members. The committee decided to accept 28 papers. The programme also included three invited talks from outstanding researchers ChristosPapadimitriou,NobelMemorialPrizewinnerReinhardSeltenandPaul Spirakis. We would like to thank all the Programme Committee members and the external reviewers who assisted them in their work. The members of the Organizing Committee as well as the developer of the EasyChair conference system deserve our gratitude for their contributions throughout the preparations.
More details
Series
Edition
2008 ed.
Language
English
Place of publication
Berlin
Germany
Publishing group
Springer Berlin
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Professional/practitioner
Illustrations
XI, 363 p.
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 21 mm
Weight
581 gr
ISBN-13
978-3-540-79308-3 (9783540793083)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0
Schweitzer Classification
Content
Invited Talks.- The Search for Equilibrium Concepts.- Experimental Results on the Process of Goal Formation and Aspiration Adaptation.- Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games.- Session 1: Routing and Scheduling I.- The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routing.- Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy.- The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited.- Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games.- Session 2: Markets.- Bertrand Competition in Networks.- On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems.- Window-Games between TCP Flows.- Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Network.- Session 3: Routing and Scheduling II.- Atomic Congestion Games: Fast, Myopic and Concurrent.- Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks.- Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture.- Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria.- Session 4: Mechanism Design.- Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions.- A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling.- Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize.- Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Algebraic Communication Complexity.- Session 5: Potpourri of Games.- The Price of Anarchy of a Network Creation Game with Exponential Payoff.- A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games.- Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium.- The Local and Global Price of Anarchy of Graphical Games.- Session 6: Solution Concepts.- Approximate Nash Equilibria for Multi-player Games.- Subjective vs. Objective Reality - The Risk of Running Late.- On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria.- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy.- Session 7: Cost Sharing.- Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to SchedulingProblems.- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?.- Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies.- Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location.- Experimental Results on the Process of Goal Formation and Aspiration Adaptation.