Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation
Published on 16. March 2006
Book
Paperback/Softback
584 pages
978-0-19-926181-9 (ISBN)
Description
Nobel Prize-winning economist James Mirrlees is one of the world's leading figures in welfare, development, and public sector economics. This volume brings together for the first time twenty-three of his seminal papers on welfare economics, tax theory, public expenditure, contract theory, growth theory, and development economics.
Academic and professional economists, particularly those interested in welfare, development, and public sector economics, will find this collection invaluable.
Academic and professional economists, particularly those interested in welfare, development, and public sector economics, will find this collection invaluable.
Reviews / Votes
James Mirrlees' special gift is to bring new perspectives to the understanding of major economic issues, economic growth and the choice of taxes. The importance of asymmetric information in the optimality of taxes was one of his greatest contributions, the study of different aspects of the role of increasing returns in economic growth another. Drawing these contributions, scattered over many journals, into a single volume will remind of the power of Mirrlees's analysis and make reference that much easier. * Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobel Laureate and Professor Emeritus of Economics, Stanford University *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
Numerous tables and line drawings
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 31 mm
Weight
866 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-926181-9 (9780199261819)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
James Mirrlees
Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation
Book
03/2006
Oxford University Press
€232.80
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
James A. Mirrlees is Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Trinity College. He was previously Edgeworth Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford (1968-95). In 1996 he won the Nobel Prize for Economics for fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information. His research interests are optimal income taxation; policy implications of imperfect rationality; and principal/agent situations with multidimensional choice variables.
Content
PART I: WELFARE ECONOMICS ; PART II: TAX THEORY ; PART III: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ; PART IV: CONTRACT THEORY ; PART V: GROWTH THEORY ; PART VI: DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS